Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism

The philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

Sanjukta Gupta

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND VAIṢṆAVISM

In Indian philosophy and theology, the concept of Brahman postulated by Vedānta occupies an important position. Hindu religious sects accept the Vedāntic soteriology which believes that there is only one conscious reality, Brahman, from which the entire creation, both conscious and non-conscious, emanated.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who lived in sixteenth-century Bengal and wrote in Sanskrit, was the last great thinker in the Vedānta tradition. During his time, Hindu sectarians came to reject monistic Vedānta. Although a strict monist, Madhusūdana tried to forge a synthesis between his monistic philosophy and his theology of emotional love for God. This book expounds the main tenets of his extensive and difficult works and represents the only comprehensive study of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's thought.

Sanjukta Gupta taught at Visva Bharati University, Calcutta University and Jadavpur University in India, as well as Utrecht University in the Netherlands. At present she is a member of the Oriental Institute at the University of Oxford. She specialises in Indian philosophy with a focus on the system of Vedānta in Hindu theology, in particular Vaiṣṇavism and Tantra.

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PREFACE

This book is based on my 1958 PhD thesis written at Visva Bharati University and published in India in 1966. It addressed mainly Indian scholars of ancient Indian Darśana Śāstra (philosophy). For a long time I wanted to re-edit and update it. My great friend the late Mrs Coomee Strooker of Amsterdam started to read it through in order to correct my English, but unfortunately age prevented her from completing the task. That was decades ago. I just mention her to express my deep respect and love for her.

To my great surprise Rishi Shaunaka Dasa, Director of the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, one day offered to publish this work in his Series of Hindu Religious Studies. I am grateful for this generous offer. He also introduced me to the Centre's secretary, Ms Diane Rollinson, who in her amazing kindness typed up my thesis on the Centre's computer. But for her I would never have been able to reshape my old work on Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. I am also indebted to Dr Sarah Shaw for reading and correcting my thesis and Mr Tamal Matilal whose careful proofreading and many suggestions for improvement have been invaluable. I thank Professor Francis X. Clooney, S.J., the former chief editor of the Routledge Hindu Studies Series, for accepting my book for publication. I must also thank Professor Godavarisha Misra for his constant encouragement. Ms Dorothea Schaefter, Associate Editor at Routledge has also been most helpful.

Sanjukta Gupta

SERIES PREFACE

The Routledge Hindu Studies Series, published in collaboration with the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, intends primarily the publication of constructive Hindu theological, philosophical and ethical projects. The focus is on issues and concerns of relevance to readers interested in Hindu traditions in particular, yet also in the context of a wider range of related religious concerns that matter in today's world. The Series seeks to promote excellent scholarship and, in relation to it, an open and critical conversation among scholars and the wider audience of interested readers. Though contemporary in its purpose, the Series recognises the importance of retrieving the classic texts and ideas, beliefs and practices, of Hindu traditions, so that the great intellectuals of these traditions may as it were become active participants in the conversations of today. Deepak Sarma's *Epistemologies and the Limitations of Philosophical Inquiry*, John Taber's *A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumarila on Perception*, Jacqueline Hirst's *Samkara's Advaita Vedanta: A Way of Teaching*, and Kenneth Russell Valpey's *Attending Kṛṣṇa's Image: Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Mūrti-sevā as Devotional Truth* have been the distinguished first four volumes in the Series.

Sanjukta Gupta's *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* is now published as our fifth volume. It is an exhaustive study of the writings of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, a prominent sixteenth-century Hindu theologian and philosopher who delved deeply and expertly into both Advaita Vedānta and Bengali Vaiṣṇavism. The publication of this work in the Series reflects our recognition that this important figure has been inadequately studied and deserves more attention. Moreover, by studying him we also fill out our understanding of Advaita and dispel exaggerations regarding the relationships and differences between Advaita and Vaiṣṇavism.

Our decision to include *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism* in this Series is also in-keeping with our determination to make available to readers, when the opportunity arises, important works that have long been out of print. Originally Dr Gupta's 1958 dissertation (Visva Bharati University) and published in 1966 as *Studies in the Philosophy of Madhusūdana Saraswatī* (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar), *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism* is still our primary source for detailed and exhaustive information on a most important Hindu thinker. We are also happy

to note that Dr Gupta has revised and updated her work in order to make it more easily accessible to the contemporary reader.

Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism is thus a solid and rare resource for the history of Hindu theology. It is, we hope, a basis for additional constructive writing on Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who deserves still further study, and on Advaita Vedānta and Bengali Vaiṣṇavism as well. Accordingly, the book accomplishes very well goals that are central to a Hindu Studies Series focused on bringing the treasures of the Indian and Hindu traditions into the contemporary conversation of students of Hinduism, theologians and scholars of religion.

Francis X. Clooney, S.J.
Routledge Hindu Studies Series Editor 2002–2005
Parkman Professor of Divinity
Harvard University

1

INTRODUCTION

A sixteenth-century Bengali philosopher of Advaita-Vedānta and theologian of Kṛṣṇabhakti

According to the tradition Madhusūdana Sarasvatī of the sixteenth century CE rose to great eminence even during his own life time. Madhusūdana, a monk, was a follower of Śaṃkara's non-dualist school of Vedānta. He was an outstanding polemic writer and wrote many commentaries and independent treatises on non-dualist Vedānta philosophy. He was also a great theologian and composed an extended commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* and a commentary on the first verse of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* and a monograph on the bhakti theology, the *Bhakti Rasāyana*. He was a renowned philosopher who was proficient in all systems of traditional Indian philosophy. According to tradition he first studied the traditional and contemporary system of logic, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and developed a powerful polemical style popular amongst the philosophers of his time. He was a formidable writer on the Advaita-Vedānta dialectics. As a theologian of the Bhāgavata school of *bhakti* he stands unique even though he was close to the Vaiṣṇava theologians of the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism promulgated by the followers of Śrīkṛṣṇa Caitanya of Navadvīpa in Bengal. He seems to have continued the tradition of the bhakti theology of Śrīdhara and Bopadeva, (thirteenth century CE), two very important commentators on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (BP) who attempted to interpret the religious position of the BP in the light of monism. As the tradition would have it he was a great admirer of Caitanya but there is no mention of him in any of his works. Nor does he indicate any adherence to the special theology of the Caitanya-school. Nevertheless, as part of the intellectual milieu of his time, he must have known Caitanya's life and activities. Madhusūdana's description of a Vaiṣṇava devotee who has achieved a devotee's goal that is, the state of constant enjoyment of ecstatic devotion for Kṛṣṇa reminds one strongly of the traditional picture of Caitanya in constant ecstasy. I think it is Madhusūdana's intellectual loyalty to Śaṃkara's non-dualistic Vedānta that prompted him to develop his own type of Vaiṣṇava theology. Thus, though he stands alone in his interpretation of non-dualistic philosophy of *bhakti* based on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, he has forged a bridge between the Śaṃkara-school of philosophy and the Caitanya's school of

theology. I should like here to show the important position of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the historical development of metaphysical and religious ideas of his period.

The works of Madhusūdana reveal him to be a versatile genius, a faithful commentator, an independent writer on Śaṃkara's school of monism as well as an upholder of the concept of *bhakti*. Not only did he synthesise the different schools of the *Advaita-Vedānta*, but he also chalked out a new path of his own against the heaviest odds of two different streams of dualism – logicians on the one hand and the Madhva-Vaiṣṇavas on the other. His unique contribution to Indian philosophy is his attempt to visualise a union between absolute monism and devotionalism.

Madhusūdana occupies an important position amongst the Vaiṣṇavas of his time. Śrīdhara and Vopadeva, already introduced a new wave of Vaiṣṇavism based on the BP, which developed a bhakti mysticism based on the concept of Upaniṣadic unqualified, immutable, ineffable, Brahman adapted to a personal godhead, Nārayāṇa or indeed Kṛṣṇa. The importance of the first verse of BP to its monistic commentators is indeed great and Madhusūdana underscored it by himself commenting on that verse. But the Vaiṣṇava theology clashed against Śaṃkara's concept of māyā or avidyā which is just a positive category, yet is illusion. It is a category on its own, being neither existent nor, non-existent. It is beginningless but is finite. World is a creation of this illusion, *avidyā* and not of Brahman, the uniquely existent reality. Being a creation of *avidyā* (or māyā) the world of living and non-living beings is false.

Madhusūdana appeared at the height of the great controversy amongst the Indian philosophers over the question of the illusoriness of the empirical world. Philosophers of all other systems contested the notions of the illusoriness of the world and of *māyā/avidyā/ajñāna*, which is the source of this illusion. The philosophers like the ritualist Mīmāṃsakas and the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika realists, on the one hand, and the theologians of the various sects who believed in the reality of God's creation, on the other, all attacked Śaṃkara's theories based on illusion.

Maṇḍana Miśra, Śaṃkara's contemporary and a follower, refuted many of these attacks on the concepts of avidyā along with Sureśvara and other early non-dualists. The great Nyāya philosopher Udayana launched a severe attack on the concept of non-dualism. His famous work, the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, successfully established the reality of the creation and its material source. One aspect of the importance of Udayana is his great style of disputation based on logical argumentations. Śrī Harṣa (twelfth century CE) took up the challenge and using the same style of disputation attacked the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika realism in his work the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyam*. This started the period of Advaita-Vedānta dialectics.

One can follow the detailed study of this subject in my teacher Ashutosh Bhattacharya's work *the Post Śaṃkara Dialectics*. I shall just mention the names and works of those who followed Śrī Harṣa by writing treatises to continue the

disputations against the realists who are relevant to our author. Madhusūdana was very much influenced by Ānandabodha, the author of, amongst other works, the *Nyāya-makaranda*. By his time Gaṅgeśa's *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* started a new trend in the method of argumentation of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers. This new phase is called the *Navya-nyāya* (Neo-logic). By far the most important person for Madhusūdana was Citsukha who also attacked the *Navya-nyāya* philosophers on their own ground, namely logical argumentations.

The interesting point of Ānandabodha and Citsukha is their success in adopting the Neo-logicians' perfect technique of logical argumentation. This technique was based on finding fallacy in the opponent's arguments by means of the syllogistic method. In the arena of dialectics the Neo-logicians insisted on using the method of syllogism as the only correct way in a disputation. In case of concepts like Pure Brahman and *avidyā*, where the main source of experience is not direct cognition, one is forced to use the method of inference to prove the validity of an experience. Since the time of Gangeśa[1] all traditional philosophers have used this method profusely. In the area of soteriology, the disputants must use the inferential arguments because the spiritual and mystical experiences are extremely subjective. By the sixteenth century CE the Neo-logicians had fine-tuned the method to such a degree that no important philosopher could capture the attention of the discussants of any Indian Brahmanical tradition of metaphysics without excelling in it.

Madhusūdana rose to his eminent position because of his perfection in the Neo-logical style of disputation. He had to rise above the attacks coming from the Madhva school of Vaiṣṇavas. Especially, the attacks of the erudite scholar Vyāsatīrtha who was a past master in the style of Neo-logic, had to be answered. This led to Madhusūdana's writing the *Advaita-siddhi*.[2]

Even a casual glance at the *Advaita-siddhi* and *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa* reveals his complete mastery over the deft and subtle style of argumentation introduced by the Navya-nyāya school. Perhaps his extensive study of the Nyāya system persuaded him in later life to think independently without being biased by traditional beliefs. Thus, in the *Advaita-siddhi* and *Gūḍhartha-dīpikā*, he sometimes boldly differed from Śaṃkara,[3] and re-explained the *Brahma-sūtra*. Sometimes he even interprets the *Bhagavad-gītā* in a new light.[4] But this in no way means that Madhusūdana drifted from the mainstream thinking of the Advaita-Vedānta school. In his delineation of monism, he followed faithfully the views of Advaita as propounded by Maṇḍaṇa Miśra, Sureśvarācārya, (*Vārtika*) Prakāśātma Yati, (*Vivaraṇa*), Vācaspati Miśra, (*Bhāmatī*) Sarvajñātma Muni, (*Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka*) and so on. Madhusūdana's favourite authors in the Advaita-Vedānta system are Sureśvarācārya, Prakāśātma Yati and Sarvajñātma Muni. He often quotes from the *Vārtika* of Sureśvara, sometimes giving elaborate explanations of these quotes.[5] He even refers to the *Vārtika* as '*vārtikāmṛta*', that is, *Vārtika*, the nectar which shows his esteem for his work. The *Vivaraṇa* is also frequently cited by Madhusūdana, and he has borrowed several of its author's ideas namely the *bimba-pratibimba-vāda*, the view that *ajñāna* is one, and so on.[6]

Another of Madhusūdana's esteemed authors is Sarvajñātma Muni. He not only commented on Sarvajñātma's *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*, but also adopted many of the theories propounded by Sarvajñātma. For example, Madhusūdana explained the view that Brahman is both the locus (*āśraya*) and the object (*viṣaya*) of *avidyā* using a quotation from the *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka* of Sarvajñātma Muni namely, '*āśrayatva viīayatva bhāginī nirvibhāga-citireva kevalā*'.[7] Sarvajñātma in his turn followed this idea from Prakāśātma Yati's *Vivaraṇa*. Also, in his exposition on the construction of the *mahāvākyas* (great Vedic statements on Brahman), depicting the *akhaṇḍārtha* (just a single integral object), Madhusūdana follows the style of Sarvajñātma.[8] Even Madhusūdana's explanation of *eka-jīva-vāda* (the theory of a single individual self), is influenced by him. This is why Madhusūdana is said to have followed the *Vivaraṇa* school of Advaita-Vedānta rather than the *Bhāmatī* school introduced by Vācaspati Miśra. On the other hand, he also argued in favour of Vācaspati Miśra's ideas.[9]

It is difficult to portray a definite and reliable biography of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, because there are no convincing materials for drawing a systematic history of his life. The main source of information regarding this is the tradition and genealogy preserved in some old Bengali families, and one genealogy of a learned South Indian family provided by a family member in a Sanskrit poetical work.[10] Madhusūdana himself remains silent about his family or any description of his activities or residence. He merely states the names of his preceptors and only once in his *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa* does he mention an object that grows specifically in Varanasi.[11]

However, tradition states that Bengal is the native land of Madhusūdana. It is said that his birthplace is Koṭālipāḍā, in the Faridpur district, which now belongs to Bangladesh. His father's name was Purandarācārya.

On leaving Koṭālipāḍā, he first went to Navadvīpa to learn Nyāya (the Indian system of logic) and then moved to Varanasi. Most of his life was spent in that ancient and holy city and he wrote all his works there. Varanasi was also the most renowned place for ancient and traditional Hindu scholarship. The city also continued over the centuries to be a great centre for religious debate. His activities were not confined to scholastic studies. He had also, as the legends reported, done much to improve the helpless condition of the Hindu monks. According to this tradition, he visited Emperor Akbar's court through his friend, Todarmal's good offices, and was successful to get justice. Be that what it may, it is his scholastic achievement, which has brought him everlasting fame.[12]

The political situation in India at that time, especially in the Indo-Gangetic plain, was very favourable for scholastic activities. The Empire of Akbar was by then firmly established, bringing with it a period of civic peace and security. The economic condition was tolerably prosperous and there remained ample scope for the deep meditation needed for the production of such a great philosophical work as the *Advaita-siddhi*. A new vigour was evident in almost every aspect of literature, poetry, logic, Advaita-Vedānta and devotionalism. It was in this favourable

climate that India gave birth to her great son, Madhusūdana, one of the last great philosophers of the ancient schools of Indian philosophy.

Tentative biography: date and works

Even though scholars have focused their attention on the date of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, it still remains an open question. The main reason for this uncertainty lies in the fact that none of his books bears any positive evidence which can help us to arrive at a definite conclusion. Rajendra Ghose, in his elaborate preface to *Advaita-siddhi*,[13] has fixed the date of Madhusūdana's birth between AD 1525 and 1530. Though he sometimes mixes up historical evidence and legend, he still supplies us with much reliable material in support. Mm. Gopi Nath Kaviraj has also discussed the question,[14] and his conclusion, that Madhusūdana lived in the sixteenth century, is in substantial agreement with Sri Ghose and Pt. Rāmājñā Śarmā Pāṇḍeya.[15] Sri P.C. Divanji also dealt with the subject very elaborately in his introduction to *Siddhānta-bindu*.[16] In that article, he mentioned and criticised the views of other scholars, thereby furnishing us with a chronological survey of the attempts made to determine when Madhusūdana lived. According to him, too, that was in sixteenth century. So all these scholars are unanimous on that point.

Mm. Gopinath Kaviraj[17] has stated that there is a manuscript of Madhusūdana's *Siddhānta-bindu* transcribed in Śaka 1539 (*Navāgnivānendumite śakābde*) or AD 1617, which means that it was actually written before that and places his birth still earlier. Further evidence is furnished by the date of Viśvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana who wrote *Bheda-siddhi* as a challenge to *Advaita-siddhi*. In his *Goutama-sūtra-vṛtti* Viśvanātha himself states his age as *Śaka* 1556, that is AD 1634.[18] Decidedly, Madhusūdana precedes this date. There was a disciple of Madhusūdana, called Śeṣagovinda, the son of Śeṣapaṇḍit. Śeṣapaṇḍit may in turn be identified with Kṛṣṇa Paṇḍit,[19] who is the preceptor of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. So we can suggest the lower limit of Madhusūdana's date.

Now we should direct our attention to the other limit of it. It is accepted that *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa* was a protest against Śaṃkara Miśra's *Bheda-ratna*. Mm. Gopinath Kaviraj,[20] on the basis of a Ms (in full) of *Bheda-ratna* transcribed in AD 1462, locates Śaṃkara Miśra in the fifteenth century. Madhusūdana must have flourished later than that time. He also quoted from *Pañcadaśī* of Mādhavācārya,[21] and from the commentary of Sāyanācārya on the Vedas.[22] These two authors flourished in the fourteenth century. Varanasi, the accepted place of activity for Madhusūdana, is far removed from Vijay Nagar, the native place of Mādhavācārya and Sāyanācārya, whom Madhusūdana quotes as authorities. It is plausible to think that the fame of these two great scholars may have taken a long time to reach Varanasi. Hence one should have a convenient gap between the dates of Mādhava and Sāyana and that of Madhusūdana. Therefore, the fifteenth century may in all probability be the upper limit of Madhusūdana's date.

Professor Dinesh Bhattacharya[23] has pointed out that there is a list of learned men of Akbar's time in Abul Fazl's *Ain-I-Akbari* (Ain. 30-book II). They are divided into several groups according to the different fields in which they show their competence. Among these, the first group, described by Abul Fazl, consists of the names of philosophers and ascetics. This list contains nine Hindu names, the first of which is Madhu Sarsati. Prof. Bhattacharya[24] shows that the name as spelt in the original Persian text is clearly Mādhava Sarasvatī. The name following immediately is Madhusūdana. Prof. Bhattacharya[25] observes that this name indicates none other than the famous scholar, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī of Varanasi. The other relevant names found in that group are Nārāyaṇāśrama, Rāmatīrtha, Nṛsiṃhāśrama and Kṛṣṇa Paṇḍit. All of them flourished in the sixteenth century.[26] The joint occurrence of the names of Mādhava and Madhusūdana can also be counted as evidence that the Madhusūdana referred to here is indeed the famous Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the disciple of Mādhava Sarasvatī. Abul Fazl wrote *Ain-I-Akbari* in AD 1597. Prof. Bhattacharya notes[27] that most of the Mohammedan names of scholars listed in the book lived early in the reign of Akbar. So it can be conjectured that by the time of *Ain-I-Akbari*, Madhusūdana too, was an elderly scholar. From this evidence, one may arrive at the conclusion that Madhusūdana was alive at least in the middle of the sixteenth century.

At the beginning of his *Advaita-siddhi*, Madhusūdana mentions Mādhava (Śri-Rāma Viśveśvara-Mādhavānām) as his preceptor and Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, in his commentary on the *AdS*, introduces Mādhava as Madhusūdana's *Vidyā-guru* (teacher of the śāstra). Rāmājñā Pāṇḍeya refers to an article by Haraprasad Sastri, published in the *Indian Antiquary*,[28] where there is a statement that a son called Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa was born to one Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa of Deccan, while he was going to Dvaraka in the year 1453 Śaka or AD 1514. This Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa had a disciple named Mādhava Sarasvatī, a resident of Varanasi. Many years after the time of his journey to Dvaraka, Rāmeśvara went to Varanasi and presumably became Mādhava's teacher.[29] One may therefore, conclude that Mādhava flourished in the middle of the sixteenth century. It is probable that he was identical with the preceptor of Madhusūdana, whose 'grand-teacher' (*paramaguru*) also bore the name of Rāma.

While delineating the doctrine of *Eka-jīva-vāda*,[30] Madhusūdana mentions two views. One of these corresponds to the *Eka-jīva-vāda* of Prakāśānanda Sarasvatī, who lived in the fifteenth century.[31] It may be said that Madhusūdana was aware of Prakāśānanda's view and that is why, while delineating his own view of *Eka-jīva-vāda*,[32] he mentioned the view of Prakāśānanda as well.

Again, Madhusūdana's theory of *bhakti*[33] seems to be very close to the theology of the early teachers of the Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism. This also indicates that they must have been roughly contemporary. Rūpa Gosvāmī's date is 1554–5 and that of Jīva Gosvāmī is 1578–9.[34] Though Madhusūdana's theory of *bhakti* resembles that of the Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism in many respects, Madhusūdana's treatment of *bhakti* is quite different from that of the Bengal school, since he places more emphasis on his non-dualist epistemological and metaphysical

aspects.[35] One may, therefore, say that Rūpa Gosvāmī and Madhusūdana are almost contemporaries, and hence there was no chance for either one of them to be influenced by the other. That is why, in spite of their apparent resemblance, Madhusūdana's theory sometimes, in various outstanding points, differs fundamentally from that of the Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism, as found in the writings of Rūpa or Jīva Gosvāmī.[36]

A tradition current among the Indian orthodox scholars holds that Madhusūdana in his old age visited Gadādhara, the great sixteenth to seventeenth Century CE logician of Navadvīpa.[37] Again, there is a tradition that Madhusūdana was a friend of the poet Tulsidāsa and wrote a verse in appreciation of Tulsidāsa's poetic abilities. The date of Tulsidāsa's death is AD 1623 and that of his composition, *Rāma-carita-mānasa*, AD 1574.[38] Moreover, there is another tradition that Madhusūdana visited the court of Emperor Akbar and was a friend of King Todarmal.[39] These also confirm the view that Madhusūdana flourished in the sixteenth century.

In the *Catalogus Catalogorum,*[40] Mr Aufrecht has listed as many as twenty-two books under the name of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. These are: *Advaita-brahma (?) siddhi,*[41] *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa, Ātmabodha-ṭika, Ānanda-mandākinī, Ṛgveda-jaṭādyāṣṭa-Vikṛti-vivaraṇa, Kṛṣṇa-kutuhala-nāṭaka, Prasthāna-bheda, Bhaktisāmānya-nirūpaṇa, Bhagavadgītā-gūḍhārtha-dīpikā, Bhagavadbhakti-rasāyana, Bhāgavata-purāṇa-prathamaśloka-vyākhyā, Mahimṇaḥ-stotra-ṭikā, Rājñāmpratibodha, Vedastuti-ṭikā, Vedānta-kalpa-latikā, Śāṇḍilya-sūtra-ṭīkā, Śāstra-siddhānta-leṣa-ṭīkā, Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka-sāra-saṃgraha, Sarvavidyā-siddhānta-varṇana, (?), Siddhānta-tattva-bindu, Harilīlā-vyākhyā and Bhāgavata-purāṇādyaślokatraya-vyākhyā*.

It is difficult to ascribe to Madhusūdana the authorship of all the above-mentioned books, although some of them possess internal evidence that suggest that they came out of a single pen. Realising this difficulty, Swami Prajnananda[42] mentions the names of only those works whose authorship can definitely be ascribed to Madhusūdana.

The *Advaita-siddhi* is the most outstanding work of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. It has made the name of Madhusūdana immortal and has given him his revered position among the highest teachers of the Śaṃkara School of Vedānta. From this book we can gather copious particulars regarding Madhusūdana: for example, that he was a member of the *sannyasin* order,[43] and that his preceptors were Rāma, Viśveśvara Sarasvatī and Mādhava.[44] Madhusūdana is traditionally referred to as the author of the *Advaita-siddhi*. Therefore it is sensible to take this book as the starting point. Besides the *Advaita-siddhi*, the following books came from the same hand: (1) *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā*, (2) *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa*, (3) *Siddhānta-bindu*, (4) *Saṃkṣepa-śārītaka-sāra-saṃgraha*, (5) *Gūḍhārtha-dīpikā*, (6) *Bhakti-rasāyana*, (7) *Bhāgavata-purāṇa-prathama-śloka-vyākhyā* and (8) *Mahimaḥ-stotra-ṭīkā*.

In the *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā*,[45] the author mentions the name of Viśveśvara in the introductory lines. This is the name of Madhusūdana's preceptor. Then again

the author of the *Advaita-siddhi*[46] mentions the name of *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā* and states distinctly that as he had elaborately expatiated upon some topics therein, he need not discuss them here any further. Moreover, the colophon of the *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā* runs thus:[47] 'Here ends the *stavaka* ... composed by *Śrīmatparamahaṃsa-parivrājakācārya* Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.' This almost exactly corresponds with the colophon of the first chapter of the *Advaita-siddhi*. Hence it is clear that both the works are by the same author.

The *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa* is a dialectical work against the empiricist and dualist school of the Nyāya philosophy. Its authorship can also be safely ascribed to Madhusūdana, because the author of this book frequently refers to the *Advaita-siddhi* as his own work.[48] Reference to the *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā*[49] as another work by the same author is also found here. Thus, undoubtedly this is also a work of the author of the *Advaita-siddhi*.

The *Siddhānta-bindu* is a commentary on Śaṃkara's *Daśaślokī*. At the beginning of the treatise, the author pays tribute to Viśveśvara, whom his commentator Puruṣottama[50] – reputed to be Madhusūdana's direct disciple – describes as the preceptor of the author. The colophon[51] of this book resembles almost exactly that of the *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa*,[52] and in the *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā*,[53] the author mentions the *Siddhānta-bindu* as a treatise written by himself. Moreover, even in the *Advaita-siddhi* Madhusūdana mentions this work, stating that in that work he has discussed the subject in question more elaborately.[54] So all the evidence points to the fact that the author of *Advaita-siddhi* also wrote this work.

The *Saṃkṣepa-śārītaka-sāra-saṃgraha* is a commentary on the *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka* of Sarvajñātma Muni. Though it is not mentioned in any of Madhusūdana's other works, nor does it mention them, it still bears evidence that strongly suggests that this book is written by the same Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who composed the *Advaita-siddhi*. First of all, in the second benedictory verse of this commentary,[55] the author mentions the name of his preceptors, which exactly corresponds to the first portion of the second benedictory verse of the *Advaita-siddhi*.[56] In addition, the colophon of the first chapter[57] is very similar to that of the *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa*,[58] and the colophons[59] of the other three chapters have only the words '*Śrīpādaśiṣya*' after 'Śrī Viśveśvara Sarasvatī', instead of '*pūjyapādaśiṣya*'. However, the two words are almost synonymous.

His largest work on religious philosophy is his commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*. It is very extensive and Madhusūdana here gives expression to his own opinions on various points where he deferred from Śaṃkara's views on the subject. The colophons[60] of the chapter herein almost exactly correspond to those of the chapters of the *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka-sāra-saṃgraha*[61] and *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa*.[62] The next point, which provides convincing evidence that the author of this work is identical with the author of the *Advaita-siddhi*, is that the first line of the last verse of this book[63] is similar to the second introductory verse of the *Advaita-siddhi*.[64] Moreover, the author here mentions the name of *Advaita-siddhi*[65] as another of his works. In the *Advaita-siddhi*[66] the author often mentions that he has dealt with some topics in the *Gūḍhārtha-dīpikā*.

Bhakti-rasāyana is Madhusūdana's most important work on religious philosophy, in which he clearly depicts his views on various topics of emotion and devotion in religion. As this work mentions the names of *Siddhānta-bindu*[67] and *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā*[68] as the author's own work, and as *Gūḍhārtha-dīpikā*[69] states that the topic at hand is further developed by the author in his *Bhakti-rasayana*, it is definitely a work of Madhusūdana, the author of the *Advaita-siddhi*.

Bhāgavata-purāṇa-prathama-śloka-vyākhyā is another theological work accredited to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. As the work mentions the name of *Bhakti-rasāyana*[70] as the author's own work, it is doubtless a work of the author of the *Advaita-siddhi*. Moreover the treatment of the metaphysical topics therein is typical of this author.[71]

The *Hari-līlā-vyākhyā* is a commentary on Bopadeva's *Hari-līlāmṛtam*, a synopsis of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*. The colophon under each of the chapters reads[72]: 'This is the account of the chapter of *Hari-līlā* composed by the illustrious Bopadeva, written by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.' The last verse of the work also gives the same name for the author. The editors of this book, and Prof. Modi,[73] declare it to be the work of the author of the *Advaita-siddhi* without putting forward any evidence whatsoever to confirm their statement. Abhyankara Sastri asserts that a different Madhusūdana wrote this and several other works.[74] But his conclusion is similarly only based on conjecture. This is a simple work. But there are several internal evidences pointing to the fact that our author must have written this commentary. The author mentions in this commentary his own commentary on the first verse of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. Moreover, his commentary definitely presupposes his treatment of *bhakti* and *bhakti-rasa* in his *Bhakti-rasāyana*. For instance, his explanation of the words *hari* and *līlā* in the title of the text bears the hallmark of his style of argumentation. Vopadeva explained that Hari is the bliss (ānanda) and his *līla* (sports) is also bliss. Madhusūdana in his typically erudite way explains that the word-combination harilīlā is to be analysed as the blissful sports (līlā) of Hari the bliss. This does not indicate any duality between līlā (also bliss) and Hari the bliss because the two words are written in the same parts of speech, that is, they have the same semantic value. He as a non-dualist does not accept any real difference between the quality and the qualified. Therefore, for him Hari and his *līlā* are in fact a single entity, the bliss. This is so typical of Madhusūdana's argumentation that I accept this work to be written by him.

Mahimṇaḥ-stotra-ṭīkā is a commentary on Puṣpadanta's *Mahimṇaḥ-stotra*. The commentator explains the *hymn* in two different ways, showing that both the gods Hara and Hari can be the object of the original verses. In the beginning of the commentary the author pays homage to his preceptor,[75] Viśveśvara, and in the colophon he also mentions himself as a bee on the lotus feet of the illustrious Viśveśvara.[76] Moreover, *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā* is here referred to as the author's own work,[77] confirming that this work can be added to the list of works ascribed to Madhusūdana.

It would not be correct to consider the *Prasthāna-bheda* as a separate work, since it is a part of his commentary on the *Mahimṇaḥ-stotra*.

The above-mentioned books are those works whose authorship can be confidently ascribed to Madhusūdana and are thus, the principal sources of his philosophy. We may then turn to the remaining works that go under the name of Madhusūdana. The list submitted by Mr Aufrecht can by no means be regarded as accurate in this respect. For example, although *Bhaktisāmānyanirūpaṇa* is listed as a separate work, it is merely a name given to the first chapter of the *Bhakti-rasāyana*. The rest of the list is not from our author's pen. T. Ganapati Sastri, Prof. Modi and Sri P.C. Divanji mention the *Hari-līlā-vyākhyā* and the *Íśvara-pratipatti-prakāśa* as works of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

The *Íśvara-pratipatti-prakāśa* is strongly advocated by both Prof. Modi[78] and P.C. Divanji[79] as a work of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. They draw this conclusion from the fact that there are some topics dealt with in this tiny work, which correspond to those covered in Madhusūdana's larger works. Prof. Modi shows that these topics[80] – the nature of God, the three conditions of the soul and the formation of the mystic word '*Praṇava*' – are covered in works such as *Siddhānta-bindu*, as well as in this work. But it may be said that similar topics with the same conclusions may be discussed in different books by different authors sharing the same views. Not infrequently, Madhusūdana himself adopts the conclusions and mode of treatment of some particular topics explored by his predecessors. The style of this work does not betray any similarity to the style adopted by Madhusūdana in his other works. Therefore, we cannot cast our votes either negatively or positively. Mm. T. Ganapati Sastri, in his brief preface, throws no light on this subject.

The *Ānanda-mandākinī* is a eulogy of Lord Kṛṣṇa. It is a metrical work, of which the last verse[81] and the colophon[82] bear the name of Madhusūdana as its composer. However, the author does not mention the name of his preceptor, which was then customary among the ascetic authors, nor does the work provide any glimpse of the author's scholarship in Vedāntic philosophy. The verses only describe the exquisite beauty of Lord Kṛṣṇa and his various heroic deeds; there is no sign of the mastermind of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the author of the *Advaita-siddhi*. The language of the book lacks any charm and its treatment is lacking in style, while repetition of ideas is often found. So one might discard this from the list of Madhusūdana's works.

As to the chronology of Madhusūdana's works, it appears from the nature and style of the composition that the author's first work is the *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka-sāra-saṃgraha*. Here, Madhusūdana confines himself strictly to the position of a commentator and seldom expresses his own views. He explains the verses of the *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka* clearly and minutely, but the personality of the commentator is always kept in the background and never overpowers the views of Sarvajñātma Muni. Again, this work bears no reference to any of the other compositions of Madhusūdana and possesses none of the author's particular views. It is also never mentioned in any of his other works.

The *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā* and the *Siddhānta-bindu* come after the Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka-sāra-saṃgraha, and the Advaita-siddhi comes after these works: both

Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa and *Gūḍhārtha Dīpikā* mention it, which suggest they came later than the *Advaita-siddhi*.

Among Madhusūdana's devotional works, with the exception of the *Mahimṇaḥ-stotra-ṭīkā*, the *Bhakti-rasāyana* comes first in chronological order, since both *Gūḍhārtha Dīpikā* and the commentary on the first verse of the *Bhāgavata* mention the *Bhakti-rasāyana*. But the position of the *Mahimaḥ-stotra-ṭīkā* is somewhat puzzling. Except for the *Vedānta-kalpa-latikā*, it does not mention any other works of Madhusūdana, and the nature of the treatment of different topics reveals the author as a vigorous follower of Śaṃkara rather than a devotee. Throughout the work the author is preoccupied with the notion of establishing that Hara and Hari are one and the same and should therefore be regarded as the *bimba* or *Íśvara*, who is identical with the absolute.[83] As the ideas, and often the language,[84] used here resemble that of the *Advaita-siddhi*, its date of composition may be placed somewhere near the time of the *Advaita-siddhi*, and probably preceding the *Bhakti-rasāyana*.

Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we come to the conclusion that the works of Madhusūdana may be arranged chronologically in the following way:

1 Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka-sāra-saṃgraha (SSSS).
2 Vedānta-kalpa-latikā (VKL).
3 Siddhānta-bindu (SB).
4 Advaita-siddhi (AdS).
5 Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa (ARR).

The devotional works are arranged thus:

1 Mahimnaḥ-stotra-ṭīkā (MST).
2 Bhakti-rasāyana (BhR).
3 Gītā-gūḍhārtha-dīpikā (GGD).
4 Commentary on the first verse of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*.
5 *Harilīlā-vyākhyā*.

I must hasten to add that these chronological lists are very tentative and open to emendation. Moreover, the last two works on bhakti may have been written any time in his career.

I have mentioned that the *Advaita-siddhi* was a work written to refute Vyāsatīrtha's the *Nyāyamṛta*. Vyāsatīrtha flourished in the period of the last part of the fifteenth and the first part of the sixteenth century CE, in Vijayanagara and was the preceptor of the royalty there. His *Nyāyāmṛta* vigorously attacked Śaṃkara's non-dualism and argued successfully against all the important non-dualists of the Śaṃkara school. Being a follower of the Madhva school of realists, Vyāsatīrtha focused his attack on the notions of *avidyā* and the unreality/illusoriness of the world.[85] The *Nyāyāmṛta* is a detailed work in four chapters in which Vyāsatīrtha quotes almost all early Advaita classics to refute their arguments

against realists position. He presents each of the issues clearly, producing arguments for and against the position of the opponents, and then proceeds to show the logical drawbacks or fallacies in the opponents' arguments. He was a great logician and effectively followed the Nyāya tactics of polemics.[86] It became imperative for the non-dualists to address this new group of opponents – the Vedāntic Vaiṣṇava realists.

Madhusūdana wrote the *Advaita-siddhi* mainly to answer the *Nyāyāmṛta*. Right from the start he made that clear. His opening benedictory verse asserts that the empirically experienced phenomenal world is false (*mithyā*), which was a clear response to Vyāsatīrtha's second benedictory verse in the *Nyāyāmṛta* referring Hari to be the creator of a real world. To emphasise his purpose of writing the *Advaita-siddhi* the author introduces his thesis that in order to establish non-duality he must first of all refute the reality of duality.[87] Moreover, he meticulously followed Vyāsatīrtha's arrangement of the content of the Nyāyāmṛta and refuted each and every argument of the latter. Vyāsatīrtha challenged the Advaita position by putting it in a syllogistic formula. 'The world is illusory' (probandum or the major term); 'because it has the qualities of being perceptible, being unconscious and being limited' (reason or the middle term); 'like the (illusory) shell-silver' that is, a piece of shell mistakenly seen as a piece of silver (example). Vyāsatīrtha then devoted the first chapter of his work to refute every part of this syllogism. Therefore, Madhusūdana's first chapter consists of elaborate refutation of every single point of Vyāsatīrtha's attack.

This led him to discuss all the possible questions about the metaphysics of the Advaita-Vedānta school and he discussed these both extensively and intensively. He measured every concept from all possible sides and synthesised the different opinions existing among the teachers of the Advaita school themselves, which had been pointed out by their opponents. This predisposition towards synthesis or harmony is obvious in all his works; especially those concerned with metaphysics. Seen in this light, it is easy to understand why Madhusūdana goes to such pains to explain and justify all the prevailing opinions regarding one issue.[88] To that extent, he can be regarded as an eclectic author. But that is only one side of his genius. In order to give a correct and logical interpretation of a question, Madhusūdana often makes a compromise from the views of different authors of his school and sometimes reinterprets or slightly twists the statements of renowned authors to fit in with his own views.[89] Madhusūdana always manages to explain each opinion of his predecessors in such a way as to quieten all opposition. That is why the *Advaita-siddhi* is regarded as a monumental work, for it succeeds in winning a complete victory over the fighting dualists like the logicians and the followers of Madhva. It should be noted, however, that in his anxiety to refute dualism, Madhusūdana sometimes puts forward weak arguments, or even shows contradictions in his arguments. By his own admission, he intended mainly to produce a work of disputation (*vāda*).[90] But the overall effect is stupendous and fully serves its purpose (fn. pp. 108 and 86 infra).

I discuss *avidyā* first because his handling of that subject secured him his eminence. Although, Madhusūdana's arguments in favour of an indescribable *avidyā* are what I introduce now, I shall constantly refer to his *Advaita* epistemology. Hence I shall discuss his views on the non-dualist epistemology next. Advaita-Vedānta accepts besides Brahman, the pure consciousness, three other conscious categories – God (*Īśvara*), the cosmic and intuitive consciousness (*Sākṣī)* and the individual consciousness (*jīva*). Only transcendental Brahman is pure, unlimited and eternally existent. The other three are relevant only on the empirical level and thus are limited in some ways. Their existence is relative to the unconscious phenomena they experience and interact with. Both these conscious and unconscious entities thus belong to the world of experience. I shall discuss these worldly categories next. Finally comes the question of the significance of all these discussions of *śāstra* of the non-dualists. The significance is to attain liberation (*mukti/mokṣa*) from worldly suffering and dissatisfaction. Therefore, *mukti* is the goal of understanding the teachings of *śāstra* and its discussion always comes at the end of the *śāstric* discussions. But for a *bhakti* theologian that is a penultimate goal. My last chapter deals with Madhusūdana's *bhakti* theology. His is a mysticism of non-dualism and divine love. A philosopher, theologian and fearsome polemist, Madhusūdana stands as a great representative of his time. I have tried to show his views and his methods of argumentation as evinced from all his masterful works. I also have, as far as possible, mentioned his use of the views of his predecessors in the Śaṃkara School, and occasionally I have used his commentators to explain his expositions. It should be noted that I have rarely translated Madhusūdana literally. Whenever I quoted him, in order to make it clear, I often paraphrased it in English. Further, almost all quotations from Upaniṣads are from Patrick Ollivelle's translations.

2

AVIDYĀ

The Vedas (*śruti*) tell us that Brahman created the universe.[91] But if the act of creation is attributed to Brahman, it can no longer remain non-different and devoid of all attributes, as the followers of the school of Advaita-vedānta hold Brahman to be.[92] The concept of *avidyā* provides an answer to this criticism. *Avidyā* is directly responsible for creation. Brahman is said to be the creator of this universe through the instrumentality of *avidyā*.[93] In other words, the universe is an illusory projection (*vikṣepa*) of *avidyā* and Brahman, being related to *avidyā* as its locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*), is said by ascription, to be the cause of the universe. The concept of *avidyā* is not made very clear in the *Upaniṣads*, although several texts suggest this concept when they deal with the term *māyā* (delusion) or *ajñāna* (ignorance). Śaṃkara realised this, and used these examples freely to support his views of *avidyā*, which he exploits to establish his theory of absolute monism. Madhusūdana also followed Śaṃkara's example and used these three terms, namely, *avidyā*, *māyā* and *ajñāna* more or less synonymously. Hence, to follow Madhusūdana's complicated style of argumentation, I shall use the terms *avidyā* and *ajñāna* interchangeably.

According to the school of the Advaita-vedānta, *avidyā* is the material cause of all created objects. Madhusūdana,[94] following Citsukha, defines *avidyā* as a beginningless, positive entity, which is destructible by knowledge. *Avidyā* is beginningless, thus the definition does not cover a knowledge that is refuted by a subsequent knowledge. Such knowledge is positive, and is refutable by the next knowledge. But as it is not beginningless, this definition does not cover it. The adjective 'positive' is given to prevent the inclusion of the absence of a particular knowledge just before its cognition.[95] Thus the definition of *avidyā* does not cover such absence of knowledge. Because even though such non-existence of knowledge is beginningless and it is also refutable by the particular knowledge, nevertheless, it is not positive.

It is incorrect for the opponent to claim that all beginningless positive objects are irrefutable like the Self (*Ātman*), because according to the Naiyāyikas, atoms are beginningless, positive and irrefutable. Thus, the black earth atoms of a black earthen pot should be everlasting. But when the pot is burnt the black earth atoms are destroyed, and we see red earth atoms in their stead. The word 'positive' is

taken here in the sense of that which is other than negative (*bhāvatvaṃ cātrābhāva-vilakṣaṇatvamātraṃ vivakṣitam*). Thus, *avidyā* is merely different from negativity and not contradictory to it. It is interpreted in this way in order to justify that *avidyā* is the material cause of both positive and negative objects of the universe. A material cause cannot be contradictory to its effect. At the same time, it cannot be similar to the effect in all respects. A cow cannot be the material cause of a horse, nor can a pitcher be the material cause of another pitcher. Considering the material causality of *avidyā*, it is defined as different from both positive and negative objects.

The dualists refute this definition in the following way: *avidyā* cannot always be beginningless because there are exceptions. For example, the ignorance (*avidyā*) about the true nature of the shell, in the shell-silver illusion, has a beginning. Again, *avidyā*, being the material cause of the negation (*abhāvopādānājñāna*) as well, cannot be exclusively positive since by nature, the cause has to be homogenous to the effect.

Madhusūdana answers these objections as follows[96]: *avidyā* conditioned by the shell is beginningless per se but it is said to have a beginning insofar as its condition namely, the shell has a beginning. Again, *avidyā* is positive, in the sense that it is not a negative concept (*abhāva vilakṣaṇa*). Thus, 'positive' here means that which is neither positive nor negative but a third category which is indefinable (*anirvacanīya*). So the question of lack of homogeneity between negation (*abhāva*) and *avidyā* (its material cause), does not arise. Moreover, two completely identical entities cannot be mutually causally related. Similarly, two utterly different objects cannot be related as a cause and effect relationship. Therefore, the question of homogeneity is not relevant.

The opponents raised an objection in connection with the definition of *avidyā*: How, they asked, can ignorance (*avidyā*) regarding Brahman be destroyed by a corresponding knowledge, as the definition of *avidyā* presupposes? For *avidyā* regarding Brahman can be discarded only by the cognition (*vṛtti-jñāna*) of the same reality namely Brahman? But Brahman can never be the content of cognition because in that case, it (Brahman) becomes illusory like the pitcher, which can be the content of its cognition (*vṛtti-vyāpya*).[97]

The answer to the objection is this[98]: Brahman is said to be the content of a *vṛtti* in the sense that *vṛtti* here serves as a distinguishing adjunct (*upādhi*), to Brahman. That is to say, though pure Brahman cannot be the object of either a cognition (*vṛtti-jñāna*) or *avidyā*, Brahman conditioned by an *upādhi* (and therefore to some extent, impure) can still very easily become the object of both *avidyā* and an experience (*vṛtti-jñāna*). Thus, Brahman is an object of *avidyā* when *avidyā* itself serves as Brahman's conditioning adjunct (*upādhi*). Brahman can also be an object of an experience (*vṛtti*) when the same *vṛtti* acts as its *upādhi*. Thus, in both cases, the conditioned Brahman is the object (*viṣaya*) and not the pure one. An *upādhi* is distinguished from an adjective in that while an adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*) becomes integrated into what it qualifies, an *upādhi* conditions an object without being inherent in it. This means that an *upādhi* without itself being

the object of either *avidyā* or cognition (i.e. *svarūpa-sat*) still conditions an entity and thus provides for its objectivity (*viṣayatā*) of either an experience or *avidyā* Such a condition, however, will pursue the conditioned entity for a long time, and thus is distinguished from an *upalakṣaṇā*, (a temporary unessential mark), which is just a casual feature of the entity it qualifies.[99] Interpreted in terms of *upādhi*, the same entity, namely Brahman, can very well be the object of both *avidyā* and cognitive (*vṛtti*) knowledge. When, therefore, Brahman becomes the object of knowledge, ignorance (*avidyā*) regarding Brahman is destroyed at once. The definition of *avidyā* thus stands unchallenged.

Objections may be raised that the state of a person who achieved liberation in this life, (*jīvanmukta*), is a challenge to the above-mentioned concept held by the followers of Śaṃkara. Since if a liberated person still retains his/her physical existence, a product of avidyā, clearly this person's self-realisation did bring him/her enlightenment but did not remove all effects of *avidyā*. The non-dualist answers that in the case of a *jīvanmukta*, the '*prārabdha karman*', that is, the accumulated *karman* which has borne fruit in the shape of the present body and its inevitable experience of pleasure and pain, forms the obstacle. The actions done by the *jīva* must be atoned for. True knowledge destroys all *karman* except for those actions, which have borne fruit. These *karman*s must be exhausted only by enjoyment (*bhoga*). For that purpose the *jīvanmukta* retains his body until the *prārabdha karmans* are exhausted.[100]

Madhusūdana puts forward another definition of *avidyā*, namely that which is the material cause of illusion (*bhramopādānatvam*). But this definition is only acceptable to those who regard *avidyā* as the material cause of the creation and Brahman as the substratum of such *avidyā*. To those who contend that Brahman, or Brahman aided by *avidyā*, is the material cause of the creation, it cannot be acceptable.

This indefinable *avidyā* is revealed by the intuitive knowledge of *sākṣin*. In fact, *sākṣin* is nothing other than pure consciousness reflected on the mode or *vṛtti* of *avidya* (*avidyā-vṛtti-pratibimbacaitanyam*). Thus *sākṣī* is the intuitive knowledge of self and *avidyā*, being connected to it, is always revealed to it. In other words like Rāhu, *avidyā* is revealed by the consciousness that it covers (*rāhubat svāvṛta-caitanya-prakāśyāvidyā*).[101] As *avidyā* is thus always revealed to intuitive knowledge, so also are the effects of *avidyā*. Whenever there is cognition of any object, it arises after discarding the particular *avidyā* that so long kept the object covered from the cogniser. Thus the cogniser observes the object as revealed. But *avidyā* cannot be cognised as such. It is revealed only to the intuitive knowledge, and the cognising self realises its existence only because this self is identical with the intuitive knowledge. Therefore no proof can be put forward to determine the existence of *avidyā*, as the scope of all such proof is limited to cognitive knowledge only. *Avidyā*, on the other hand, is not cognisable. Doubt regarding the existence of *avidyā* is also impossible for the same reason. Therefore doubt may arise regarding the nature of *avidyā*, such as its being *anirvacanīya*, endless, etc.; and four kinds of *pramāṇas* (means to valid knowledge),

are posited to determine its nature. These are direct knowledge, inference, scripture and implication. *Avidyā* exists because it can actually be perceived. Such undeniable experience[102] as, 'I am ignorant, I do not know myself or anyone else', or 'I do not know the object which you are referring to', bear testimony to *avidyā*. The first cognition cognises *avidyā* in general while the second posits particular *avidyā*, that is, *avidyā* concerning a particular object (e.g. a jar). Likewise, 'I slept peacefully and did not experience anything'[103] – a memory at the waking state after the break of dreamless sleep – proves the direct experience of *avidyā* at the state of dreamless sleep.

The opponents[104] argue that the first experience mentioned above reveals only a negative object, such as the absence of knowledge, and not *avidyā* as a positive entity, because according to the monists, positive *avidyā* cannot exist in anything except absolute consciousness (*citireva kevalā*). In the cognition, 'I am ignorant' *avidyā* is presented as existing in the ego (*ahamartha*), which is not absolute consciousness. Therefore it should be recognised that in the above experience the object of cognition cannot be positive *avidyā*. Hence the absence of knowledge should be accepted as the object of such experience. The same applies in the case of the cognition of ignorance regarding a particular object, for example 'I do not know what you are referring to' (the jar, for instance). The same argument, which establishes the first cognition revealing absence of knowledge, also establishes that the second cognition, too, reveals the absence of knowledge. They further argue that so far as the objects are concerned, there is no difference between the two forms of knowledge, namely 'I am ignorant' and 'There is no knowledge in me'. So the object of the cognition, 'I am ignorant' is nothing but the absence of knowledge in general.

The summary of Madhusūdana's answer to this is as follows: according to the monists, pure consciousness is the substratum of *avidyā*. On this consciousness mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is superimposed as identical with the consciousness mentioned above. Therefore, though *avidyā* is really revealed by *sākṣin*, it is erroneously attributed to consciousness limited by *antaḥkaraṇa*.[105] The error arises because both *avidyā* and *antaḥkaraṇa* subsist in the same substratum, namely (individual) consciousness. This justifies the cognition of *avidyā* as an attribute of *ego* (*antaḥkaraṇa*)[106] as presented in the experience, 'I am ignorant'. It is true that both the experiences refer to the same object. But that object cannot be the absence of knowledge, because the knowledge of a negative object cannot arise without the previous knowledge of its positive counterpart (*protiyogin*).

The opponent may then ask what is the object of this particular cognition, namely 'I am ignorant' or 'I do not know'? Is it the totality of absence of all the knowledge taken individually, or the absence of knowledge in general? In both cases, the admission of a previous knowledge of the positive counterpart of the negation contradicts the negation itself, since if there is a single knowledge, it immediately discards the totality of negation or the general negation of knowledge. On the other hand, the recognition of positive *avidyā* in these cases is free from this criticism. In this case *avidyā*, being a positive entity (i.e. not negative),

does not anticipate knowledge of the positive counterpart. But how can knowledge refer to *avidyā*, which is diametrically opposed to knowledge in nature? The answer is that *avidyā* is revealed by *sākṣī-jñāna*, which, unlike the *vṛtti-jñāna*, is not opposed to *avidyā/ajñāna*.[107]

Even when one argues that *sākṣī-jñāna* reveals *avidyā*, one is still open to criticism. In the knowledge, 'the blue pitcher' the knowledge of blue, the adjective of the pitcher, is a prerequisite. Likewise, the knowledge of the object of *ajñāna* is necessary before the knowledge of *ajñāna* becomes possible. This is because *ajñāna* is never known in the abstract, but is always known in relation to a particular object. The object thus qualifies *ajñāna* and the knowledge of the qualification is the prerequisite of the knowledge of the qualified. Thus it must be recognised that the knowledge of the pitcher exists before the *ajñāna* about the pitcher is revealed. The knowledge of the pitcher has to be *vṛtti-jñāna*, which has the claim to be *pramā-jñāna* (valid knowledge) at the same time. So the question is, how can *ajñāna* about the pitcher arise at all in the face of valid knowledge of the same pitcher? And if *ajñāna* does not exist in this case, then the question of its being known does not arise. So *sākṣi* knowledge cannot grasp *ajñāna* that thus had already become non-existent.

In reply, Madhusūdana admits that *ajñāna* always appears concerned with an object. He further admits that the previous knowledge of that object is necessary for the revelation of the *ajñāna* concerning it. But the knowledge of the object – and here he differs from his opponents – is not a normal cognition (*vṛtti-jñāna*) at all and hence is not a valid knowledge which is opposed to the *ajñāna*. In fact, like *ajñāna*, the object too, is revealed by *sākṣī-jñāna*. Whether a cogniser knows the pitcher or not, *sākṣī-jñana* reveals the object. Thus, the same *sākṣī-jñāna* reveals both the pitcher and its ignorance. In this way, though ignorance about a pitcher requires previous knowledge of the pitcher, previous knowledge of the pitcher, being a *sākṣī-jñāna*, is compatible with *ajñāna* and its knowledge. It is the nature of *sākṣi-jñāna* that unlike ordinary valid knowledge, it reveals unknown objects as both unknown and known, that is unknown to the individual cogniser and known to *sākṣin*. Whether it comes within the parameters of the valid cognition and the cognising individual, or not, every object is revealed to the *sākṣin*.[108]

The contention of Madhusūdana's opponents is that the content of the knowledge, 'I am ignorant', is the absence of knowledge and not the indescribable *avidyā*. Since it is merely an absence of knowledge, the question may be asked as to what kind of absence (*abhāva*) this absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*) can possibly be? Is it the totality of absence of all knowledge taken individually? Is it the absence of knowledge in general? Or is it the *prāgabhāva* (pre-existing absence) of a particular knowledge?[109] Madhusūdana has already refuted the first two alternatives, so his opponents propose the third. In this case the inconvenience of the first two alternatives is removed, as the knowledge concerns a particular *prāgabhāva* of a particular knowledge rather than of all knowledge. In the absence of all knowledge, the existence of the awareness of that

absence contradicts the idea of the absence of all knowledge, as the existence of any one knowledge goes against the contention of the absence of all knowledge. But in this case, this *prāgabhāva* of a particular knowledge allows scope for the existence of any other knowledge except for that particular individual whose *prāgabhāva* is being experienced. Hence the knowledge of such *prāgabhāva* does not make the conception wrong. However, there may be another danger in admitting this view, since the knowledge of the positive entity that is being negated (*pratiyogin*), is held to be the prerequisite to the knowledge of its absence. Accordingly, before one experiences an absence of a particular knowledge, the very knowledge of that particular knowledge, that is, the *pratiyogin*, is necessary. To avoid this criticism of circular argumentation, his opponents state that the requisite knowledge of the *pratiyogin* comprehends the latter in its generic form. That is, the knowledge of the particular *pratiyogin* which serves as the cause of the knowledge of its *prāgabhāva*, presents the *pratiyogin* in its generic form and not individually. The result is that, in such a case, the *pratiyogin* is not required to be present for the attainment of its knowledge, since, according to the Naiyayikas, the knowledge of generality (*sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti*), in present case *jñānatva*, can grasp even past and future knowledge. This obviously cannot be present at the time of such knowledge. Therefore, the object of the knowledge – 'I am ignorant' – is the *prāgabhāva* of a particular knowledge.[110]

Madhusūdana answers that: if the object of the above-mentioned experience is the *prāgabhāva* of a particular knowledge, then it is undeniable that very experience comprehends that particular knowledge, the *pratiyogin* of the *prāgabhāva*, in its specific form. Hence, as the prerequisite of the knowledge of the *prāgabhāva* of a particular *jñāna*, the knowledge of the *pratiyogin* must have to grasp it (*pratiyogin*) in its specific form. Therefore it cannot be accepted that the requisite knowledge of the *pratiyogin* comprehends it in generic form.

In fact, Madhusūdana does not at all accept the concept of *prāgabhāva*. He explains that the expression 'the pitcher will come into existence', does not imply the *prāgabhāva* of the pitcher, but refers only to its future existence (*bhaviṣyattā*). The verb 'will become' (*bhaviṣyati*) denotes the association of the pitcher with a time which neither contains the pitcher nor its destruction. Likewise, s*āmānyābhāva* is a false notion.[111] For example, in the case of, say, the s*āmānyābhāva* of a pitcher, the knowledge of such s*āmānyābhāva* requires the knowledge of its positive counterpart (*pratiyogin*) namely the pitcher. But the pitcher may be comprehended only when it exists. In that case, the knowledge of the general absence of the pitcher cannot occur in the face of the existing pitcher. Moreover, the concept of *prāgabhāva* as presented by opponents of this theory renders the concept of s*āmānyābhāva* untenable, since they state that even the absence (*abhāva*) of a particular object concerns a *pratiyogin* qualified by a generic attribute (*sāmānyābhāvā vacchinnapratiyogitāka*). Hence the concept of s*āmānyābhāva* cannot be distinguished from the concept of *prāgabhāva* as both the *abhāvas* concern identical objects as they are delimited by (*pratiyogitāvacchedaka*) the same generic attribute. If the concept of s*āmānyābhāva* is accepted as distinct from the

concept of *prāgabhāva*, then the concept of *prāgabhāva* remains to be reinterpreted. Thus, both the acceptance and non-acceptance of the notion of *prāgabhāva* produce the same effect – the dismissal of the concept of *sāmānyābhāva*. By such means, Madhusūdana discards both the concepts of *prāgabhāva* and *sāmānyābhāva* in order to refute the claims of opponents that 'I am ignorant' is an experience of the absence of knowledge. Madhusūdana continues to defend the indescribable nature of *avidyā*. I have just given a few examples to show his method.[112]

Having thus analysed the ordinary experience of the waking state, Madhusūdana proceeds to examine the cognition of deep sleep (*suṣupti*) in support of *ajñāna* as a non-negative entity. The retrospective knowledge of the waking state *(jāgratparāmarśa*) – 'I slept happily, I did not know anything' – is additional evidence as to the existence of *ajñāna* at the time of deep sleep. In response to this, his opponents ask whether this retrospective knowledge (*parāmarśa*) is an inference, or a case of memory? If it is an inference, then the same inference proves the existence of *absence of knowledge* and not indescribable *ajñāna* at the time of deep sleep. The logic of the inference runs thus: 'before' and 'after' have an intermediate time, so between the waking state and the reversion to the same, there is an intermediate time called the *suṣupti*, that is, the state of dreamless sleep. At that time, 'I had no knowledge' because (1) I was in a special state, (2) all conditions of knowledge were then absent and (3) the individual self (*ātman*) was invariably not remembered as having knowledge at the time. This retrospective knowledge cannot be a case of memory for want of relevant impression (*saṃskāra*), one of the conditions of memory. The reason for this is that previous knowledge produces memory in due course only through the intermediate operation of *saṃskāra*. While previous knowledge dies out it leaves the *saṃskāra* about its content, which being instigated (*udbuddha*) by a stimulus, produces memory about the same content. This means that *saṃskāra* presupposes for its existence the destruction of previous knowledge, since, unless the knowledge dies, it must be said to continue and will then produce by itself the succeeding knowledge, which in that case cannot be a memory for lack of *saṃskāra*. But the knowledge of *ajñāna* at the time of *suṣupti* is a *sākṣī-jñāna*. As such, it cannot be destroyed at the waking state, for *sākṣī-jñāna* is consciousness limited by *ajñāna*. But neither consciousness nor *ajñāna* is destroyed at the waking state. Hence, *sākṣī-jñāna*, being indestructible, does not produce any *saṃskāra* and consequently no memory is possible about the content of that knowledge. Therefore, opponents conclude, the retrospective knowledge under consideration cannot be a case of memory. And if it is an inference, such inference will establish absence of knowledge (and not *ajñāna*) at the time of deep sleep.[113]

Madhusūdana replies that: the inference by which his opponents try to prove the existence of the absence of knowledge at the time of *susupti*, is open to objection, since it is fallacious. The reasons that is, the middle terms on which this inference is based are faulty and the adjective to the minor term (*pakṣa*) is unknown. In the first reason, the special state of *ātman* is nothing but its lack of knowledge (*jñānābhāvavatva*), although this has not yet been established by valid

knowledge. In the second reason, the absence of all conditions of knowledge is determined by the absence of knowledge, which is the major term (*sādhya*) of the syllogism under consideration. Thus, in this case, the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*) become interdependent. The third reason may be interpreted in two ways: either, *ātman* is never recognised as having knowledge, or, when limited by the time of *suṣupti*, *ātman* is not recognised as having knowledge. The first interpretation is impossible, as it is contrary to common experience. In the second case, mere recognition cannot justify the absence of such knowledge. There are some experiences which the cogniser does not care to remember (*upekṣaṇīyajñānābhāva*). Only the things that are fit to be remembered are remembered. The knowledge for which the cogniser does not care may arise, but such knowledge is never remembered. So this case, at least, is not covered by the middle term (i.e. the third reason) of the syllogism under consideration. In fact, the absence of knowledge is never proved by the reason of not having been remembered. The absence of knowledge of anything is determined by *anupalabdhi pramāna*.[114] The retrospective knowledge in question refers to the memory of *ajñāna* experienced at the time of *suṣupti*. For *saṃskāra*, the condition of memory, is possible because *sākṣī-jñāna* is not the consciousness limited by *ajñāna* (as supposed by opponents) but is consciousness reflected on a mode of *ajñāna*.[115] At the time of *suṣupti*, *ajñāna* is comprehended by such *sākṣī-jñāna*. With the disappearance of *suṣupti* the operative mode of *ajñāna* (which in the view of *Vivaraṇa* is *suśupti* itself)[116] is destroyed, and so the corresponding *sākṣī-jñāna* may be said to disappear. In this sense, the previous knowledge, namely *sākṣī-jñāna*, is capable of producing *saṃskāra*, necessary for subsequent memory.

Opponents argue that if *ajñāna* is regarded as being revealed only when its particular mode (*vṛtti*) exists, then at the time of the absence of this specific mode, doubt may arise about *ajñāna*, since, in the case of an ordinary pitcher, doubt arises about the existence of the pitcher when any cognitive mental mode is absent concerning that pitcher. But according to the Advaita-vedānta, doubt cannot arise about *ajñāna*, because the existence of *ajñāna* is never doubted, as it is revealed by *sākṣin*. Madhusūdana answers that the existence of *ajñāna* covering an object is the root cause of doubt about that object.[117] Hence, when any cognitive mental mode embracing the pitcher is absent, the pitcher remains covered by *ajñāna*. In this situation, doubt may arise as to whether the pitcher exists or not. But it is absurd to think *ajñāna* can cover itself. Therefore, doubt as to whether '*ajñāna* exists or not' is impossible. However, it may be said that one doubts the indescribable nature of *ajñāna*. This may lead one to doubt 'is *ajñāna* indescribable or not?' prompting an investigation into the nature of *ajñāna*.

Recognising that retrospective knowledge such as 'I did not know anything' is a case of *ajñāna* experienced at the time of deep sleep, opponents now ask how is it possible that this experience of *ajñāna* is recollected as opposed to knowledge as it actually occurs in retrospective knowledge, while at the time of deep sleep, it was not experienced as opposed to knowledge. Madhusūdana replies that like the agent 'I' (*aham*) revealed in retrospective knowledge, *ajñāna*'s attribute

of being opposed to knowledge is also revealed only at the time of retrospective knowledge. Thus memory concerns itself with *ajñāna* alone and not other components of that retrospective experience. In fact, the retrospective knowledge under consideration is a consolidated experience (that is, perception-cum-memory), where part of this experience, namely, ego (*ahamartha*), that is, the subject of the experience and *ajñāna*'s attribute of being opposed to knowledge, are presented by perception, whereas *ajñāna* is presented by memory.

Again, opponents object that as Madhusūdana holds that *ajñāna* is revealed by consciousness reflected on a mode of *ajñāna* existing in *sākṣin*, such a mode may be presumed to continue along with *ajñāna*, which does continue at the waking state, since *ajñāna* is always the same. Madhusūdana admits the problem and answers by identifying this mode of *ajñāna* with the deep sleep condition. Thus when the deep sleep condition is broken at the time of awakening that particular ajñāna-mode is also removed. Thus, at the waking state *sākṣin continues to reveal ajñāna*, but not through its mode of deep sleep. Therefore, even though *ajñāna* is one and it continuously exists through the states of deep sleep and wakefulness, due to the difference of limiting mode of *ajñāna*, it is experienced differently. In this way, the experience of *ajñāna* at the time of deep sleep is destroyed at the waking state, leaving behind an impression, which inspires memory of *ajñāna* cognised at deep sleep.[118] As the opponents are quick to indicate, the two early authors of Advaita-vedānta held somewhat contradictory views on this point. The author of *Vivaraṇa* (Prakāśātma Yati)[119] states that the retrospective knowledge of *ajñāna* is a case of memory and Madhusūdana 's explanation follows his view.[120] But the author of *Vārtika* (Sureśvara) states[121]that the experience of ajñāna in deep sleep is not a case of recollection. These apparently conflicting statements are reconciled by Madhusūdana in the following way: while the author of *Vivaraṇa* takes the retrospective knowledge of *ajñāna* to be a case of memory, he is referring to it as limited by the mode of deep sleep on the authority of the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali (1. 10.). On the other hand, the author of *Vārtika* takes the experience of deep sleep to be the experience of *ajñāna* and not a special mode of it because he was explaining the nature of the unmanifest creation while talking about the process of creation. In another context (*BṛĀU Bhāṣya-vārtika* 3.4.103) the author of the *Vārtika* accepted the view which was same as the view of Madhusūdana.

Inferential evidence

After adducing perceptional evidence as to the existence of *ajñāna*, Madhusūdana proceeds to prove it by means of inference. In this connection he quotes[122] the inference put forward by the author of *Vivaraṇa* which runs thus: 'like the first flame of a lamp in darkness, valid knowledge presupposes an entity, because it reveals an object which was so far subject to the usage "the thing is not revealed"; such an entity is, however, (1) other than the antecedent absence (*prāgabhāva*) of the valid knowledge, (2) opposed to the usage "the object exists and is revealed,"

(3) liable to dismissal by the said valid knowledge and (4) it exists in the same locus where the valid knowledge is produced. In the case of the first flame, for example, such an entity is darkness (which according to the Vedānta theory is an entity and not just a lack of light), and in the case of the main object to be proved by the inference is nothing but the valid knowledge of *ajñāna*'. The adjectives of the *object to be* proved are inserted for the following reason. The *prāgabhāva* of valid knowledge is opposed to this knowledge, destroyed by the knowledge and exists in the same locus where knowledge is subsequently produced. But a *prāgabhāva* is not other than *prāgabhāva*. Likewise, the particular *adṛṣṭa* which produces valid knowledge, is other than the *prāgabhāva* of that knowledge, is exhausted when the same knowledge, its product, is produced and has existed in the same locus where the knowledge is subsequently produced. But such *adṛṣṭa* is not opposed to valid knowledge. Similarly, a specific *adṛṣṭa*, which is opposed to the valid knowledge, is other than the *prāgabhāva* of the knowledge and existed in the same locus where the knowledge is subsequently produced. But such *adṛṣṭa* is not discarded by the knowledge in question. Unless the knowledge is produced, there can be no question of it discarding the hostile *adṛṣṭa*. In the same way, the absolute absence of the valid knowledge (*jñānātyantābhāva*) is other than *prāgabhāva* of that knowledge, is opposed to that knowledge, and is discarded by the presence of that knowledge, but such absolute absence is not located where the said knowledge is subsequently produced. Therefore, all the four adjectives stated above in connection with the inferable entity (*sādhya*), that is *ajñāna*, are necessary so that the inference may not be diverted. It does not apply to *prāgabhāva*, or to a favourable or unfavourable *adṛṣṭa*, or to the absolute absence of valid knowledge. The words 'valid knowledge' (the minor term in the above inference) include the valid knowledge of absolute Brahman as an epistemic adjective. Brahman, which has so far been subjected to the usage 'Brahman is not revealed to me', becomes revealed by that cognitive experience. Though Brahman is self-revealed, one still can experience, for instance, 'Brahman is not revealed to me'. Just as the initial light of a lamp instantly removes one's incomprehension of an object concealed by darkness, so also the valid knowledge reveals an object, having removed the ignorance covering that object. In both cases the process of revelation contradicts the usage namely, 'the thing is not revealed to me'. Therefore, this conclusion does not make Brahman an object of an empirical cognition. This inference proves the general existence of *ajñāna.*

The author of *Tattvapradīpikā* adduces another inference, also quoted by Madhusūdana,[123] which proves the existence of specific occurrence of *ajñāna*. The inference is thus: a valid knowledge, of Caitra (a particular individual) discards a beginningless entity, which is other than that very valid knowledge, or its antecedent absence; because it is valid knowledge. Like the valid knowledge of Maitra, which does the same thing, namely it discards a beginningless entity (i.e. the antecedent absence) of the valid knowledge of Maitra, which is other than that very valid knowledge or its antecedent absence existing in Caitra. It should be understood that in the case of the valid knowledge of Maitra, such

a beginningless entity is *prāgabhāva* of that knowledge, while in the case of the valid knowledge of Caitra, such an entity cannot be anything other than *ajñāna*. This inference, therefore, results in the recognition of a specific *ajñāna*, discarded by the valid knowledge of Caitra. Hence, the existence of that specific *ajñāna* is proved by the inference.

Madhusūdana has taken cognisance of the later writers (*Navyāh*),[124] who have suggested further improvements on the inference propounded by the *Tattva-pradipika*. Their inference runs thus: valid knowledge under consideration destroys a beginningless entity which is other than the absence in general (*sāmānyābhāva*) of the said valid knowledge, because this valid knowledge is a product (*kārya*) like a pitcher. A pitcher is a product which also discards a beginningless entity, namely its absence immediately prior to its creation, which is other than the absence in general of the valid knowledge under consideration. In relation to the valid knowledge under consideration, such a beginningless entity, other than the absence in general of the valid knowledge under consideration, is *ajñāna*. *Ajñāna*, therefore, is established by such inference.

Evidence of śruti

In the eighth chapter of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, it is stated that: ‘as a person, who does not know that there is gold buried under a place unconsciously treads the same ground time and again, so this individual always comes in contact with Brahman, yet being covered by *anṛta*, they do not comprehend Brahman.’ Madhusūdana[125] takes the word ‘*anṛta*’ to mean *ajñāna* and therefore, he adduces this *śruti* as evidence of the existence of *ajñāna*. His opponents argue that ‘*anṛta*’ should not be taken to mean *ajñāna*, since the word ‘*ṛta*’ is generally used to mean good deeds, as in, for example, the *śruti* ‘*ṛtam pibantau sukṛtasya loke*’.[126] The word ‘*anṛta*’ should therefore mean bad deeds (i.e. sin). Madhusūdana answers that the first *śruti* quoted above goes further, and says that *ātman* is devoid of bad deeds (*apahatapāpmā*). If *anṛta* is taken to mean ‘bad deeds’, as these opponents claim, then it should be acknowledged that the first *śruti* refers to the souls blinded by bad deeds (*anṛtena-pratyūḍha*); at the same time, however, this *śruti* also takes *atman* to be devoid of all sins, which is an apparent contradiction. If, on the other hand, *anṛta* is taken as *ajñāna*, the *śruti* should mean that the soul is generally blinded by *ajñāna*. Therefore, even though it is really devoid of any sins, a soul does not realise it and mistakes itself to be a sinner. Thus the word ‘*anṛta*’ occurring in the first *śruti*, should, in addition, mean *ajñāna*, and not merely bad deeds, because the analogy holds out the ignorance of an ordinary person about the location of treasures beneath his feet. Likewise, an individual soul does not know its true nature, because it is possessed by *ajñāna*. Moreover, it must be recognised that from time immemorial, people have been labouring under an obstacle to self-realisation. Therefore, such an obstacle must be recognised as being removed with the dawning of knowledge. In ordinary experience, knowledge discards ignorance. Therefore, in the world of metaphysics, ignorance

should be accepted as the beginningless obstacle, which is liable to dismissal by the knowledge of reality. That such an obstacle is dispelled by knowledge is also borne out by the *śruti*, which says that ultimately (when the knowledge arises) the cosmic illusion ceases to exist.[127]

The evidence of arthāpatti (inference from circumstances)[128]

It should be noted here that Madhusūdana tries to give a more practical reason for accepting *ajñāna* as an object of metaphysical consideration. The evidence of implication also proves the existence of *ajñāna* as a positive entity. It is a fact that all-bliss Brahman is self-revealed, yet it is equally true that such Brahman is not revealed to an ordinary person. How should such an apparent contradiction be explained? The explanation is found in the recognition of *ajñāna*, which should then be taken as concealing the nature of Brahman from an ordinary individual. Another argument is that as the material cause of illusion cannot otherwise be explained, the existence of *ajñāna* must be accepted as serving as the material cause of illusion. Neither mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) nor Brahman can be taken as the material cause, for mind has to depend on the sense organs to produce a cognition. But the illusory knowledge of the shell-silver is produced independent of sense-object contact. So mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is helpless in producing that knowledge. Brahman being immutable, it cannot be the material cause of anything.[129] However, Brahman is taken to be the material cause of the universe only insofar as it is the substratum of *ajñāna*, which is the material cause of all illusion.

Thus, all these four kinds of evidence prove the existence of *ajñāna* as a beginningless, positive entity, capable of being eradicated by knowledge alone. *Ajñāna* cannot be accepted as revealed by absolute consciousness, that is reality. If it is, the content of absolute revelation, it becomes as real as Brahman itself, and therefore should be taken to exist even at the time of liberation. If, on the other hand, *ajñāna* is taken as revealed by *sākṣin*, that is the consciousness reflected in a mode of it (*avidya-vrtti*),[130] then from an absolute standpoint such *sākṣin* is as false as its revelation. *Ajñāna*, being the content of such revelation, naturally becomes false; just as 'Rāhu' is revealed by the sun or the moon encapsulated by 'Rāhu', so also *ajñāna* is revealed by a stance of consciousness, (sākṣī), which is covered by *ajñāna*. *Ajñāna*, as such, cannot be manifest in a cognitive knowledge (*vṛtti-jñāna*). But, as previously demonstrated, *vṛtti-jñāna* can prove the existence of *ajñāna* as something distinct from the object of illusion. Similarly, it is as liable to destruction as it is beginningless.

Substratum of avidyā

Following *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*,[131] Madhusūdana takes pure consciousness to be the substratum of *ajñāna*. *Ajñāna* exercises its power (such as *duḥkhitva*, etc.) on the *jīva* but it does not exist therein. The *jīva* is, according to Madhusūdana

(who possibly believed in the existence of a single individual self),[132] the reflection of consciousness on a special mode (vṛtti) of *avidyā*. Just as the blemishes on a mirror affect the reflection on it, but not the object reflected, so the operation of *ajñāna* influences the *jīva*, but does not influence pure consciousness. Consciousness per se is not opposed to *ajñāna*, but it is so when reflected on a mode. The sun sustains everything by its rays, but when these rays shine through the lens of a magnifying glass, they burn the grass etc. on which they fall. Likewise, *ajñāna* remains safe in pure consciousness, but when the same consciousness becomes reflected on a special mode of *ajñāna*, it destroys *ajñāna* and its products.[133] When the *jīva* is called '*ajña*', it only means that *avidyā* and its effects operates just on the individual soul.[134]

Madhusūdana's opponents argue that although it is undeniable that illusion arises in the cogniser, such illusion is destroyed by valid knowledge arising in the same cogniser. Hence the cogniser, being the substratum of both error and valid knowledge, should be taken to be the locus of *ajñāna*, which is nothing but non-revelation of an object. Madhusūdana answers that the cogniser is none other than *sākṣin* identified with the individual consciousness as well with pure Brahman, which is the substratum of *ajñāna*. Thus, where there is identity between the cogniser, *sākṣin* and pure consciousness, *ajñāna* can very well be said to exist in the cogniser.

Acceptance of Vācaspati's view

Thus, establishing a la Sarvajñātma Muni, that pure consciousness is the substratum of *avidyā*, Madhusūdana further proceeds to justify the view of Vācaspati Miśra, that *jīva* is the locus (*āśraya*) of *avidyā*. According to Vācaspati Miśra, *jīva* is consciousness limited by *ajñāna*.[135] Opponents object that as a product of *avidyā*, *jīva* cannot be its locus, as that would involve interdependency. In other words, *jīva*, in order to be the locus of *avidyā*, has to be pre-existent. But how can *jīva*, which depends on *avidyā* for its existence, pre-exist *ajñāna*? Madhusūdana answers that as both *avidyā* and *jīva* are beginningless, there is no question of interdependency in their production. Such interdependency does not occur even in the knowledge of either *avidyā* or *jīva*, for although *avidyā* is revealed by consciousness, *jīva*, (which is consciousness itself), does not depend on *avidyā* for its own revelation. Finally, the fault of interdependency cannot be ascribed to *jīva* and *avidyā* even in their existence, as although *avidyā* exists in consciousness and depends on it for its own existence, consciousness, that is *jīva*, does not depend on *avidyā* for its existence.[136]

Object or content of avidyā

Pure consciousness is not only the locus (*āśraya*), but also the object (*viṣaya*) of *avidyā*. In other words, pure consciousness is somehow connected with *avidyā* so that one has the usage 'Brahman does not exist nor is it revealed'. Even though

Brahman as the self-revealed reality may always be revealed as pure existence it is not revealed as pure bliss, due to the operation of *avidyā*,. At least, such usage as 'Brahman is revealed to me as pure bliss' is found wanting, and lack of this usage is due to the operation of *avidyā*. This brings about the false relationship (*ādhyāsika tādātmya*) between *avidyā* and Brahman. Such a relationship persists until the dawning of true knowledge. As this contact of *avidyā* with Brahman is beginningless, such questions as 'when did the contact first take place?', 'when was the contact first known?' or, 'when did it first exist?', do not arise.[137] Though undifferentiated consciousness cannot be partially revealed by itself, that is as the substratum only and not in its fullest glory, yet due to the special power of *avidyā*, absolute Brahman is indicated as non-existent, not revealed. It can also be experienced as just real (*sat*), the locus of the world illusion.

Ajñāna thus conceals Brahman from *jīva*. The problem with this is that just as a pitcher covers a lamp, thereby barring the lamp's contact with another object (non-luminous), similarly *avidyā*, by covering consciousness, should prevent its contact with another object. But how can *avidyā* conceal consciousness from another consciousness, namely *jīva*? Madhusūdana replies that *jīva*, being limited by mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), is illusorily distinguished from pure consciousness, and *avidyā* conceals pure consciousness from such illusorily distinguished *jīva*, which is thus reduced to the status of another object. As both the distinction between Brahman and *jīva* and the concealment of Brahman from *jīva* are beginningless, they involve no interdependency.[138]

Again, one may ask how can self-luminous consciousness be the object (*viṣaya*) of *ajñāna*? In other words, how can *ajñāna* be related to consciousness? Like darkness and light, they cannot have a mutual relationship of any kind.[139] Madhusūdana answers that pure consciousness, or *sākṣin*, is not opposed to *ajñāna*. In fact, *avidyā*, being the illusory creation of consciousness, can easily stay in consciousness like any other created object. For example, an analysis of the experience 'I am ignorant of the object you are referring to', yields the following results: when a person has general knowledge about an object (say, the pitcher) doubt may arise in the mind as to whether it is a pitcher or not. It follows that though the doubt is based on the general knowledge of the pitcher, this doubt itself embraces the pitcher in its specific form (*ghaṭatva*). Similarly, in the given experience, the pitcher (the object referred to by the first person) is taken specifically, though such knowledge on the part of the second person is based on the general knowledge of the object referred to by the first person. This knowledge, therefore, is a revelation of the object (i.e. the pitcher) referred to by the first person. Such revelation is nothing but the revelation of consciousness as conditioned by the pitcher (*ghaṭāvachinna caitanya prakāśa*). But this very revelation reveals *ajñāna*, as testified by the above experience. This shows that revelation of consciousness (*caitanya prakāśa* though in the present case such consciousness is limited by the pitcher) is not opposed to *ajñāna*. In other words, consciousness that reveals its own self also reveals the *ajñāna* at the same time. In this sense, therefore, *ajñāna* may be related to knowledge (*jñāna*), even though

both *Jñāna* and *ajñāna* may be concerned with the same object in the same form. On the other hand, knowledge of an object is found to destroy *ajñāna* regarding the same object. How is it possible to reconcile these two apparently contradictory facts?[140] Madhusūdana says that knowledge is not opposed to *ajñāna* when it is intuitive knowledge (*sākṣi-jñāna*). That is, intuitive knowledge being the substratum of *ajñāna* is not opposed to it. When, on the other hand, such knowledge is a cognitive knowledge (*vṛtti-jñāna*), it discards *ajñāna* at once. Such an explanation therefore, presupposes a *sākṣi-jñāna* different from ordinary knowledge (*vṛtti-jñāna*). *Sākṣi-jñāna* is nothing but *sākṣin* or consciousness, which not being opposed to *ajñāna*, can have a mutual relationship. In this sense, *caitanya* may very well be the object of *ajñāna*.

Avidyā is anirvacanīya

The nature of *avidyā* cannot be specifically determined. Therefore, *avidyā* is known as '*anirvacanīya*' (indescribable). Reality may be divided into three categories: absolutely real (*sat*, like Brahman), absolutely unreal (*asat*, like the horns of a hare) or a compromise between the two. However, *avidyā* does not belong to any of these categories. If it is real like Brahman, it can never be destroyed. If it is absolutely unreal like the horns of a hare, it cannot be cognised at all. Since a compromise between the two is absurd, *avidyā* cannot fall within this category either. Defying all categories, *avidyā* is thus said to be indefinable (*anirvacanīya*) or false (*mithyā*). Opponents raise the objection that the negation of the real world means the assertion of unreal and vice versa; therefore, how can there be an entity that is both real and unreal? Madhusūdana answers that the concept of contradiction between absence and its positive counterpart is based on the presumption of reality of both. But in view of the fact that everything other than Brahman is false, such a presumption is unwarranted. Hence, a false thing, that is *avidyā*, comes under a fourth category, being other than the three mentioned above, namely, the real, the unreal and a combination of both. *Avidyā* is indescribable in this sense.

The falsity of the universe

The universe is the creation of *avidyā* and as such, it is false (*mithyā*). To prove the falsity of the universe, Madhusūdana puts forward the arguments of his predecessors one by one. Ānanandabodhācārya, advanced the following inference: 'the universe under consideration (*vimata*) is false (*mithyā*):

1 because it is the object of cognition (*dṛśyatvāt*);
2 because it is insensate (*jaḍatvāt*);
3 because it is limited (*paricchinnatvāt*).

The reason why Madhusūdana starts his answers to Vyāsatīrtha's arguments with his analysis of this syllogism is that Vyāsatīrtha picked up this syllogism

right at the start of his refutation of Śaṃkara's concept of the falsity of avidyā. In this connection, Madhusūdana has, naturally followed Vyāsatīrtha and adduced the same five definitions of falsity on the basis of those of different foregoing teachers of Advaita-vedānta.

Madhusūdana first takes up the major term of the syllogism namely, 'world is false'. So, he asks what is meant by falsity? He then starts answering himself this question by defining falsity.

Pañacapādikā's definition

The first definition is based on that of *Pañcapādikā*: a false (*mithyā*) entity is not the substratum of either existence or non-existence (*sadasattvānadhikaraṇa*). That is, existence (*sattvā*) means freedom from contradiction for all time to come (*trikālāvādhyatvam*) and non-existence means the ineligibility for being cognised anywhere. From this point of view, Brahman is existent in that it is never liable to contradiction, while the horn of a hare is non-existent because such a thing is never cognised. However, the universe steers through a middle course. While it is discarded by knowledge, it continues to appear in the pragmatic knowledge until the dawning of true knowledge of Reality.[141]

First definition of Vivaraṇa

The second definition of falsity is taken from the *Vivaraṇa*:[142] *mithyā* is an entity that appears in a place where it did not exist, does not exist, nor will exist in the future. Thus *Mithyā* is not absolutely non-existent like a hare's horn, for unlike it, *mithyā* appears to exist somewhere. It is not absolutely real either, as its existence is contradicted (*vādhya*). (*Pratipannopādhau traikālikaniṣedha-pratiyogitvam vā mithyātvam*.)[143]

The question is, therefore, whether the absolute negation of the universe is real *(tāttvika*) or unreal (*atāttvika*). Opponents argue that if such negation is real then a second reality other than Brahman must be acknowledged. However, such an admission will put an end to the monist theory. If, on the other hand, such negation is held to be *prātibhāsika* (illusory), then the opponents agree with this because they also hold such negation to be illusory. In that case, Madhusūdana does not put forward any new ideas. If such negation is said to possess pragmatic (*vyavahārika*) reality, then that being contradicted (*vādhita*) would make the universe, the positive counterpart of the negation, real, since a negation, if opposed, re-establishes its positive counterpart. Again, in this case, the *śruti* '*neha nānāsti kiñcana*'[144] has to be regarded as yielding a false proposition,[145] thus making the universe a reality.

Madhusūdana answers that in the case of the negation being ultimately real, it is regarded as being identical with Brahman, the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of such negation. So the reality of negation does not involve dualism. Furthermore, the positive counterpart of a real negation does not need to be real, for the real

negation of illusory shell-silver does not make it real. On the other hand, such negation may be taken as unreal, that is, the negation is *vyavahārika*. Though a *vyavahārika* entity is liable to contradiction (*vādhya*), such negation does not make the universe, its counterpart, real, since in dream, the illusory negation of an equally illusory object does not result in the confirmation of its counterpart (i.e. the illusory object). So if the negation is contradicted, it does not mean that such negation will confirm the reality of its positive counterpart. Only when the negation possesses a lesser degree of existence (*nyūnasattāka*) than its positive counterpart, does it fail to oppose the reality of its positive counterpart. In the present case, both the universe and its negation possess the same degree of existence (*tulyasattāka*) namely, *vyayahārika sattva*. Such negation need not imply absolute (*pāramārthika*) existence of the universe, for both the negation and its positive counterpart stand on the same footing, in that both are equally liable to contradiction. This is the case in the destruction of an object, which negates the existence of both the object and its antecedent absence. Both the universe and its contradiction are equally liable to contradiction, because both have a common feature, namely *dṛśyatva*. As the *śruti* '*neha nānāsti kiñcana*' asserts the unreality of the unreal object, it cannot be regarded as invalid (*apramāṇa*).

Opponents argue that the negation of the shell-silver and that of the universe cannot be on par in terms of their specific attributes (*svarūpa*),[146] since in the case of the negation of silver, the form of the contradictory knowledge is 'here (i.e. in the shell) silver did not exist'. If this knowledge is analysed it reveals that, in this case, the positive counterpart of negation is the real silver. (It should be noted here that 'real' means *vyavahārika*). It may be said, of course, that the content of the shell-silver illusion was the illusory silver, and thus itself, according to the rule that the content of illusion should be identical with the content of the contradictory knowledge of that illusion, the counterpart of the negation of shell-silver is illusory silver taken in terms of reality (*pāramārthikatva*). So the second explanation means 'the illusory silver did not really exist'. But equally this cannot be regarded as the negation of illusory silver per se. If, on the other hand, the contradictory knowledge is taken to negate real silver in terms of illusion, then similarly such real silver is not negated as it really is. Therefore, the negation of shell-silver cannot be taken as an example of the negation of an entity just as it is (*svarūpataḥ*).[147]

Moreover, even the author of *Vivaraṇa*, whose view is followed by Madhusūdana in the present case, states that the positive counterpart of the negation of silver is the ordinary real (*laukika pāramārthika*) silver taken as it is, and not the illusory silver. The *Vivaraṇa* also states as an alternative view, that the illusory silver taken as real is negated in the contradictory knowledge, but not at its face value. In such a case, the *Vivaraṇa* cannot confirm that in the example of the shell-silver contradiction, the positive counterpart is the unqualified illusory silver. So how can the shell-silver contradiction serve as an example for the contradiction of the universe?

The third objection is that if the universe is negated as it is then, like the sky-flower, the universe also becomes absolutely non-existent. In that case, how can the *śruti* confirm the creation of the universe, because an absolutely non-existent object cannot be created?

Madhusūdana answers that in the first case of contradictory knowledge, the positive counterpart is indeed the illusory silver. In the shell-silver illusion, the illusory silver had appeared as identified with real silver.[148] Therefore, the knowledge that contradicts it has the illusory silver as its positive counterpart, which appears as identified with the real silver. In other words, the illusory silver 'appearing as identical with real silver' is negated in the experience of contradiction, where such illusory silver is taken just at its face value. In such a case, the same silver that appeared in the illusion becomes contradicted by the opposing knowledge.

In the second case stated earlier, the content of the aforementioned experience of contradiction, namely, 'here existed no silver', is not merely the illusory silver but the illusory silver 'appearing identical with the real silver'. The statement in the *Vivaraṇa* should thus be interpreted in the following way: the illusory silver appearing as identical with real silver, as qualified by its special attributes, is negated in the experience of contradiction. Though, as an alternative, the same statement may refer to the negation of illusory silver taken as real. From the form of the sentence used, Madhusūdana adds, it appears that the *Vivaraṇa* only casually puts forward this alternative form. In fact, the aforementioned *Vivaraṇa* passage can be formulated as follows: it means that illusory silver taken as identified with real silver is negated in terms of shell-silver's specific attributes (*svarūpa*) or (and this 'or' shows the dislike of the *Vivaraṇa* for the second view) in terms of reality.

In the third case, the inference: 'the universe is not as unreal as a sky flower, since a sky flower never appears to exist, while the universe does appear to exist until the dawning of true knowledge.

Such a universe, which can be cognised, may possess its creation, function, a material cause and destruction, and yet can still be the positive counterpart of its absolute negation.

Thus it is just like the shell-silver, which possesses creation etc. and yet can be absolutely negated. In this inference, the analogy lies between the negation of the illusory silver taken per se, and the universe, also confirmed to be negated as per se.[149]

Second definition of Vivaraṇa

The third definition of *mithyātva* is also based on the *Vivaraṇa*:[150] '*mithyā* means that which is liable to termination (*nivartya*) by knowledge (*jñānanivartyatvam vā mithyātvam*)'. Opponents argue that as the first knowledge is destroyed by the second knowledge, such first knowledge should be regarded as *mithyā* according to the definition stated earlier.[151] Moreover, when a pitcher is smashed it is

destroyed, but such destruction is not brought about by knowledge, though the pitcher is a *mithyā* object. Madhusūdana replies that *mithyā* is to be understood as an entity whose existence in general is liable to contradiction by knowledge. In the case of a smashed pitcher, though such a pitcher is destroyed in its gross form (*kāryarūpa*), it continues to exist as latent in its material cause.[152] Such destruction then does not mean the negation of its existence in general. By the same logic, the second knowledge cannot destroy the existence in general of the first knowledge. The existence of the illusory shell-silver should be acknowledged at the time of its appearance, but the contradicting knowledge negates the existence in general of the shell-silver. Thus, the contradicting knowledge destroys not only the shell-silver but also its material cause, that is, the particular *ajñāna* creating it. Thus the shell-silver is robbed of its existence in general by the contradicting knowledge.[153]

Mithyā may also be that which has narrower scope than *jñānatva*', that is, the generic quality of knowledge. Therefore, it is liable to destruction by knowledge characterised by the same generic quality.[154] His opponents raise the objection that memory is also characterised by the generic quality '*smṛtitva*', which is narrower than *jñānatva*.[155] When a memory takes place, it destroys the mental impression (*saṃskāra*) that produces it. Then the definition of *mithyātva* misses its mark (*arthāntara*) insofar *saṃskāra* is concerned. Madhusūdana answers that the advent of memory does not, in fact, destroy the *saṃskāra* producing such memory. However, it does produce another *saṃskāra* regarding the same object and thus the number of *saṃskāras* is multiplied.[156]

Alternatively, the definition might be explained as that which is liable to be contradicted by direct knowledge. This interpretation is much simpler than the second interpretation of *jñāna-nivartyatva*. Hence, the author of the *Vārtika* states that, 'when the direct knowledge is generated by the *śruti* "*tattvamasi*," the *avidyā*, along with its effect, completely ceases to exist'.

Definition of Citsukha

The fourth definition of *mithyā* is taken from Citsukha's '*Svāśrayaniṣṭhātyantābhāva pratiyogitva' 'mithyā* is the positive counterpart of the absolute negation co-existing in the same locus (*āśraya*) as the object under review'. This is interpreted in the following way: a *mithyā* is the positive counterpart of the absolute negation that is invariably present where the same object appears to 'be'.[157] In other words, an object that is invariably absent where it seems to be present is called *mithyā*. His opponents argue that when a pitcher is produced from its halves (*kapāla*), its material cause, it remains inherent (*samaveta*) in the *kapāla*, so how can it be absolutely absent? Madhusūdana answers that both the pitcher and its absolute negation may co-exist at the same time, for example, the pitcher exists in the *kapāla* at the same time as its absence remains on the floor. Likewise, why are the pitcher and its non-existence unable to co-exist at the same place?[158] Though the pitcher becomes absent in its

material cause in the way stated earlier, the law of causality is not violated thereby. The antecedent negation (*prāgabhāva*) of a particular pitcher, resting with a particular *kapāla*, regulates the production of that particular pitcher from that specific *kapāla*. As in time, so also at the same place (as, for example, in the *kapāla* in the present case) the antecedent negation as well as the absolute negation of the same object (i.e. the pitcher in the present case) can co-exist. Though such co-existence may not be apparent to us, the authority of the *śruti* (*neha nānāsti kiñcana*) establishes such co-existence. Moreover, while the pitcher is a pragmatic reality, its absence is absolute. Therefore, for us, the pitcher and its absence can co-exist (in the *kapālas*) because each of them has a different grade of reality. The law of contradiction operates only where the absence and its positive counterpart possess the same degree of reality. Obviously for Madhusūdana, this is a more reasonable and direct explanation than the former one, which is somewhat involved. Thus, just as illusory shell-silver and its pragmatically real absence can easily co-exist on the shell, likewise the pitcher and its absence can both be present on the *kapāla* without any fear of contradiction. Though in this way the universe becomes absolutely absent, it should not be confused with the non-existence of the 'horns of a hare' (*asat*). They are different because, while the latter never appears to exist at any locus, the former evidently appears to exist in Brahman. So the definition of *mithyā* boils down to this: an illusory object is, in fact, absolutely and invariably absent whenever and wherever it appears to exist.

Definition of Ānandabodha

The fifth definition of *mithyā* is derived from Ānandabodhācārya: 'a *mithyā* is other than real (*sat*), yet it appears to be real'. 'Real' is that entity which is established by a proper means of knowledge, (*pramāṇa*). *Pramāṇa* is defined as the instrumental cause (*kāraka*) of knowledge, which is not accompanied by *doṣa* (fault). In other words, 'real' is that which is the object of a valid knowledge.[159] Knowledge is said to be valid when its content is never contradicted. According to the Naiyāyikas the difference between the shell-silver illusion (*bhrama-jñāna*) and valid knowledge (*pramā-jñāna*) of a pitcher lies in the fact that although in both the experiences, the instrumental cause (*kāraka*, for example the sense-organs) is the same, in the case of illusion such an instrumental cause is accompanied by some fault. According to Advaita-vedānta, both shell-silver illusion and the knowledge of the pitcher are illusory knowledge, inasmuch as the objects of such knowledge are contradicted (*vādhita*). Accepting the Naiyāyika's principle of discrimination between an error (*bhrama*) and valid knowledge, the monists recognise *avidyā* as the *doṣa* in both the earlier cases. Thus for the Advaita-vedāntin, only knowledge of Brahman is valid, as its content (namely, Brahman) is never contradicted. Though *avidyā* is accepted as the material cause of all the three types of experiences, namely transcendental (*Brahma-jñāna*), empirical (*ghaṭa-jñāna*) and false (*brahma-jñāna*), to justify the illusory nature of the latter two cases, *avidyā* is recognised there to be an agent (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) as well.

In the case of transcendental experience, on the other hand, *avidyā* does not play any role. Hence, experience of Brahman is not an illusion. In other words, the knowledge of Brahman is not accompanied by avidyā-*doṣa*, while both the illusory knowledge of shell-silver and the ordinary knowledge of a pitcher are. Therefore, while the content of the first knowledge is confirmed by a flawless *pramāna*, the contents of the second and third experiences (i.e. shell-silver and the pitcher) are not so. So both shell-silver and the pitcher are false in that they are other than that (i.e. Brahman), which is confirmed by an instrument of knowledge unaccompanied by any flaw (*doṣa*).

The major premise of Ānandabodha's syllogism (P. 26) is, 'the world is false (*mithyā*)'. Apropos to that, Madhusūdana analyses and defends the defining nature of *mithyā* as forwarded by most of the prominent teachers of Advaita-vedānta. Although only one definition would have been enough, Madhusūdana gives as many as five definitions. The reason for that is that he is answering Vyāsatīrtha who attacked and refuted all the prominent teachers of Advaita-vedānta, preceding him, on their definitions of falsity. Thus the major term (*sādhya*) of the syllogism intended to establish the falsity of the universe is settled.

Madhusūdana next proceeds to examine the three middle terms (*hetu*) for the same inference. In this connection he puts forward several explanations of the first *hetu, dṛśyatva*. Among these, the following deserves primary consideration:[160] 'a *dṛśya* is a phenomenon pervaded by a cognitive mode (*vṛtti*)'. Opponents argue that Brahman is also pervaded by a certain *vṛtti* known as *akhaṇḍākāracittavṛtti*.[161] Madhusūdana answers that pure consciousness (i.e. Brahman) is not the content of that *vṛtti*, but the limited consciousness (*upahita* Brahman) is – and limited consciousness is *mithyā*. It may be asked that if pure consciousness cannot be the content of any *vṛtti*, how can the *śruti* present such consciousness? The answer is that pure consciousness, being self-revealed and self-valid, does not depend on any external evidence for its establishment. When the *śruti* states that 'consciousness is pure and self revealed' it implies that impurity pervades all lack of self-revelation and as consciousness is not impure, it does not lack self-revelation. Opponents argue that pure consciousness may not be the content of a *vṛtti*, but Madhusūdana admits that the limited (*upahita*) consciousness can be the content of *vṛtti*. If it is so, then he must admit the validity of the following argument, namely 'as the limitation (*viśeṣaṇa*) becomes the content of a *vṛtti* embracing the limited, so also the subject (*viśeṣya*) that is limited, becomes the content of the same *vṛtti*. In the present case such a subject is pure consciousness. Hence, in this way, pure consciousness does become the content of *vṛtti*'. Madhusūdana answers that when pure consciousness becomes the subject (*viśeṣya*) it no longer remains pure.[162] This is because the content then becomes consciousness, limited by a qualifying adjective.

His opponents argue that it is a fallacious argument. Because when *akhaṇḍākara-cittavṛtti* is intended to embrace limited consciousness, such limitation, in the absence of anything else, is the *akhaṇḍākara vṛtti* itself. Therefore, the *vṛtti* that embraces the limited, embraces the limitation as well. Thus the *vṛtti*

inevitably becomes its own content. Madhusūdana cannot accept this position, for the aforesaid *vṛtti* is, after all, a verbal cognition and as such, it cannot concern anything which relevant words (such as, *tat tvam asi*,) have not presented. Moreover, as this *akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti* concerns a *vṛtti* (a product of *avidyā*) it cannot discard *avidyā* altogether, as claimed by the Advaita-vedānta. Only such knowledge, which does not concern either *avidyā* or its effect, can discard them.

Madhusūdana, following the author of *Kalpataru*,[163] answers that while *akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti* embraces consciousness, the same *vṛtti*, without being its own content, conditions the consciousness. For instance, in the case of *sākṣin*, which is consciousness limited by *ajñāna* (i.e. *ajñāna vṛtti*), *ajñāna* is the content of *sākṣī*-knowledge, yet being unconscious it cannot be *sākṣin*. Likewise, consciousness limited by *vṛtti* is the content of *vṛtti*, yet the limitation remains outside this *vṛtti*'s own purview. Therefore, opponents cannot raise any objection regarding the *vṛtti* being its own content. From the earlier discussion, Madhusūdana concludes that as the object of the primal *ajñāna* is Brahman, limited by that *ajñāna*, and the content of *akhaṇḍākāra vṛtti* is the same limited Brahman, only this time limited by a *vṛtti*, so both *ajñāna* and its contradictory knowledge occupy the same content, that is, Brahman. In both cases, the content is limited but it is not the agent of limitation as well.[164] So far, Madhusūdana has established the view that *pure* Brahman is not at all the content of any cognitive *vṛtti*.

In that case, he further elaborates, the term 'being pervaded by *vṛtti*', (*vṛttivyāpyatva*), with reference to an empirical object, would mean that it is the object of a cognitive *vṛtti* arising from anything other than *only* verbal evidence. Thus, Brahman is the content of a cognitive *vṛtti* which is verbal (i.e. the śruti, *tat tvam asi*), and the non-existing 'horn of a hare', which is also the content of a verbal cognitive *vṛtti* namely, 'the hare's horn is unreal' are equally excluded from the category of *dṛśya*, that is empirical phenomena.[165]

Madhusūdana gives a third explanation of the term 'to be pervaded by a cognitive *vṛtti* (*vṛttivyāpyatva*)', in that a *dṛśya* is the object of determinate knowledge (*savikalpa-jñāna*). Determination is an attribute, which is cognised as existing in the object which is the content of the experience. Thus Brahman, being unqualified, cannot be the object of any determinate knowledge. Likewise, the so-called attribute (e.g. *gagana-kusumatva*, the attribute of being a sky-flower) of a non-existing sky-flower, (*gagana-kusuma*), never appears to be really existing. Therefore, none of them can be regarded as *dṛśya*. Even *abhāva* (negation) is grasped as qualified by the existing quality, *abhāvatva*.[166]

Dṛśya may also mean being the object of consciousness, (*caitanya*). To be the object of consciousness means to be related to the latter by any type of relationship. Brahman, being itself consciousness, cannot be related to its own self. Likewise, a hare's horn, being non-existent, can never be related to consciousness. Therefore, neither Brahman nor the non-existing hare's horn can be regarded as *dṛśya*.[167]

A *dṛśya* may also be described as an entity which, for its own usage (*vyavahāra*) is invariably dependent upon knowledge which is not its own self

(*svātirikta*).[168] The word 'usage' includes both the revelation of the entity and the use of it by means of words (*śabda-vyavahāra*). This means a *dṛśya* is never self-revealed. In other words, it is always revealed by knowledge of itself, which knowledge is other than its own self. On the other hand, consciousness is self-revealed in that without being the content of any knowledge, it can be revealed and be used as existing. The universe does not possess such self-revelation, which is thus a *dṛśya*.

The second middle term is insensateness (*jaḍatva*).[169] That which is not sensate is *jaḍa* and hence it is other than knowledge; is other than self (*atman*) or, is not self-revealed. Opponents say that if *jaḍa* is stated to be that which is not knowledge, then consciousness will become *jaḍa*, for knowledge means consciousness connected with a cognitive *vṛtti*. So consciousness by itself is not knowledge, just as *vṛtti* by itself is not knowledge. Madhusuūdana answers that knowledge means the revealing consciousness as marked by an object (*arthopalakṣita prakāśa*). Such knowledge is consciousness itself. As the object is only a temporary marker (*upalakṣaṇā*), at the time of liberation, when no object remains, knowledge essentially can and does exist apart from any object. But a material object (*jaḍa*) cannot exist at that time.

The third middle term is *paricchinnatva*, which means that which is limited. Limitation can be of three kinds: the limitation of time, the limitation of space and the limitation of object. That which is the counterpart of destruction is known as limited by time; that which is the positive counterpart of absolute negation is known as limited by space and that which is the positive counterpart of mutual difference is known as limited by object. Brahman is not limited by time, by space or by object. Hence, it is not *paricchinna* like the universe.

The aforementioned discussion about the three middle terms of the syllogism establishes the validity of the inferential evidence for the falsity of the universe. Although the words of this inference make it clear that it refers to the world as a whole, by the same inference, one may determine the falsity of every pragmatic object, for example, 'the sky is false, because it is a *dṛśya* like the shell-silver'.

Chitsukha puts forward a separate inference to establish the falsity of an individual pragmatic object: 'This specific cloth is the positive counterpart of the absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) existing in this particular thread (that produces the cloth), because it (the cloth) is constituted of several parts (*aṃśitvāt*) like other such objects (*itarāṃśivat*).'[170]

After explaining the inference proving the falsity of the universe, Madhusūdana now states how shell-silver, the example of that syllogism, possesses major term (*sādhya*), namely falsity (*mithyātva*).[171] It has been stated before that a false object appears as existent in a locus, where its absolute non-existence invariably exists. This experience of existence of such a false object is discarded by direct knowledge that contradicts this. The locus of the false or illusory universe is Brahman and as this universe has illusory contact of identity with Brahman, it appears to exist (*sat*). In the case of shell-silver, it must also be acknowledged that since shell-silver has a locus where it appears, it has an

existence. As only direct knowledge can discard shell-silver illusion, it must have been directly experienced in illusion. It has been stated before that an illusory object is invariably absent where it is present (vide the definition of Citsukha). Moreover, when the *Vivaraṇa* maintains that an illusory object is discarded by direct knowledge (vide the second definition of falsity given by Prakāśātma Yati), it means that the cognition of a false object is also direct knowledge. A direct illusion is discarded by direct valid knowledge only. A direct illusion requires the presence of the object of illusion because direct knowledge is confined only to the object that is present at the time of the direct knowledge. All this shows that even an illusory object has to exist albeit temporarily.

The question might be raised as to how the pitcher, as well as the shell-silver, can be recognised as existing in the same sense, because while the pitcher continues to exist until the dawning of ultimate knowledge, the shell-silver is falsified within a few moments after its knowledge.[172] Madhusūdana answers that the word '*rajata*' (silver) is equally applicable to illusory as well as to the real (pragmatically existent) *rajata*, by virtue of the fact that in the case of the real silver, the generic quality of the silver (*rajatatva*), which has a pragmatic utility, does in fact exist therein, while it is ascribed to the illusory silver. Likewise, existence (*sattā*), which really belongs to Brahman alone, is ascribed to the pitcher as well as to the shell-silver. In that sense, both the pitcher and the shell-silver are said to exist. Though in real sense existence is the special privilege of Brahman and is an imposition on the pitcher as well as on the shell-silver, the imposed existence is nevertheless recognised by Madhusūdana as an existence.[173] The practical difference between the pitcher and the shell-silver is explained by the assumption that in the case of the pitcher, such imposed existence is pragmatic (i.e. remains uncontradicted until the dawning of ultimate knowledge), whereas in the case of shell-silver it is illusory (i.e. is discarded within a few moments from the knowledge of shell-silver). In this way, Madhusūdana has recognised the experience of shell-silver's temporary existence, even if it is illusory, as is the existence of empirically experienced universe. Hence, shell-silver can serve as a good example in the inference proving the illusoriness of the universe (*prapañca*). Madhusūdana has drawn upon Śaṃkara's theory of the experience of the inexplicable (*anirvacanīya khyāti*) to justify such existence of shell-silver, which maintains that the illusory knowledge of shell-silver concerns the illusorily existing silver and not the empirical silver.

The Mīmāṃsā-school raises the question as to why one should recognise the existence of shell-silver at all. According to them, the experience of shell-silver ('this is silver') is not a single knowledge. One directly perceives only 'this'. The perception of 'silver', as its qualification is in fact a case of memory of empirical silver. One is said to undergo the experience 'this is silver', only so far as one fails to grasp the difference between the two forms of experience – perception in the case of 'this', and memory in the case of silver – and also fails to grasp the difference between the two objects of this knowledge, namely 'this' and 'silver'. So it is not a unitary knowledge and one need not accept the existence of

shell-silver to justify such knowledge. Such a lack of discrimination between the two forms of mental activities, namely, perception of an object and the memory of its supposed quality of 'silverness' generate reactions in the beholder in the form of his/her rushing towards it. This theory is known as a form of experience that only partially reveals its content (*Akhyātivāda*).

Madhusūdana criticises this theory and argues that mere non-comprehension of distinction between the objects ('this' and 'silver') and between perception and memory, cannot produce any activity regarding the object (silver). The fact is that the comprehension of shell-silver induces one to go to pick it up. So one has to accept such comprehension to be a positivistic knowledge.

The Vijñānavādin Buddhists, who maintain that the shell-silver experience is a case of a lack of experience of a real object (*asat-khyātivāda*) may, of course, say that if one has to accept the experience of shell-silver, even then one need not accept its real existence. Knowledge itself may give the illusion of a form (*ākāra*) of an object, but such an object does not correspond to reality. The process is that the knowledge projects the form of silver on the 'object at the vicinity' ('this'). This 'object at the vicinity is real', according to Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools of Bauddhists while according to Vijñānavādins, it is illusorily, imagined by the beginningless flow of mental impressions (*vāsanā*) existing in the individuals. But in any case, the silver is a mere projection of knowledge and has no reality (*asat eva rajatam abhāt*).

Madhusūdana answers that if the object is thus reduced to a mere projection of knowledge then it cannot be perceived. Because, in order to perceive an object, a contact between the sense organ and the object is necessary. But this is not possible in the case of the non-existing silver.

To this, the followers of the Nyāya-school reply that for perception one need not recognise the creation of the *anirvacanīya* silver on 'this'. The Naiyāyikas contend that the knowledge – 'this is silver' – is a case of perception. So far as 'this' is concerned such perception is ordinary because the conjunction between the sense-organ and the object at the vicinity – the requisite sense-object contact – is available without any difficulty. Difficulty arises as to the requisite sense-object contact in the case of silver perception: contact between the eyes, on the one hand, and the silver –the object of that very, (mistaken), experience – on the other. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the silver revealed in the said experience is not shell-silver, but an actual piece of silver which the cogniser had actually witnessed at the market. Such previous cognition of real silver seen at the market has left the impression of real silver on his mind. At the sign of brightness in the object at the vicinity (i.e. the shell), the impression of real silver, lying dormant in the mind so far, is awakened, giving rise to the memory of real silver experienced before. Such a memory of real silver is what the Naiyāyikas call 'extraordinary perception of a connection' (*jñānalakṣaṇā sannikarṣa*) mistakenly attributed to an object of perception. Through the operation of this memory, the sense organ, namely the eyes, are said to perceive the real silver of the market. As such perception is a little out of the way, they recognise it as extraordinary (*alaukika*).

So analysis of that experience, 'this is silver', yields the following results: (1) this experience is purely a case of perception; (2) in the case of 'this' such perception is ordinary, while in the case of 'silver' it is extraordinary; (3) as real silver justifies such experience, there is no reason to recognise the creation of another kind of silver (i.e. the shell-silver) apart from the real silver.[174]

Madhusūdana refutes this view[175] by stating that '*jñānalakṣaṇā-sannikarṣa*' is not acceptable to the Advaita-vedāntins, since in all cases of perception (irrespective of valid knowledge and error) the sense-object contact (*viṣayendriya-sannikrṣa*) is a prerequisite. Therefore, in the case of the perception 'this is silver', there is no need to accept any other kind of contact except the same conjunction of sense and the object. Moreover, in the case of shell-silver error, so far as 'this' is concerned, the sense-object contact is available. Therefore, for the sake of economy of conception, one should accept that same contact in the case of silver, as well. Therefore, it is necessary to accept the existence of shell-silver for its perception to occur. As real silver cannot exist in shell, it is necessary to accept the creation of an apparent silver – a new kind of silver (*prātibhāsika rajata*), created by *avidyā* covering the shell.

The question is therefore: is it necessary to accept illusory silver as separate from the pragmatic silver and if such illusory silver is said to be revealed in error, then what is the positive counterpart of the contradicting knowledge? If the illusory silver, taken in that form, is regarded to be the positive counterpart of the contradictory knowledge, then the form of the negative experience should have been 'the silver was produced and is destroyed', and not 'the silver was never present in the shell', which is the purport of the contradictory knowledge.[176]

Madhusūdana challenges his opponents with a counter question: when do they believe that particular experience occurs?[177] Does it occur at the time of the revelation of shell-silver or at its contradiction (*vādha*)? Such experience cannot occur at the time of the revelation of shell-silver, since at that time shell-silver appears as identified with the shell. Thus it seems to have a continued existence without the question of being created or destroyed. Moreover, before the advent of contradictory knowledge, the beholder has never experienced any real silver to be totally destroyed. At the time of contradiction, on the other hand, the experience of the absolute negation of the silver prevents the existence of the experience, such as the shell-silver is produced and is destroyed. The existence of the experience of the absolute negation of silver prevents the advent of the experience of its being destroyed. Though the experience of the absolute negation is contradictory to the experience of its production, for all practical purposes, such experience has to be accepted for the sake of the nature of experience. This explanation is based on the assumption that the contradictory knowledge negates illusory shell- silver just as such. As an alternative view, it may be said that the content of negation is the illusory silver presented as real (*pāramārthika*).[178] Such reality, existing in the illusory silver at the time of its appearance, is equally illusory. Hence, in the experience of illusory silver's contradiction, the attribute of silver, namely its absoluteness, does not really belong to the illusory silver but

to something else. Thus the negation that comprises of an object possessing an attribute, which does not really belong to that object, does not invariably require the existence of the experience of its counterpart. In the given experience of the negation of illusory silver, its absoluteness is grasped through the function of memory. Indeed, Madhusūdana does not accept the notion that the content of a negative experience must be presented by that experience. Even the memory of such content is sufficient for the negative experience. In order to justify the actions generated in the beholder, such as trying to go near it etc., one must accept the attribute of some sort of pragmatic reality in the shell-silver. Such an attribute is common to both shell-silver and ordinary silver. Thus he seems to hold a view close to the Naiyayika view. The third most radical explanation given by Madhusūdana is that the real silver is the content of negation.[179]

It should be remembered that these various explanations are given only to justify the observations of such previous scholars of his school as Prakāśātma Yati; because he wanted to totally refute Vyāsatīrtha's argument attacking the Monistic Vedānta view. But, as previously mentioned, the personal view of Madhusūdana is that the illusory silver is revealed in error as identified with real silver, and the same silver (i.e. illusory silver as identified with pragmatic silver) is negated in the contradictory knowledge. The comprehension of shell-silver (in the form 'this is silver') consists of two parts. In 'this' (i.e. the locus) portion, it is ordinary perception, that is, a mental cognitive mode and in the 'silver' (i.e. the imposed) portion it is *sākṣī*-knowledge, that is, a mode of *avidyā*.

The question is if silver is not perceived, that is, if it does not fall within the purview of ordinary cognitive mode, then can one say 'I perceive the silver' (*rūpyam paśyāmi*)? Madhusūdana answers that: before the false knowledge of shell-silver is produced, we have the real knowledge of 'this' (*idam*). That is to say, we have a real cognitive awareness the content of which is 'this'. The content of the *avidyā-vṛtti* revealing false silver, on the other hand, has no connection with any sense organ and therefore should not be cognised as a perception. However, it can be explained as follows: since this false silver is produced by the *avidyā* that exists in the same cognitive consciousness as possessed by the cogniser the latter thinks it to be also perceived. So the perceptibility, which really belongs to the mental cognitive mode, is ascribed to *avidya-vṛtti*.[180] That is why we say 'I see silver'.

Not satisfied, his opponents raise the objection that if two different *vṛttis* are recognised, how is it possible to maintain unity of the experience 'this is silver'? Madhusūdana gives three explanations for this:[181]

1 Objects of the two *vṛttis* (namely, 'this' and 'silver') become identified through ascription. Such identification makes for the ascribed identity of the correspondence knowledge.
2 False silver, being the effect of *avidyā* existing in consciousness limited by 'this', appears as identical with the object 'this'. Likewise, the *avidyā-vṛtti*

presenting the false silver, being the effect of *avidyā* existing in the same conscious self, whose mental mode, at the time of shell-silver appearance, has as its content the unspecified yet real object 'this', appears as identified with the above mentioned mode of *avidyā* presenting the false shell-silver. In other words, in this procession of illusion, the individual consciousness, influenced by *avidyā* fails to distinguish between different modes of *avidyā* and their contents.[182]

3 Though the *vṛttis* are different, as both 'this' and 'silver' are revealed by the same consciousness limited by 'this',[183] the results appear to be one. As a consequence the knowledge is also one.[184] *Avidyā-vṛtti* cannot discard *avidyā* and hence cannot be regarded as cognitive knowledge. Only a mental *vṛtti* (here in the form of 'this') can discard *avidyā*, and therefore it is knowledge. This means that in the case of *idam rajatam*, one must accept that both the *vrttis* of the mind and *avidyā* are so closely juxtaposed that the experiencing individual fails to distinguish it.

In the case of 'this' – because the eyes have contacted with the object in front, (i.e. 'this') – the mind can go out of the visual sense organ and on reaching 'this', can assume the mode of the latter. But in the case of the silver, no such process is possible.[185]

Rāmānuja, in his *Śrī-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* severely criticised the notion of *avidyā* as depicted by the Advaita-vedāntins. *Avidyā*, or *Māyā*, is accepted by all dualistic Vedāntins, as a divine power of Brahman. But they do not agree with the Advaita-vedāntic notion of *avidyā* as a false, beginningless indefinable entity existing in Brahman, the pure existence. In order to refute such *avidyā*, Vyāsarāja developed and used all these objections, along with those laid down by the teachers of other Vaiṣṇava systems, in countering the Advaita-vedānta views. Madhusūdana answered all the objections put forward by Vyāsarāja. Yet here he chooses to refute the arguments of Rāmānuja against the Advaita-vedānta's notion of *avidyā*. The reason for singling Ramānuja out, I shall argue, evinces Madhusūdana special regard for Rāmānuja's Vaiṣṇava theology, which to some extent, he even followed in his own *bhakti* exposition.

Rāmānuja's first objection concerns the nature of *avidyā* as a veil covering consciousness. The question may be asked as to whether the *avidyā* is real or false. If it is regarded as real, then the Advaitins are reverting to dualism. If, on the other hand, it is taken to be false, one has to discover another false entity in order to ascertain the cause of this falsity, thus leading it to endless regression. The answer to this objection is that *avidyā* is indeed a power of Brahman which, being a false entity, is identical with it. The universe is an evolution of this *avidyā*, which has threefold innate characteristics (*guṇas*), namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. *Avidyā* subsists in pure Brahman and is evolved into the universe. As evolution is the nature of *avidyā*, it does not need any other power to set it evolving except pure Brahman, its substratum.

The second objection of Rāmānuja is raised against the view that Pure Brahman is the substratum of *avidyā*, and that *jīva* is its object. The inferential proofs given to contradict the first view are:

1 *avidyā* does not subsist in Pure Brahman alone, because it exists in the knower;
2 Brahman is not the substratum of *avidyā* because it is devoid of the quality of being the knower. Rāmānuja explains objection to this view, because he regarded *avidyā* as being the absence of knowledge. Moreover, *avidyā*, being contradictory to knowledge, can never exist in it. Brahman, being absolute knowledge itself, cannot have the absence of knowledge as well. Madhusūdana's answers to such objections are based on the views of both Prakāśātma Yati and Vācaspati Miśra on that issue. With regard to the objection concerning *avidyā*'s existence in knowledge, Madhusūdana states that *avidyā* is not contradictory to just every kind of knowledge, but only to that of cognitive knowledge, which is not the transcendental Brahman, the substratum of *avidyā*. Madhusūdana's answer to Rāmānuja's objection concerning *avidyā*'s existence in *jīva* has already been covered earlier in this chapter.

Rāmānuja's third objection concerns the view that *avidyā* covers Brahman or in other words, that Brahman is the object of *avidyā*. Rāmānuja explains that the absence of Brahman's manifestation means either the lack of creation of such a manifestation or the destruction of it. But neither of these explanations is possible. Self-manifested, absolute Brahman can never be destroyed, nor is it created.

Madhusūdana answers this objection by establishing that *avidyā* falsely prevents the manifestation of self-luminous Brahman. Just as the sun, when covered by cloud, is considered as not manifest, likewise self-luminous Brahman, being covered by *avidyā*, is regarded as being neither existent nor manifest. But just as the cloud covers only the sight of the beholder, so also *avidyā* covers *jīva*, preventing him from realising the true nature of Brahman. Hence the beholder thinks Brahman is neither existent nor manifest.

The fourth objection is against the logical proofs put forward by the Advaitavedāntins to establish the positive *avidyā*. This point is very critically considered by Madhusūdana and has been discussed elsewhere in this book.

The fifth objection is raised in connection with the indefinable (*anirvacanīya*) nature of *avidyā*. In order to establish the nature of *avidyā*, Madhusūdana discusses the concept of indescribability (*anirvācyatva*). *Anirvācyatva* can be defined as:

1 quality of being different from existent, non-existent or both existent and non-existent at the same time;
2 quality of not being proven as either existent or non-existent or otherwise (*satvāsatvābhyām vicārāsahatve sati sadasatvena vicarāsahatva*;
3 quality of being contradicted where it appears to be existent (*pratipannopādhau vādhyatvam*).

Here the words 'existent' and 'non-existent' are used in the normal sense. It cannot be objected that contradiction of one means the existence of the other, because all forms of contradiction are regarded as false in this system. For example, it cannot be claimed that false silver is contradictory to real shell. Therefore, whenever in the definition the term 'contradiction' (*niṣedha*) is used in connection with existence, non-existence and so on, it is done in order to establish the falsity of those objects. Those who consider the destruction of *avidyā* as a fifth category, other than existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence and the contradiction of both, should add 'the quality of not being existent at the time of liberation' to the definition of *anirvācyatva*. When it is stated that all contradictions are false, this means that both existence and non-existence, as they are normally experienced, are false. Though in the case of real existence and non-existence, the absence of both cannot exist anywhere, but in the case of false existence and non-existence, the absence of both simultaneously is possible in a third object such as *avidyā*. The conclusion is that although each existence and non-existence co-exists with the absence of the other, neither of these is identified with the absence of the other. This particular nature of *avidyā* is established by several means of valid knowledge, such as perception, inference, *śruti* and *arthāpatti*, and is perceived when one experiences the contradiction of the knowledge of false silver (*nedam rajatam*).

The *inference* supporting the *anirvācyatva* of *avidyā* runs in the following way: 'the disputed object is something other than existent and non-existent, while it is other than both existent and non-existent together; either, because it is subjected to negation or, its manifestation depends on some false object. That which is not subjected to negation or does not depend on some false object for its manifestation, is none other than existence, etc., such as Brahman' (*vimatam sattvārahitatve sati*, *asattvā-rahitatve sati sattvāsattvārahitam*; *vādhyatvāt*, *doṣaprayuktabhānatvād vā*; *yannaivam tannaivam*; *yathā* Brahma).

Madhusūdana presents *arthāpatti pramāṇa* in the following way: the object of controversy, such as shell-silver cannot be real or it would never be contradicted, nor can it be unreal, for in that case it would never appear to be existent. But the fact is, such silver *is* contradicted and *does* appear to be existent. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that such silver is neither real nor unreal, and hence it is *anirvācya*, or false.

Rāmānuja's final point of contention is that nothing can destroy beginningless and positive *avidyā*. This is based on the assumption that pure, absolute, immutable and indeterminate Brahman is a false conception. For Rāmānuja, Brahman is always qualified (*saguṇa*). However, Madhusūdana has fully considered the issue, that and his conclusions are discussed in the next chapter.

3

KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

In Advaita-vedānta, knowledge or consciousness (*caitanya*) is the only existing reality, which is the essence (*svarūpa*) of Brahman and the only spontaneously revealed entity.[186] Objects are by nature non-conscious (*jaḍa*) and hence not automatically revealed. They are revealed only when they come into contact with knowledge, through a relationship created by *avidyā*. The transcendental knowledge is absolute and has no real relation with empirical objects, for there can be no relationship between knowledge and the known, insofar as the former is absolute truth, while the latter, being the creation of *avidyā*, is false. However, to explain the physical universe that has forced itself upon our knowledge, some sort of relationship has to be recognised between knowledge and the known, since if knowledge is totally unrelated to objects of knowledge, then it cannot possibly reveal the object. Thus knowledge, though itself transcendental, somehow becomes connected with the objects which it reveals. 'Knowledge' is used in Advaita-vedānta to mean both absolute knowledge, when left by itself, and pragmatic (cognitive) knowledge, when wrongly related to false objects. Epistemology concerns itself with the latter kind of knowledge as distinct from absolute knowledge, which is a metaphysical entity; although in substance both types of knowledge are one and the same.

Philosophers have tried to comprehend ultimate knowledge/reality through empirical knowledge. Although ultimate truth, per se, transcends empirical comprehension, empirical knowledge is useful insofar as it repels ignorance (*ajñāna*) about ultimate reality (absolute knowledge). It must be noted here that absolute knowledge per se is not antagonistic to ignorance. Since absolute knowledge is the locus (*āśraya*) of ignorance, it is also the locus of all products of ignorance. However, the same knowledge removes ignorance only when it is conditioned by a cognitive mode (*vṛtti*), just as the rays of the sun that usually sustain grass, burn it when those same rays are refracted through a magnifying glass.[187] Therefore, an object is exposed to knowledge only through the operation of *vṛtti*. Cognition of an object, being empirical knowledge, should therefore involve *vṛtti*. That is why it is called *vṛtti-jñāna*, and is described as consciousness reflected on a cognitive mental mode (*vṛtti*).

It is common knowledge that some external objects exist, which are not always known to the knower (*pramātā*). That means the cognisant has ignorance about those objects. Knowledge is the revelation of an object to the cognisant, consequent upon the removal of his ignorance regarding that object. Although the knower is identical with Brahman in substance, still everything is revealed to Brahman, the substratum of creation. Whereas, an object is revealed to the knower, *pramātā* only when it is covered by a *vṛtti*, which, as will be shown later, is either a mode of the inner sense organ of the knower or a mode of *avidyā*. Thus it must be acknowledged that for the manifestation of objects, cognitive knowledge has to depend on a *vṛtti*. The subject consciousness limited by its inner sense organ (mind) is *pramātā*, the knower. The manifestation of a hitherto concealed object to the knower through a mental mode (*vṛtti*) is known as *pramā-jñāna* (valid knowledge). I use the word mental to indicate the inner sense organ that covers the entire field of mind categorised in the Sanskrit terms of *buddhi*, *manas* and *citta* as well as the ego.[188] The mental mode that leads to the cognition of an object is called *pramāṇa*, or instrument of valid knowledge. Though objects are manifested to the knower by the *vṛtti-jñāna*, their existence does not depend on that *vṛtti-jñāna*. That is to say, an object can exist even without being perceived by a person.

However, there is another type of empirical knowledge, the object of which does not exist beyond the duration of that knowledge. In this case, as long as those objects exist they are revealed all the time; for instance, a mistaken cognition of silver in place of a shell. In order to distinguish this special type of cognition from ordinary valid knowledge (*pramā-jñāna*), the Advaita-vedāntin differentiates between the respective modes (*vṛtti*) involved in each case. The revelation of these kinds of objects is a kind of cognition, and therefore one must admit the function of a mode (*vṛtti*) involved in the process of cognition, so that knowledge can take place at all. At the same time, such a *vṛtti* should be recognised as distinct from valid knowledge (*pramāṇa-vṛtti*). For instance, while an external object stays longer than the moment of its cognition, the object (i.e. shell-silver, the object of illusory knowledge) of this second type of *vṛtti* does not usually stay beyond the duration of this *vṛtti*. Moreover, the existence of illusory shell-silver is different in nature from that of an ordinary pitcher, so the *vṛtti* producing the knowledge of shell-silver should be different from the *vṛtti* that produces the empirical knowledge of a pitcher. The direct cause of shell-silver is *avidyā*, so the *vṛtti* producing the knowledge of shell-silver is also regarded as arising from the same *avidyā*. It is important to remember that the process of any type of cognition, even if it is an error, must involve a modal activity either of the *avidyā* of the knower or, of his/her mind so that a contact is established between the knower and the cosmic revealer *sākṣin*.

Similar to the knowledge of shell-silver, the knowledge of feelings like happiness etc. is also contemporaneous with the existence of the knowledge of such feelings. On the basis of this similarity, in the case of knowledge of happiness, the *vṛtti* producing such knowledge is regarded as a mode of *avidyā*. However, it may be

noted here that although knowledge of shell-silver and the knowledge of happiness are both brought about by *avidyā-vṛtti*, the former is an error while the latter is valid knowledge. In fact, the validity of knowledge depends on the non-contradiction of its content. This is a vital point in the Advaita-vedānta soteriology.

Therefore, it is evident that *avidyā-vṛtti* can produce valid knowledge without the help of any *vṛtti* of mind. Such is the privilege of *avidyā-vṛtti* that it can produce knowledge, even valid knowledge, independent of the operation of the *mental vṛtti*. This *avidyā-vṛtti* can, therefore, be employed to explain knowledge at the time of deep sleep when, with the dissolution of all sense organs, the mental mode cannot possibly operate. That knowledge remains present even in deep sleep and is borne out by the composite knowledge such as, 'I slept happily and did not know anything'. This knowledge is a combination of first, memory of happiness which a person experienced during his/her deep sleep – a vṛtti of *avidyā* that always exists in *sākṣin*, inherent in the cognising person; and second, a cognitive mental *vṛtti* referring to the ego of the same person, which comes back when he/she is awake. But memory presupposes experience. Therefore, the person's experience of entities such as happiness and ignorance (*avidyā*) must have taken place at the time of his/her deep sleep. One must thus accept this explanation of the simultaneous experience of happiness and a total ignorance during the deep sleep as a case of *sākṣī-jñāna* wherein the sleeper's pragmatic ego-consciousness remains dormant.

Besides *avidyā-vṛtti* and the *vṛtti* of the mind which generates valid knowledge (*pramā-jñāna*), there are several other mental modes that are not considered capable of generating any form of cognition. For example, when a person meditates on a name of a deity, taking it for supreme Brahman, his meditation consists of a mental exercise. This is not a valid knowledge as such a name is neither Brahman nor an illusory object. It is just a divine attribute ascribed on Brahman. The person knows this fact hence it is not an illusion, for he possesses the contradictory knowledge (*vādhaka-jñāna*) of this illusion. His meditation is therefore a mere mental exercise that operates on the will of mind. The person operates his mind by the Vedic injunction '*nāma Brahmeti upāsīta*' (meditate on Brahmā as a proper name), and for that reason also this mental mode is not regarded as knowledge, since injunctions can never be made on knowledge.[189] Likewise, '*tarka*' (logical argumentation) is also not a form of cognitive knowledge, but a mere mental process, since argument is always based on mental hypothesis and is regulated by the will of the mind. Hence, it is neither valid nor illusory knowledge. An example of this is given in the argument that follows the proposition, 'the hill is on fire; because there is smoke' (*parvato vanhimān dhūmāt*). This hypothesis is based on the argument that 'if there is no fire then there should be no smoke; because smoke is invariably concomitant with fire; in the present proposition, smoke is sighted on the hill, hence one may safely conclude that there is fire on that hill'. In order to prove the presence of fire on the hill, for argument's sake, the absence of fire, which is proved by the absence of smoke, is hypothetically ascribed to the hill by means of the assumption of a hypothetical

middle term, namely the absence of smoke. It is not knowledge generated by a mental mode, but a hypothetical judgment brought about independently by the mental mode.

In Advaita-vedānta the means to attain liberation is through the removal of a person's *avidyā, which* projects the world on the locus of Brahman. Only the realisation of Brahman, the locus, can remove this cosmic avidyā. The true nature of Brahman, the only reality, is instructed by the *Upaniṣads*, which is transmitted orally by the enlightened teachers to the pupils. The famous statement of Yājñavalkya to his wife Maitreyī revealing the method of acquiring this gnosis of truth by means of realising one's own true self, *ātman* which is identical with Brahman, the Truth, runs as follows: 'You see, Maitreyī – it is one's self (*ātman*) which one should see and hear, and on which one should reflect and concentrate. For by seeing and hearing one's self, and by reflecting and concentrating on one's self, one gains the knowledge of this whole world.'[190]

This statement is split into two. The first part, that is, 'seeing', refers to the Brahma-gnosis which is a direct experience. The second part, hearing etc., shows the method of acquiring this gnosis. This method is threefold – hearing the Upaniṣadic teaching from an enlightened preceptor, (*śravaṇa*), reflecting on that teaching (*manana*) and finally deeply meditating on that (*nididhyāsana*). Moreover, the second part, indeed a yogic process, leads to the gnosis of Brahman and thereby brings about *mukti*. Madhusūdana takes this entire Vedic statement to mean Vedāntic discourse (*vicāra*) – which is nothing but a form of deliberation (*tarka*).[191] This is why a Vedic injunction (*vidhi*) is accepted in modes such as *śravaṇa*. Had it been a case of cognition, *vidhi* would have been impossible.

It may be noted here that while elucidating the word '*cittavṛtti*', as it occurs in the *Pātañjala-yoga-sūtra* I. 2, '*Yogaścittavṛtti-nirodhah*',[192] Madhusūdana states that there are five kinds of such *vṛtti*:

1 Valid cognition *Pramāṇa-vṛtti*, itself sub-divided into six types, according to the type of pramāṇa leading to it.[193] Direct knowledge, (*pratyaksa*), inferential, (*anumāna*), scriptural knowledge (*śāstra*), analogy, (*upamāna*), presumption, (*arthāpatti*) and negation, (*abhāva*).
2 *Viparyaya-vṛtti*, or false knowledge, sub-divided into *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *abhinivesaṣḥ* which are explained in the *Pātañjala-yoga-sūtra* II.3 as sources of transience of individuals.
3 *Vikalpa-vṛtti*, by which non-existent objects like the sky-flower, are used in language. This is not knowledge like perception but merely a mental exercise.
4 *Nidrā-vṛtti* which is just the state of sleep and is considered the seat of *tamoguṇa*. Hence in this state the individual knows the lack of all the other four *vṛttis*.
5 *Smṛti-vṛtti*, which is recollection of previous experience; that is, the knowledge of the impressions left by the store of previously acquired experienced. As *smṛti* embraces the impressions left by the other four *vṛttis*, Madhusūdana leaves it until last.

It may be noted here that except for *vikalpa-vṛtti* and *pramāṇa-vṛtti*, all the other are, in fact, *avidyā-vṛttis*. This is why Madhusūdana describes them elsewhere as belonging to *sākṣi-jñāna*.[194] *Vikalpa-vṛtti*, on the other hand, is not knowledge at all, but merely a mental operation when mind, by its independent will, uses a word to express a non-existing object such as a sky-flower or a hare's horn. *Pramāṇa-vṛtti* is, of course, a mental mode, *citta-vṛtti*. In other words it is a modification of mind. Thus, not all five *vṛttis* mentioned above can be taken to be *mental-vṛttis*.[195]

Genesis of valid knowledge, pramāṇa-vṛtti or the valid mental mode

As stated earlier, the cause of valid knowledge is a valid mental mode, *vṛtti*. The mind's modification undergoes the following process: A person's mind, which is transparent, reflects on every object it comes into contact with. It moves out through a sense organ if that organ comes into contact with an object which is reflected on the mental mode. This is known as *vṛtti*. Thus the mental mode extends itself from the body up to the object. The portion of mind that remains inside the person is known as his ego (*ahaṃkāra/garva*), which is the subject of the experience of the act of knowledge. The portion of *mind* that stands intermediate between the object and the ego is known as a mental mode, *vṛtti* and is said to be the cognitive act (*kriyā*). The mind that pervades the object immediately removes the ignorance of the person that covered that object, and thus reveals it. It should be noted here that the *vṛtti* of mind that flows through a sense organ cannot pervade every object, but only those objects that are capable of being perceived by a mental mode, (*yogyān ghaṭādi viṣayam*).[196] Consciousness limited by the ego aspect of mind is known as *pramātā* (knower).[197] Consciousness limited by the *vṛtti* is *pramāṇa*, the instrument of knowledge. Lastly, consciousness limited by the *vṛtti* that pervades the object is called *pramiti*, that is, cognition.[198] The object of knowledge – *prameya* – is Brahman, limited by a particular object (*viṣayāvacchinnacaitanya*). Brahman is the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of each and every physical object. Brahman has to be the object of knowledge inasmuch as empirical knowledge of an object always occurs after removing the *ajñāna* regarding that object since, following Sarvajñātma Muni, Madhusūdana contributes to the view that the object of knowledge must necessarily be concerned with the object of *ajñāna*, and the object of *ajñāna* is always only consciousness (cit).[199] According to him, physical objects like the pitcher become manifest only as the limitation (*avacchedaka*) of Brahman. The content of a cognition (*prameya*), when it becomes known through the act of cognition (*pramiti*), is called *phala*, or the result of *pramā* that is, valid knowledge.

Function of the mental mode (antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti)

The revealer of an object is the consciousness that is its locus.[200] As the substratum of *avidyā*, Brahman is the material cause of every object. An object is wrongly

superimposed on Brahman and the relationship between the superimposed object and its locus, Brahman, is that of illusory identification (*ādhyāsika tādātmya*).[201] Such identification regulates the revelation of the object by consciousness in which the object is falsely related in terms of identity, as stated earlier. The consciousness in fact, as the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna caitanya*) reveals itself and thereby the object superimposed on it. In this way, objects are always revealed to their substratum consciousness.

One may object that if the substratum consciousness is the revealer of objects how can the knower (*pramātā*), that is, the individual knows objects? In other words, how can the knower, distinct from locus-consciousness, reveal the object? The answer is that an object may be revealed to the cognising person when this cognising consciousness merges its identity into the substratum consciousness (*adhiṣṭhāna caitanya*). This in fact reveals the object. This identity with the revealed substratum consciousness follows, in all cases, the removal of ignorance from the cognising person with regard to the object. This removal of ignorance is brought about by the mental mode. Therefore, in the individual's perception, there has to be a modal form of the mind. However, the experience '*ghaṭaḥ prakāśate*' ('the pitcher is being revealed') as distinct from the experience '*ghaṭam aham jānāmi*' ('I know the pitcher') shows that the revealing consciousness, the locus, of the pitcher is different from a mental mode which operates in an individual's perception of an object. The nature of the functions of *vṛtti* depend upon the conception of *jīva*, the knower, and its relationship with the substratum consciousness, the revealer of the objects. I have been using the phrase 'substratum consciousness' which actually means *sākṣī-caitanya* or just *sākṣī*. Gauḍa Brahmānanda, Madhusūdana's commentator explains: 'the word means witness to whom every object is always revealed'.[202]

Very broadly speaking, *the individual, jīva*, is conceived by the Advaita philosophers in two ways.[203] In one view, he is limited by the inner sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). The *sākṣī* of the objects is then Brahman. In the other, *jīva* is all-pervasive. The latter view is further divided into two branches: one holds that *jīva* is all-pervasive, yet it is not the *sākṣī* of the objects; the other, that *jīva* is all-pervasive and the material cause of the objects, hence is their substratum as well. The authors of the *Vivaraṇa*, *Vārtika* and *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka* consider *jīva* to be all-pervasive and not covered by *avidyā*.[204] Although all-pervasive, *jīva* is by nature unrelated to any objects (*asaṅga*), so while the objects are revealed to *sākṣin*, their material cause, *jīva*, (though not covered by *avidyā*) does not experience them. According to Vācaspati Miśra, however, *jīva* is limited by *avidyā* and is the material cause of its universe. *Jīva*, being the locus (*āśraya*) of *avidya*, is considered by him to be the material cause. In this case, *jīva*, being the material cause, is the cosmic substratum consciousness, the revealer of the objects. However, some contents of experiences like happiness and sorrow are always revealed to *jīva*, while others, such as a pitcher, are only occasionally revealed to it. This position must be accepted. If it is not accepted, objects (like a the pitcher) would always, like emotions, appear to the *jīva*.[205] Some followers of Vācaspati

Miśra consider *jīva* to be limited by the inner sense organ. Being limited, *jīva* is in this case, distinct from the substratum consciousness of objects which is the all-pervasive consciousness *sākṣī*. According to this view, *jīva* is not the material cause of the universe either.

The functions of *vṛtti* vary according to these concepts of nature of the cognising *jīva*. When *jīva* is consciousness limited by its inner sense organ, (the second view of the Vācaspati school), the substratum consciousness of the object, as stated earlier, is distinct from the cognising *jīva*. So in order to know an object *jīva*, has to make himself identified with *sākṣī*, to whom all objects are always revealed. The function of the mental mode in this instance is to forge that identification.[206] Although avidyā-*vṛtti* can forge identification between the conscious knower and the consciousness underlying the object, until the knower's ignorance with regard to the object is removed, it cannot be revealed to him. The complication arises because, from a metaphysical standpoint, even though the consciousness underlying each object is Brahman itself, and the cognising *jīva*, though limited by his inner sense organ, is still fundamentally identical with Brahman. Therefore, if mere identification between the consciousness underlying the object and the conscious knower is enough for the revelation of the objects to *jīva*, then the objects should have always been revealed to him. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that a mental *vṛtti*, apart from forging an identity between object consciousness and the subject consciousness, removes the veil of ignorance from *jīva* with regard to the object it reveals by *vṛtti*. According to the view propounded by the authors of *Vivaraṇa*, *Vārtika* and *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka*, the cognising *jīva*, being all-pervasive, is basically identical with the *sākṣī* of objects. *Jīva* need not, therefore, be identified afresh with it. Identity with the substratum consciousness of objects connects *jīva* with the physical objects in a very general way. But being '*asaṅga*' (i.e. not connected with objects other than *avidyā*, its modifications, the inner sense organ, etc.), *jīva* lacks special contact with the objects necessary for their revelation to its self. The reason is that, in this view, *jīva* is not the material cause of the universe. The physical objects are therefore not superimposed on *jīva*.

The function of *vṛtti* here is to remove from *jīva* the ignorance with regard to a particular object that is its content. The other function of *vṛtti* may be summed up as follows: *Vṛtti* qualifies the otherwise *asaṅga jīva* with a capacity to reveal the objects. In this context, Madhusūdana draws upon an analogy from the old school of Naiyāyikas. According to this school, all objects have a general relationship with universals such as cow-hood (*gotva*), but only the object marked by its dewlap, (i.e. the cow), reveals *gotva*. Likewise, *asaṅga-jīva* reveals an object only when it is marked by *vṛtti*. In this way *vṛtti* provides for a special aptitude in *jīva*, conducive to the revelation of the object.[207] Thus the object becomes revealed to the *jīva*.

According to the other view (i.e. the theory of delimitation of *jīva*, *avacchedavāda* of Vācaspati), *jīva*, being the material cause of its own universe, possesses the special contact with the object conducive to its revelation. However, as stated earlier,

jīva is also covered by ignorance which prevents the object being revealed to it. Hence the mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti*) operates only to remove that ignorance from *jīva*.[208]

Madhusūdana's opponents raise the following objections: If ignorance (*ajñāna*) is regarded as a single phenomenon, and if the mental mode removes this ignorance from *jīva*, then a *vṛtti* should bring about *jīva*'s liberation, for liberation means the annihilation of *jīva*'s ignorance. Moreover, if consciousness, as marked by for instance, a pitcher is said to be concealed by ignorance, and if the pitcher is not covered by anything,[209] then concealment of the consciousness as marked by the pitcher (*viśiṣṭa*) would virtually mean the concealment of pure consciousness. In such a case, the *vṛtti* should reveal this pure consciousness. This will tantamount to instant liberation of the *jīva*, since, as a rule, revelation and concealment occupy the same place.[210]

Madhusūdana proposes several answers to the first objection. In the *Siddhāntabindu*, he explains the function of *vṛtti* in the following way: Just as in the analogy purported by the Mīmāṃsā school, that the burning power of fire (*dāhakatā śakti*) is suppressed by the presence of a *candrakānta* gem (supposed to be capable of counteracting burning) and again becomes active when such a gem is removed, likewise *vṛtti* does not destroy ignorance completely, but merely suppresses its power of concealing just one object, which is then revealed to the knower. When such *vṛtti* ceases, the concealing power once again envelopes the object, so there is no question of liberation on the part of the knower by a particular cognition achieved by a mental mode.[211] Madhusūdana also draws upon the view of Vācaspati Miśra to answer the same question. Vācaspati classifies *avidyā/ajñāna* into primordial (*mūlāvidyā*) and its offshoots (*tulāvidyā*). While the former is one and its destruction brings liberation, the latter are many and are different from the former, because they are innumerable and occupy only a single object.[212] Finally, Madhusūdana mentions a view, which states that *vṛtti* destroys only individual ignorance (*avasthājñāna*). According to Madhusūdana, these, though identical with *mūlāvidyā*, are innumerable. Thus a *vṛtti* destroys one particular case of ignorance, while the other such individual cases of ignorance remain intact.[213]

Madhusūdana also suggests some other views to explain the function of *vṛtti*. *Vṛtti* is said to take away a part (*ekadeśa*) of the *mūlāvidyā* that covered the object; or like a coward warrior, *avidyā* just glides away at the presence of its opponent, the *vṛtti*; or just as a rolled-up mat exposes the object beneath it, so *vṛtti* helps to roll up the *avidyā* a bit at a time revealing a part of the entire phenomenal world while the rest remains concealed. It is apparent that these views draw upon physical analogies that should not apply to an extraordinary entity like *avidyā*.[214] However, all the above views come to a common conclusion that cognition generated by the function of mental mode does not destroy *mūlāvidyā* and therefore, the question of the knower's liberation does not arise.

The answer to the second objection, that an ordinary *vṛtti* should reveal pure consciousness, is that the *vṛtti* of the inner sense-organ taking the shape of an

object, can remove the ignorance regarding the substratum consciousness as appearing identified with that very object insofar as that object is concerned; however, it does not remove the individual's ignorance regarding pure Brahman.

Madhusūdana describes the modus operandi of *vṛtti* as follows: If such *vṛtti* operates through one of the sense organs of the knower then, on the one hand, it has contact with the knower and on the other, the content of his cognition. By its contact with the knower it dispels his ignorance regarding the very existence of the object (*asattv-āpādak-āvaraṇa*). While embracing the object of knowledge (*prameya*), it discards the cover of ignorance that caused the non-revelation of that very object (*abhān-āpādaka-āvaraṇa*) so that the object is revealed to the cogniser as a real thing.[215]

The fact that at any one time an individual knower knows one particular object to the exclusion of others is borne out by the presence of a specific *vṛtti* of a specific knower regarding a specific object.[216] Such a specific *vṛtti* establishes a specific identification between the specific individual knower and the object-consciousness that reveals the object. As the specific *vṛtti* arises at a specific moment, the knower of the knowledge, the object of knowledge and the time of knowing the object, all become specific.

When *vṛtti* does not operate through a sense organ, that is, when knowledge of an object is indirect (*parokṣa*), as in the case of inferential knowledge, the mental *vṛtti* does not leave the body of the cogniser and so cannot take the shape of the object of knowledge (*prameya*). In this case, the *vṛtti* resides in the body of the cogniser.[217] As the *vṛtti* does not come into direct contact with the object, it cannot remove the concealment of the revelation of that object (*abhān-āpādaka-āvaraṇa*). However, as it is generated in the mind of the investigating person, the *vṛtti* can remove the covering of that investigating person which conceals the existence of the object (*asattv-āpādaka-āvaraṇa*). Thus, as distinguished from *aparokṣa* (direct) *vṛtti*, which produces knowledge such as 'the pitcher exists and it reveals itself to me', *parokṣa* (indirect) *vṛtti* ensures only the knowledge of the pitcher's existence.

It may be objected that, if from the standpoint of the opinion that *vṛtti* is necessary for the connection of the cognising consciousness with the object-consciousness, then merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) and Brahman should also be always revealed to the cogniser as these are directly connected with his mind/inner sense-organ. Because the latter is their locus (*āśraya*), so no *vṛtti* is necessary for the direct perception of *dharma, adharma* and Brahman. Madhusūdana answers that, in this view, only those objects that are both transparent and uncovered are revealed to the cogniser and *vṛtti* fosters those two qualities to its object. Brahman, though transparent, is covered to the cogniser by its ignorance and thus it waits for *vṛtti* to remove that cover and reveal Brahman. In the case of an ordinary pitcher, *vṛtti* removes its covering and also makes it transparent by pervading it. In the case of the non-transparent *dharma* and *adharma*, they are by their very nature covered so *vṛtti* is able to remove only the cogniser's ignorance covering their existence, thus generating only indirect knowledge of

them.[218] In the case of false shell-silver, the silver is not covered but it is non-transparent. Hence *vṛtti* is necessary to make it transparent.

Even though, in the light of what has been said above, *vṛtti* operates differently at different places, generally speaking it establishes contact (*uparāga*) between the cogniser and the object of cognition so that the cognitional *vṛtti*, receives the reflection of both the cognising consciousness and the object-consciousness.[219]

Savikalpa and nirvikalpa pratyakṣa

There are two kinds of direct knowledge, determinate, or conceptual perception, (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and indeterminate or, nonconceptual perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*). The former means the direct knowledge of an object that reveals the substance in terms of its attributes. For example, the knowledge 'the pitcher is red' reveals both the substance – the pitcher – and the attribute – its red colour. It also discloses their relationship with regard to identity. However, in the latter, the experience does not reveal the differentiated nature of the object, for instance, pitcher and its attribute, redness. In other words, *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* presents the object to the cogniser as an integral whole (*akhaṇḍārtha*) without any reference to its substance and attributes. In the Upaniṣadic sentence '*tat tvam asi*', (you are it), Advaita-vedānta claims, each of the words '*tat*', (it) and '*tvam*', (you) and the verb to be (*asi*), produces *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* and presents an *akhaṇḍārtha*, while the whole sentence also generates *nirvikalpa pratyaksa* knowledge of pure Brahman without any reference to the attributes of either 'it' or, 'you' or to any relationship between them; or any reference to the time, or space of their existence. This is a very important notion because this and three other Upaniṣadic statements designated as *mahā vākya* (great sentence) are to produce the gnosis of the unqualified and undifferentiated Brahman by removing the error of all differentiated cognitions.

As previously stated, *vṛtti* in general dispels the veil of ignorance embracing an object. As the nature of Brahman, the ultimate reality, is concealed from *jīva*, a *vṛtti* should legitimately be drawn upon to discard this veil of ignorance. According to the Advaita-vedānta, such a *vṛtti* embraces the identity between *jīva* and Brahman. This identity is called *akhaṇḍārtha*, the integral monolithic meaning. It may be noted here that the *vṛtti* we are concerned with is an *aparokṣa* (direct) *vṛtti*, insofar as it is intended to discard *jīva*'s ignorance regarding Brahman, so that Brahman is revealed to him. Since the veiling ignorance of a person regarding Brahman is direct, the *vṛtti* has to be direct as well, because only the direct *vṛtti* dispels the veiling nescience. For example, in the case of an error regarding direction (*dig-bhrānti*), it is only dispelled by direct knowledge about the direction.

Such a direct *vṛtti* is recognised by the Advaita-vedānta to emerge, as referred to before, from great Upaniṣadic statements such as '*tat tvam asi*' and '*aham Brahmāsmi*' (I am Brahman). In other words, even though such modal cognition is a type of direct knowledge that dispels primordial *avidyā*, it is still a form of verbal cognition. Therefore an objection may be raised as to how a verbal statement can

produce direct knowledge. The answer put forward by Madhusūdana is that word (*śabda*) can indeed produce direct knowledge,[220] although it generally generates indirect knowledge. Just as sometimes mind produces indirect knowledge and at other times direct knowledge, so also *śabda* sometimes produces direct knowledge, while at other times it produces indirect knowledge. In connection with sound producing direct knowledge, the following situation deserves consideration. Ten people cross a river. When they reach the other side, each one counts the number of heads to check that they have all safely crossed the river. But each one commits the same error of omitting himself from the count. Another person comes along and requests one of the original ten to count again. The man counts, and repeats the same mistake. The other person then says to the counter, 'you are the tenth person' and removes his mistake. All ten people committed the same error of direct illusion (*aparokṣa bhrama*). Such a mistake can be rectified by contradictory knowledge, which is equally direct. Just as the person counting is disillusioned by the criticism of that eleventh person, he has to admit that the statement 'you are the tenth person' has yielded direct knowledge (*aparokṣa jñāna*), which has discarded his direct error. This demonstrates that even though *śabda* usually produces indirect knowledge, when a statement is applied to establish identity between one meaning of a constituent word and another presented by the word '*tvam*', such a statement produces direct knowledge. Seen in this light, sentences like 'you are the tenth' (*daśama-s-tvama asi*); 'you are the king' (*rājā tvam asi*), making somebody realise his hitherto unknown royal identity, and '*tat tvam asi*' revealing the individual's true identity, will all yield direct knowledge. On the other hand, a statement like 'the blue jug' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) will produce indirect knowledge. Though this statement produces an identity between the blue colour and the pitcher, neither 'blue' nor 'the pitcher' conveys the meaning of total identity like the sentences shown above.

Moreover, this interpretation of those *śruti*s producing *akhaṇḍārtha* is not baseless. Scriptures such as '*tad-dh-āsya vijajñau*', '*tamasaḥ pāram darśayati*' and '*vedānta vijnnāna suniścitārtha*',[221] also confirm that sentences like '*tat tvam asi*' produce direct knowledge of an individual's identity with absolute Brahman. The first two scriptural quotations show that only scriptural teaching can generate direct knowledge of the absolute Brahman. In the third, the word '*vijñāna*' indicates that Vedantic teaching can produce knowledge of absolute Brahman, while the word '*suniścitārtha*' denotes that such knowledge is direct.[222]

The question is, how can verbal knowledge, that generally embraces a substance in relation to certain attributes, comprehend '*akhaṇḍārtha*', the integral monolithic meaning which apparently disallows all consideration of relationship? Because, every sentence by definition shows the relationship between the different parts of speech in order to produce a coherent sense.

To answer this question, Citsukha[223] states that when a sentence having non-synonymous words (*aparyāya śabda*) presents an integrated and monolithic meaning without any reference to their intra-relationship, such as that exists between the parts of speech in a sentence, that sentence is said to have an integral

sense (*akhaṇḍārtha*). In other words, when the constituent words of a sentence denote the meaning of one substance which is looked upon as a mere stem (*prāti-padika*), without any reference to the syntactical inflexions usual in a grammatical sentence, those words are taken to yield *akhaṇḍārtha*. Thus, for example, in the sentence *prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaḥ candraḥ* (moon, the marvellous light), the word '*prakṛṣṭaprakāśaḥ*' denotes only the object, the moon, as the stem *chandra* indicates that it is unrelated to anything. In this light, the words '*tat*' and '*tvam*' in the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' present mere consciousness without any reference to any relationship. It may be noted here that such meaning is obtained only with reference to the words' secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*).[224]

Madhusūdana's definition of *akhaṇḍārtha* largely follows that of Citsukha. According to Madhusūdana, 'when non-synonymous words constituting a sentence convey an integrated meaning in such a way that the sentence itself does not present any additional meaning of the relationships between the parts of speech as the content of a valid cognition, but only presents the unitary meaning recalled by the powers of the same constituent words, it is said to be a case of *akhaṇḍārtha*'[225] ('*aparyāya śabdānām padavṛttismāritātiriktāgocara pramājanakatvam*). Hence, his innovation lies in his mentioning that 'the sentence itself does not present any additional meaning of the relationship as its content' (*padavṛttismāritātiriktāgo-cara*). When a sentence produces verbal knowledge, (*śābdabodha*) such knowledge normally involves inter-relations between the meanings of the words constituting the sentence. Thus, for example, the sentence '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*' presents the cognition that 'blue colour and the pitcher are identical'. Here the relationship between the meanings of the words '*nīla*' and '*ghaṭaḥ*' regarding identity is embraced by the sentence '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*'. As to the presentation of the interrelation in the verbal cognition, there are two prevailing theories in the Mīmāṃsā school, known as '*anvitābhidhānavāda*' and '*abhihitānvayavāda*', respectively held by the Prabhākara's school of Mīmāṃsakas and the Bhaṭṭa Kumārila's school of Mīmāṃsakas.

According to the former view, the denotative power (*śakti*) of the words constituting a sentence presents, in the verbal cognition, both the substantive meanings and their interrelations. The process may be described in the following way, using the sentence '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*' (the blue pitcher), as an example. The word '*nīla*', when heard, produces the knowldge that '*nīla*' denotes blue which is understood as the śakti, power of that word. This cognition of *śakti*, in turn, presents to the memory the colour blue. According to the Mīmāṃsā school, memory not only embraces the colour blue, but this colour in relation to another object (which is in this case the pitcher, '*ghaṭaḥ*'). This is also the case with the word '*ghaṭaḥ*'. Thus the meanings of both '*nila*' and '*ghaṭaḥ*' are revealed in the verbal cognition in terms of a special relationship of identity – the colour blue is identical with the pitcher. Furthermore, it is stated that every word in a sentence possesses two *śakti*s, one revealing its direct meaning-content and the other its relationship with the meaning-contents of other words. A solitary word, completely independent of a sentence, does not convey any proper meaning. While the

first *śakti*, being known, presents the substantive, the second *śakti* by itself, (i.e. without being known), presents the relationship. As distinguished from the first śakti, the second śakti is called '*kubjā śakti*' (bent or restricted word-power), since this *śakti* itself remains outside the verbal cognition. Hence, according to this theory, even though the interrelationship is presented by the śakti of the words, this interrelationship is not recalled (*smārita*) by means of the cognition of *śaktis* of the words.[226]

The *abhihitānvayavāda* explains the cognition of relationship in verbal knowledge in the following way: Starting with the same statement '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*', they expound that the word 'nīla' presents the colour blue to the memory of the cogniser (but not any relationships). Likewise, the word 'ghaṭaḥ' presents to the cogniser in a second memory the form of the pitcher (but not its relationship with the other). It may be noted here that even though the first and second memory comprehend the colour blue and the pitcher respectively, the subsequent verbal cognition embraces not only the blue colour and the pitcher, but their relationship of identity as well. The question is how does the relationship of identity appear in the verbal cognition? If verbal knowledge is confined to the meanings presented by the verbal *vṛtti*, then a *vṛtti* has to be accounted for, which gives rise to the aforementioned relationship of identity. The Bhāṭṭa-school maintains that while *śakti* presents the primary meaning of a noun, that is – the colour blue – while its secondary meaning, (*lakṣaṇā*) presents the relationship of identity. According to this school, such a *lakṣaṇā* is itself a relationship (*śakyasambandha*) between, on the one hand, the primary meaning presented by *śakti* and, on the other, the relationship of identity revealed in the verbal cognition.[227] Seen in this light – every verbal cognition involves a secondary meaning insofar as it comprehends the relationship that cannot be presented by *śakti*. *Śakti* ceases to operate immediately after it has presented the substantive meaning of the word. The secondary meaning, however, like the second *śakti* of the *Anvitābhidhānavādins*, presents by itself, without any reference to the intended relationship in the verbal cognition. The extent of the function of this secondary meaning is regulated by the expectancy (*ākāṃkṣā*) existing in the words. Such expectancy determines in the verbal cognition the precise contents, including their mutual relationship.[228]

Both these views agree that interrelationship (*saṃsarga*) between words-constituents of a sentence which a verbal cognition reveals, is not recalled (*smārita*) by the power of denotation of the constituent words of a sentence. At the same time, however, both views maintain that revelation of relationship in a verbal cognition is brought about by the cognising mental mode, primary meaning (*abhidhā*) in one view and secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*) in the other.

The Advaita-vedānta holds that an interrelated meaning is not necessarily conveyed in each and every sentence. There may be some cases of sentences that present a monolithic meaning without any scope of such relationship. In most cases, verbal cognition does involve relationship, but other cases are conceivable where verbal cognition may not involve any relationship at all, but may be strictly confined to the knowledge of a single substantive. The secular statement

'*prakṛṣṭaprakāśaścandra*', and the Vedic statement '*tat tvam asi*', are both illustrations of the latter kind of knowledge. Using the conclusions of both the Mīmāṃsā schools,[229] Madhusūdana states that while ordinary verbal knowledge comprehends an entity (relationship) which is not recalled to memory by means of '*padavṛtti*', that is, verbal cognition, the similar knowledge emerging from sentences like '*tat tvam asi*' does not comprehend an additional entity, namely, relationship, apart from the meanings of the pure substantive of constituent words. A sentence that does not allow any interrelationship between the meanings of its constituent parts, is said to present an integral meaning, (*akhaṇḍārtha*). Hence any shadow of duality emerging from its verbal cognition is ruled out.

Madhusūdana adopts Citsukha's definition of *akhaṇḍārtha* as an alternative one without making any substantial change. The commentator, Brahmānanda, while elucidating on the concept of Madhusūdana on this definition, states that sometimes words, by their secondary connotative meaning alone, produce a verbal cognition of just a single substantive (*prātipadikārtha*).[230] It should be noted that the words constituting a sentence that yield such *akhaṇḍārtha* must be non-synonymous. For example, the words '*satyam*', '*jñānam*' and '*anantam*' in the Vedic statement '*satyamjñānamanantam Brahma*', through their *lakṣaṇā-śakti*, refer to one substantive, namely pure Brahman, although by their primary meaning they denote different entities. Thus, *satyam* means reality as marked by the absence of falsity, *jñānam* means the same reality marked by the absence of ignorance and *anantam* means the reality as marked by the absence of any limitation.

As stated before, *akhaṇḍārtha* is the intended meaning of sentences like '*tat tvam asi*'. The realisation of such meaning is the goal of the Vedānta teachings insofar as it dispels the primordial ignorance of the knower regarding the true nature of Brahman. However, an analysis of the process of the verbal cognition which comprehends the integral meaning, will disclose that such verbal cognition is dependant upon the cognition of the meaning of '*tat*' and '*tvam*', the constituent words of '*tat tvam asi*'. In other words, the knower must first be sure about the meaning (*śakti*) of the words '*tat*' and '*tvam*', before he realises the integral meaning in the verbal cognition arising from the sentence. The determination of the meaning of '*tat*' and '*tvam*', which is thus a prerequisite of verbal knowledge, is recognised by the Advaita-vedānta school to be another form of verbal knowledge. Thus a Vedic statement like '*satyamjñānamanantam Brahma*'[231] is said to present the knowledge of '*tat*', which is undoubtedly a verbal knowledge, and is also stated to comprehend an *akhaṇḍārtha*, namely pure Brahman. This *akhaṇḍārtha* refers to the meaning of a single part of speech in a sentence, in view of the fact that it is the meaning of the word '*tat*' of the sentence '*tat tvam asi*', though it also denotes the meaning of a whole sentence, being the meaning of the sentence '*satyamjñānamanantam Brahma*'.[232] It may be noted here that a Vedic sentence like '*satyamjñānanmanantam Brahma*' yields an *akhaṇḍārtha* which serves the purpose of understanding the meaning of '*tat tvam asi*', which presents a second *akhaṇḍārtha* emerging from that sentence. In this way, the first sentence

sub-serves the purpose of the second and therefore is subordinate to it. *Akhaṇḍārtha* is therefore of two types, the first called '*padārtha*', that is, the verbal cognition of a word in a sentence, and the second known as '*vākyārtha*', that is, the verbal cognition of a sentence.[233]

As the sentence 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and eternity', (*Satyamjñānamanantam Brahma*), is a definition of Brahman and is given in answer to the question on the nature of pure Brahman, so this statement has to denote absolute Brahman, which is the meaning of the word 'that', (*tat*) in the sentence 'that you are' (*tat tvam asi*). This is the *akhaṇḍārtha* belonging to the word '*tat*'. Similarly, the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' presents an *akhaṇḍārtha*, whose meaning does not itself involve any distinction between the constituent words, '*tat*' and '*tvam*', as related to one another by, for example, cause and effect, but embraces an identical substantive connoted by the two words, namely, the one and the same Brahman. Hence the meaning of this sentence does not involve any kind of relationship.[234]

Madhusūdana examines two objections against the conclusion that a Vedic statement like '*satyamjñānamanantam Brahma*' presents *akhaṇḍārtha* through *lakṣaṇā*. The first objection is that if the constituent words of a sentence do not present a relationship in the verbal cognition, they cannot constitute a sentence. The words of a sentence must possess *ākāṃkṣā* (expectancy), *yogyatā* (congruity) and *āsatti* or *sannidhi* (proximity), all of which involve relationship.[235] The second objection is that if the words in the sentence '*satyamjñānamanantam Brahma*' do not involve any relationship, then there can be no secondary meaning, *lakṣaṇā*. According to some scholars, *lakṣaṇā* is the presentation of an object which is revealed in the verbal cognition in relation to another object and which is not the denotative meaning of a word. The root cause of such a presentation is the apparent incongruity of relationship between the denotative meanings of the words.[236] Thus *lakṣaṇā* always involves a relationship. Both these objections are based on the description of verbal knowledge held by the Naiyāyikas.

In answer to the first objection, Madhusūdana states that all three conditions of a sentence, namely *akāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *āsatti*, exist in the words '*satyamjñāna-manantam Brahma*', yet they present the *akhaṇḍārtha*, that is, absolute Brahman, in the verbal cognition. *Ākāṃkṣā* is that condition without which the words cannot present the intended meaning (*tātparyārtha*) of the sentence. Seen in this light, *ākāṃkṣā* does not involve any contact (*anvaya*). This intended meaning may sometimes include relationship (*saṃsṛṣṭa*) for example, 'the blue pitcher', and sometimes *akhaṇḍārtha* for example, '*satyamjñānamanantam Brahma*'. Such *ākaṃkṣā* exists in the four words of the sentence '*satyamjñānamanantam Brahma*', which then present an integral meaning in the verbal cognition, and thus constitute a sentence.[237] Likewise, by proximity, Madhusūdana means the presentation of words in a favourable juxtaposition to the verbal cognition.[238] Therefore, proximity does not necessarily involve any relationship and can exist in the words belonging to '*satyamjñanamanantam Brahma*' without this aspect. On the other hand, congruity (*yogyatā*), means non-contradictoriness in

the subject of import (*tātparyārtha*), hence it may remain even in a case of *akhaṇḍārtha*, which does not involve any relationship. Therefore, Madhusūdana concludes that even though the words belonging to the sentence '*satyamjñāna-manantam Brahma*' present an *akhaṇḍārtha* in the verbal cognition, they may still possess all three qualities of *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *āsatti*, which enable them to present intended meaning.

In answer to the second objection, Madhusūdana states that the secondary meaning is not by itself presented through the intended meaning (*lakṣyārtha*), but it is the verbal mode (*vṛtti*) that persists in the relationship (*śakyasambandha*) between the literal meaning (*vācyārtha*) and the secondary or intended meaning (*lakṣyārtha*). As the Advaitins maintain that there is a false relationship subsisting between the *vācyārtha* and the *lakṣyārtha* of the said words, there is no harm in admitting *lakṣaṇā* here. Moreover, the root cause of admitting a *lakṣaṇā* is the incongruity in the intended meanings of the words (*tātparyārthānupapatti*). Thus a *lakṣaṇā* does not necessarily involve interrelated sentential meaning.[239]

Sākṣi-jñāna

The discussion has thus far been focused on experiences where the knower is an individual and the experiences are related to the functions of his mind. But beyond the fold of this type of knowledge, remain some other kinds of experience which are regarded by the Advaitins as *sākṣi-jñāna*.[240] A pitcher may exist whether or not it is cognised. On the other hand, happiness cannot exist without being cognised at the same time. There is, therefore, a practical distinction between the cognition of a pitcher and the cognition of happiness. The question arises as to what is the difference between these two types of knowledge. The nature of the pitcher or that of happiness cannot be adduced as an explanation for this difference, since the nature itself varies from pitcher to pitcher, or from happiness to happiness. Likewise, the knowledge of the pitcher is as distinct from the knowledge of happiness as is the knowledge of cloth. Is it possible to state, therefore, that the nature of cloth explains the difference of knowledge? If so, then the nature of cloth is a second differential, apart from the nature of the pitcher. So it is clear that there is no one consistent (*anugata*) criterion that may be held out to distinguish the knowledge of the pitcher from the knowledge of happiness. Therefore, the differential must be found elsewhere. For example, it may be said that the difference between the two types of knowledge occurs because there is a difference between the two types of cognitive mode involved in such knowledge. Thus, while knowledge of the pitcher is brought about by a mental mode, the knowledge of happiness is said to result from a mode of *avidyā*.

As is put forward earlier in this chapter, in ordinary cognition the knower's inner sense organ functions in a way that the ignorance covering the object from the knower's awareness is removed, thereby revealing the object to him. In this sense, the mode of the inner sense organ is called 'valid cognitive mode' (*pramāṇavṛtti*), which is instrumental to his valid knowledge regarding a particular

object. On the other hand, as happiness can never be concealed from the individual who experiences it, that which is experiencing such happiness has to be recognised as being a different entity from the knower of an ordinary object like the pitcher. The distinct reality that experiences happiness is called *sākṣī*.

However, *sākṣī* is not only distinct from an individual but also from pure Brahman. The reason for this is that *sākṣī*-knowledge, for instance, the experience of happiness, is as fleeting as the knowledge of the pitcher and not at all like Brahman-knowledge. The ordinary cognition of an object, say a pitcher depends upon the cognitive mode of the inner sense organ. Brahman-knowledge involves no modal function of any phenomenon; but *sākṣī*-knowledge requires to be conditioned (*upahita*) by the modal function of *avidyā*, (*avidyā-vṛtti*). However, as it is not ever contradicted *sākṣī*-knowledge is accepted as valid. In fact validity or non-validity is generally associated with ordinary knowledge like the knowledge of a pitcher, *sākṣī*-knowledge is taken to be free from such consideration.

Sākṣī-knowledge has its parallel in the introspection (*mānasapratyakṣa*) and recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of the Naiyāyikas. It corresponds to the intuitive knowledge (*prātibhakajñāna*) of the Śaiva school of thought and the *dhvani* of the school of poetics, in which '*rasa*' is cognised as long as it exists.

Knowledge is self-revealed (svaprakāśa)

The function of *vṛtti* is already established as the removal of the ignorance covering the object that it embraces. Besides this, some scholars posit that *vṛtti* forges a contact between the object-consciousness and the knower, while others hold that it produces identity between the object-consciousness and the cognising consciousness. Whatever the function of *vṛtti* may be, it is evident that it is not the revealer of the object. Objects are always revealed by consciousness, as conditioned by *vṛtti*.[241] This is known as the knowledge of an object. So who is the revealer of this knowledge? It is stated that knowledge is self-revealed (*svaprakāśa*). This is the distinction between consciousness and ordinary insensate objects. While insensate objects are revealed (*dṛśya*) by external consciousness, consciousness is not; it reveals its own self as well as the objects that come into contact with such consciousness. Hence self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*) is the basic feature of knowledge. Whenever knowledge is produced, it becomes revealed, just like a lamp which, as well as its own self, reveals the objects that come into contact with it. Madhusūdana defines self-luminosity of knowledge as follows:

> While a pitcher requires knowledge for its revelation, knowledge does not require other knowledge for its own revelation. On the contrary, it is self-revealed. Technically speaking, while the pitcher is apt to be revealed by consciousness (*phalavyāpya*), consciousness does not require this element, so it is called self-revealed.[242]

Madhusūdana proposes another definition of the self-revelation of knowledge:

> Knowledge does not, for its revelation, require another knowledge; because knowledge by itself provides for such usage as 'knowledge is revealed' (*aparokṣavyavahārayogyatvam*).[243] Knowledge is therefore self-luminous insofar as it yields to usage based on direct knowledge, even though it is not comprehended by other knowledge.

Thus, although the pitcher and consciousness seem to be on a par, in that both are liable to direct usage based on direct knowledge, yet, while the pitcher requires a valid *vṛtti* for its revelation, consciousness does not. However, the same consciousness cannot be both the knower and the known, for such a relationship presupposes a distinction between the knower and the known, which is not true in the case of consciousness.[244] Therefore, it is necessary to explain what a valid knowledge really is and how it functions.

Knowledge is, in fact, the reflection of consciousness on a *vṛtti*. As reflection is identical with the object being reflected, so knowledge is not different from consciousness, that is, pure Brahman. Brahman is self-revealed in the sense that even when not directly known, unlike an ordinary object, it is still liable to be used, as is in the verbal knowledge, 'I am Brahman'. Likewise, though not properly understood to the extent of its real nature, knowledge is still liable to be used as revealed in the form 'I have knowledge of the pitcher'.[245] To prove the self-luminosity of knowledge, Madhusūdana proposes two inferences:

1. Knowledge is, by its essence, not the object of consciousness, that is, not pervaded by '*phala*' (the result of a valid *vṛtti*), because knowledge is consciousness.
2. Knowledge that is unknown, that is, unrevealed by the '*phala*', is still capable of being used, because knowledge is consciousness (*anubhūti*).

The argument runs thus – 'that which is pervaded by the result of a cognition, or in other words, that which is the content of a cognition, becomes liable to direct usage, yet is not consciousness, e.g., the pitcher'.[246] This argument is a case of a syllogism where the middle premise is a negative (*vyatireka*[247]) one.

The main argument in favour of these inferences is that knowledge, being consciousness, cannot be the object of consciousness; that is, knowledge cannot be the object of its own self or of another knowledge. Opponents of this theory state that there are cases where an entity does become its own object. For example, the mental endeavour (*kṛti*) exerted on performing an action (*kriyā*), is itself an action. Likewise, the knower himself becomes the known, as in the case of the experience 'I know myself'. Such experience shows that the relationship between the object and the subject does not always require the duality of the knower and

the known. Nor does this relationship require that the two entities must exist when knowledge takes place, since, in the case of knowledge of an object that is destroyed or that of a non-existing object such as a sky-flower, the objects do not exist yet their knowledge is still an undeniable fact. Thus there are some entities, such as those mentioned above, that become objects of their own selves.[248] Consciousness is therefore on a par with them.

Madhusūdana meets this problem in the following way: It is a fact that usage such as 'this is a jug', is based upon previous knowledge of the jug. An object must be known before a statement is made about it. In order to make this rule applicable to the usage – 'this is consciousness' – it has to be presumed that this knowledge, the content of this usage, has also been revealed by knowledge. The question then arises, is the knowledge that reveals the first knowledge – the content of the usage – identical with the first knowledge or, is it a separate reality? The admission of a separate reality would raise the same question with regard to the second knowledge as well, and so on, so there would be no settlement of the issue (*anavasthā*). It should be accepted, therefore, that the so-called second knowledge that reveals the first knowledge is, in fact, not a second knowledge after all, but the self-revelation of the first knowledge. The acceptance of such a position amounts to the admission of a nature (*svabhāva*) of knowledge, which enables it to reveal itself so that it may be liable to direct usage. Madhusūdana therefore contends that the general rule – 'usage of an object requires previous knowledge of it' – need not be applicable to knowledge itself. Therefore, for the sake of this rule, the revelation of knowledge by its own self need not be recognised. Unlike the pitcher, knowledge is self-revealed insofar as it conduces to a direct usage, namely 'this is consciousness', without knowledge being previously known.

Thus far, the self-luminosity of knowledge has been discussed on the basis of the presumption that knowledge is basically consciousness itself. However, parallel to this concept of knowledge, another notion exists in which knowledge means valid cognition obtained through the function of a valid mental mode. This raises the question if the validity of the valid knowledge requires some other valid cognition. To avoid this problem knowledge is taken to be self-valid. The self-validity of knowledge may be considered in two ways: First, validity of knowledge is produced by the same conditions that produce the knowledge itself. Second, the knowledge that reveals the first knowledge invariably reveals the validity of the second knowledge. Both issues are dealt with separately in the following.

Self-validity of knowledge in its origin

Validity of knowledge is self-produced in the sense that the conditions for the production of knowledge are the same for the production of validity in that knowledge.[249] However, when a *doṣa* (fault) affects those conditions of knowledge, it prevents the production of (valid) knowledge and instead produces an error. For example, in the case of a piece of shell taken for silver in the shell-silver illusion,

although all conditions for the production of knowledge are present, the existence of distance plays the role of *doṣa* and prevents the production of knowledge of shell. In summary, therefore, it is unnecessary to search for a separate cause for the production of validity of knowledge, since whenever knowledge is produced it is valid. On the other hand, error is denied the opportunity to become knowledge, and the existence of a special impediment in the conditions of the production of knowledge is presumed to justify the production of an error.[250]

Validity of knowledge in the comprehension

The same knowledge that reveals the first knowledge reveals the validity of this knowledge.[251] Thus, when a knower has an experience such as 'I know the pitcher', at the same time he also knows that that knowledge he possesses about the pitcher is valid. This is known as the self-validity of knowledge at the point of its revelation. This conclusion may appear inconsistent, as knowledge sometimes grasps even an error. The answer is that knowledge whose validity is under consideration is intended here as a cognition involving a mental mode. On the other hand, error is a mode of *avidyā*. Thus, from this standpoint, error is not knowledge at all. Hence, the question of its validity does not arise. That, knowledge in this context refers to the cognition generated only by a valid mental mode, is borne out by the fact that such knowledge is taken here to be contradictory to ignorance.[252] Knowledge, which is contradictory to error, cannot be error itself.

An objection may be raised that if an error is not knowledge, then how can such an undeniable experience as 'I have an illusory knowledge' be justified? Such an experience unmistakably shows that error is also a form of knowledge. Madhusūdana meets the question in the following way: In the case of the error, 'this is silver' ('*idam rajatam*') there are two *vṛttis*, one is the mental mode embracing 'this' (*idam*) and the other, *avidyā-vṛtti*, embracing 'silver' (*rajatam*). The *avidyā-vṛtti* embracing 'silver' becomes falsely identified with the mental-*vṛtti* embracing 'this'. The character of knowledge (*jñānatva*) that exists in mental-*vrtti* is falsely ascribed to *avidyā-vṛtti*. Thus *avidyā-vṛtti* is not knowledge by itself, merely a semblance of knowledge (*jñānābhāsa*).[253]

As stated previously, the question of self-validity of knowledge is a real one when knowledge is taken to mean mental-*vṛtti*. The same question might be taken to be relevant when knowledge is recognised to be consciousness and not merely a mental-*vṛtti*. The answer is that knowledge as consciousness (*caitanya*) is neither produced nor known, so the question of the self-validity of that knowledge, both in its origin (*utpatti*) and its comprehension (*jñapti*), does not arise. For such a question to be allowed at all, the answer should be formulated in terms of *vṛtti*, which serves as a condition of consciousness and which entertains the question of validity in the light stated earlier. The self-validity of such *vṛtti*-knowledge in its comprehension is revealed in the knowledge of *sākṣī*, in the sense that every object, consciously or unconsciously, is revealed to the *sākṣī*

(*sarvam vastu jñātatayā ajñātatayā vā sākṣi-bhāsyam*). But the knowledge of *sākṣī* does not make its object known to the cognising *jīva*. Thus, even though the validity of knowledge is revealed to the *sākṣī*, along with that knowledge itself, the true identity of knowledge remains unknown to the cognising *jīva*. In this way, such knowledge remains valid, inasmuch as it presents an unknown object to the *jīva*.

4

BRAHMAN

The chapter on knowledge and epistemology introduces the binary division of the world of experience; these are *dṛk*, perceiver and *dṛśya*, perceived. Brahman as the pure consciousness comes within the first category and so do other forms of consciousness empirically conceived to explain the world and its experience. These are God (Īśvara), the creator and the saviour; *Sākṣī*, totally passive but omniscient consciousness who reveals every phenomenon; and finally, the individual person who is the subject of every perception. The second category is the phenomenal world that forms the content of an individual's perceptions.

At the top of the first category is Brahman, the totally transcendent, unqualified and unchangeable consciousness – for Advaita-vedānta the unique reality. For these reasons other forms of consciousness had to be devised. Behind the variegated world stands Brahman, the Absolute Being. Philosophy is the relentless pursuit of truth, and truth, according to the Advaita-vedānta, is Brahman. Thus knowledge of Brahman is the main subject taught in Advaita-vedānta. The truth or reality is absolute and one, infinite and indeterminate. That which 'is' must always be. Existence is absolutely unlimited by any condition. Therefore, Brahman as truth is completely free from any limitation (*pariccheda*) imposed by time (*kāla*), space (*deśa*) or matter (*vastu*). As any kind of limit spoils the absoluteness of reality, the universe, full of limitations, is held to be unreal. This is also the case with individual selves. As *avidyā*'s creation, they become subjected to the limitation of time, space and matter. Being themselves created by Brahman these phases cannot limit Brahman. Absolute Brahman is the root cause of the entire creation and the ground upon which the structure of the universe stands. Brahman is the creator, the sustainer and the re-absorber of the multitudinous universe in so far as Brahman is the locus of *avidyā*, which causes these activities. When *avidyā* is active, pure Brahman is designated God (*Īśvara*).

Brahman, as God (Īśvara), the designer, the origin and the controller of this universe, is conceived of as transcendental as well as immanent. Underlying this phenomenal world, Brahman exists as the very essence of its existence. It provides the illusion of existence to the non-existent universe; but that does not mean that Brahman is exhausted in the universe. While enduring through the universe, Brahman transcends it at the same time. The very name 'Brahman' suggests its

pervasiveness, its immense reach, whereas the universe is small and inadequate. The essence of Brahman is its oneness and its nature of Absolute Existence, Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Bliss.

At the time of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Brahman's nature as existence and knowledge was already established. The only questions were whether this existence was unique and absolute and whether Brahman could also be regarded as Bliss. This concerned mainly the dualist followers of *bhakti* theology. Vyāsarāja, the great scholar of Madhva school of Vaiṣṇavas, attacked the Advaita concept of the unqualified Brahman with particular vehemence. With great polemical skill he refuted this view of identity of Brahman with the world of conscious and unconscious beings and established the real difference (*bheda*) between Brahman and the individuals, on one hand, and with other worldly phenomena, on the other. Madhusūdana answered each point made by Vyāsarāja and refuted this with formal style of argumentation.[255] As both Vyāsarāja and Madhusūdana followed the contemporary neo-logicians' style, I have presented here these arguments in somewhat detailed form. Madhusūdana, therefore, starts with the proposition that Brahman is the reality without a second and is the culmination of Bliss.[256] The pressing demand of the Vaiṣṇavas at that time was the establishment of the reality of the individual selves and of the outer world. They also stressed the blissfulness of the divine communion between God/Brahman and the individual self as God's devotee. To refute this dualistic theory of devotion cherished by the Vaiṣṇavas and the qualified nature of Brahman, which they held as the highest truth, required great polemical skill and deep knowledge in religious and philosophical *śāstras*.

Madhusūdana argues that the true nature of Brahman can be known from the scriptures alone because the limited knowledge of the individual fails to comprehend the unlimited and unqualified nature of Brahman, the Absolute.[257] The scripture describes Brahman as the omniscient consciousness, unique and unqualified (*sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaśca*).[258] All but one of these features show the real nature of Brahman, with omniscience (*Sākṣī*) held to be only an incidental quality (*taṭastha lakṣaṇa*). Thus the idea of the qualified Brahman is negated.

The contention of the Vaiṣṇavas, with their faith in the qualified Brahman as the highest truth, is that because scripture promotes worship of the self – (*ātmetyevopāsīta*)[259], any texts[260] depicting the self to be unqualified and so forth has only a subordinate significance (*arthavāda*). Therefore, these latter scriptural texts aim only to praise the self and have nothing to teach. On the other hand, there are several scriptural texts that establish the qualified nature of Brahman. For example, the scripture asserts that Brahman possesses great attributes – '*bṛhanto-'sya dharmāḥ*'. Vedic passages describing Brahman as attributeless are then ancillary to the passages confirming Brahman's qualified nature. It is therefore inadmissible that the texts depicting qualified Brahman should be discarded in favour of those describing Brahman as unqualified and without attributes. Passages such as '*ya ātmā'pahatapāpmā … satyakāmāḥ satyasaṃkalpa so'nveṣ ṭavyaḥ ca vijijñāsitavya*'[261] clearly show that Brahman does possess real attributes. The scripture states that these qualities are eternal virtues of Brahman. Vedic

texts, stating that 'the knowledge of Supreme self is eternal, the activity is eternal and its strength is also eternal (*jñānam nityam kriyā nityā balam nityam parāt-manaḥ*)', clearly establish the eternity of Brahman's qualities. The scripture emphasises that such qualities cannot be conditional (*aupādhika*) because knowledge, activity and strength are natural to Brahman.[262] Passages depicting Brahman as one or identical with the individual self[263] or positing that the universe is false[264] should be taken as just hypothesis offered only to be refuted. So that the assertion that Brahman is 'not without attribute' etc. become understandable in the light of these passages. Statements contained in Vedic literature, such as 'in the beginning it was indeed nonexistent', '*asad vā idamagra āsit*' and 'the two birds…', '*dvā suparṇā*'[265] establish the following:

1 The reality of the universe.
2 The negation of absolute Brahman by denying its reality.
3 The difference between Brahman and the individual self by negating their identity.

Therefore, in order to introduce the positive counterparts of these negations, the *śruti* must describe them. Thus, by the statement '*neha nānāsti kiñcana*'[266] the *śruti* first lays down the falsity of the universe, then negates it by stating – '*Viśvam satyam*'. Likewise, the *śruti* first describes absolute Brahman – '*satyam jñānamanantam Brahma*' – only to negate it by the statement, '*asadevedam*'. The relationship between *jīva* and Brahman is posited in the *śruti* as '*tat tvam asi*' in order to negate it in '*dvā suparṇā*'. Therefore, passages such as '*neha nānāsti*, '*tat tvamasi*' or '*satyam jñānam*', should not be taken at face value. In fact, the *śruti* always stresses meditation, *upāsanā*, even of the unqualified.[267] Vācaspati also maintains that the Supreme self is suitable for *dhyāna*, that is meditation and that is, *upāsanā*.[268]

Thus the *śruti* has chosen the qualified Brahman as real and eternal. Indeed, unless Brahman is regarded as qualified there cannot be any enquiry about it, as an enquiry presupposes a subject matter describable in terms of attributes (*idamittham*). Thus even in the face of the conception of unqualified Brahman as depicted in some Vedic texts, the qualified Brahman is the purport of the scripture. Here ends the opponent's objections.

The non-dualist's answers to these arguments are as follows: The Vedic passages such as '*bṛhanto'sya dharmāḥ*', when referring to the qualified Brahman, are for the purpose of *upāsanā* only, as it is seen conducive to arrive at the self-realisation that is *mukti*. Vācaspati also meant that, as his commentator, the author of the *Kalpataru* explains, 'people who are slow to realize the supreme Brahman, first prepare their minds by the *upāsanā* of the qualified Brahman. Thus when their minds become purified, therein is revealed the real self of absolute Brahman, devoid of all limitations'.[269] Evidently the qualified Brahman, as described by the *śruti*, must be regarded as possessing conditional reality, while absolute Brahman is unconditional and absolute. However, this is not apparent in the following passages

taken from two particular *śruti*: '*sadeva saumya idamagra āsit*'[270] and '*asad vā idamagra āsit*'.[271] In each case the word *idam* refers to the universe, meaning that before creation the universe was identical to the ultimate and unmanifest reality; thus although manifested after the creation, the universe is unreal. Therefore, the *śrutis* cannot mean that both qualified Brahman and unqualified Brahman are ultimately real. To avoid mutual contradiction within the *śrutis*[272] Madhusūdana concludes that qualified Brahman possesses empirical reality whereas unqualified and unlimited Brahman has absolute reality. Therefore, *śrutis* such as '*bṛhanto'sya dharmāḥ*' and '*kevalo nirguṇaśca*' cannot be condemned as communicating contradictory theories. As for the *śruti* establishing the eternality of Brahman's knowledge, strength and activity (as in '*jñānam nityam*', for example), the knowledge of Brahman forms the very core of Brahman, thus it is identical with Brahman. The eternality of Brahman's strength and activity is stated only figuratively because these attributes are not ultimately real. They are said to be eternal inasmuch as they persist until the dawning of ultimate realisation of the true self. Hence, empirically they are eternal, because so long as the concept of time exists, they also exist.

The opponents of this theory contend that:

1 The *śruti*, '*neha nānāsti kiñcana*,' do not establish the falsity of the universe, but merely supply the positive counterpart (*abhāva pratiyogin*) of the negation of falsity of the universe purported by the *śruti* 'v*iśvam satyam*'.
2 The *śruti* '*tat tvam asi*' instead of testifying the identity between *jīva* and Brahman merely provides the positive counterpart, which is negated in the *śruti*, '*dvā suparṇā*'.
3 The *śruti*, '*satyam jñānam*' does not evince the validity of the absolute Brahman. It only supplies the positive counterpart that which is negated in the *śruti* '*asadeva idamagra āsit*'.[273]

Madhusūdana answers these criticisms by stating that the *śrutis* such as 'all these are just Brahman' (*Brahmaivedam sarvam*)[274] and '*neha nānāsti kiñcana*' establish the falsity of the universe, demonstrating that the *śrutis* are inclined towards the view that the world is not real. Moreover, '*viśvam satyam*' is not a negative statement therefore it is unnecessary to put forward a positive counterpart to it.

The same can be said for '*dvā suparṇā*', where again the *śrutis*, for example '*tat tvam asi*',[275] and '*aham Brahmāsmi*',[276] establish the idea that *jīva* and Brahman are identical. Therefore, the meaning of '*dvā suparṇā*' cannot be the duality of *jīva* and Brahman. Moreover, Madhusūdana mentions that the '*Paiṃgī-rahasya-Brāhmaṇa*'[277] explains the *śruti* '*dvā suparṇā*' as positing the difference between the mind (*buddhi*) and *jīva*.

The third point made by his opponents is that the theory of the non-existent Brahman does not stand up to scrutiny, as no *śruti* has ever established this fact. For example, '*sarvam khalvidam Brahma*'[278] states that Brahman is the locus of the universe. An unreal thing cannot be the locus of any object. It should therefore be

acknowledged that *śrutis* such as '*asadevedam agra āsit*' do not convey the idea of Brahman's non-existence. These *śrutis* merely inform that before its origination the universe was implicit in Brahman. It is therefore incorrect to consider that the *śruti* '*kevalo nirguṇaśca*',[279] which establish Brahman's unqualified nature, is not authoritative.

The attributes described by *śrutis* such as '*bṛhanto'sya dharmāḥ*' or '*parāsya śaktirvividhaiva śrūyate*' in the context of Brahman, are merely pragmatic and the *śrutis* describe them only for the purposes of negating them against Brahman. When the *śruti* describes a false object as false it cannot be unauthentic for saying so. When the *śruti* states that Brahman's knowledge, activity and strength are 'natural' to it (*svābhāvikījñānabala kriyā ca*) it does not mean that these qualities are innate within it. The *śruti* conveys only the idea that while knowledge of *jīva* is accidental, it is a permanent feature within Brahman so long as *ajñāna* exists. For the knowledge of Brahman is its omniscience which, being a modification of *ajñāna*, is co-existent with the latter. It cannot be said that through association with false omniscience, Brahman also becomes false. Although Brahman is associated with false omniscience, still it may be real. Two realities of differing degrees can remain side by side without affecting each other by their respective peculiarities. Brahman and its omniscience mutually differ in that while omniscience is liable to negation, Brahman is not. Moreover, it must be noted that the *śruti* '*yah sarvajñaḥ*'[280] refers only to the quality of omniscience, and does not establish its reality as well.[281] The *nirguṇa śruti*, '*kebalo nirguṇaśca*', claims supremacy over the *saguṇa śruti*, namely, '*bṛhanto'sya dharmāḥ*' inasmuch as it conveys the absolute truth and is the only means for the attainment of the ultimate knowledge of Brahman.

Nevertheless, the *sagṇna śrutis* should not be regarded as valueless. As I have stated elsewhere, they are meant for *upāsanā* or meditative worship, which requires a qualified object. The unqualified is beyond the reach of *upāsanā*. *Upāsanā* of the unqualified Brahman[282] is but knowledge in the form of deep meditation. Referring to *Kalpataru*'s remark quoted above,[283] the object of *upāsanā* is Brahman as symbolised in *oṃ*, consisting of three syllables, *a*, *u* and *m*. Therefore, the statement in *Bhāmatī* does not go against the contention of the Advaitins, namely that only the *nirguṇa* Brahman is the purport of the entire Vedānta literature. The knowledge of the *nirguṇa* Brahman brings absolute bliss, the salvation from and the cessation of worldly bondage and sorrow. The *upāsanā* of the *saguṇa* Brahman cannot bring ultimate salvation, which comes only when Brahman is revealed as the absolute, unconditional and unqualified reality, that is, when complete identity is established between *jīva* and Brahman. The salvation that can be attained by the *upāsanā* of the qualified Brahman is only relative (*avāntara*).[284] *Upāsanā* makes the mind of the worshipper fit for receiving the final knowledge derived from the great Vedic statements such as '*tat tvam asi*' and '*aham Brahmāsmi*'. However, the unqualified nature of Brahman does not make it unsuitable as an object of discussion, for that purpose can be served by assuming false qualities in Brahman.[285] Likewise, absolute Brahman is completely formless.

Even though the *śruti* sometimes describes Brahman as having thousands of limbs and other characteristics peculiar to the body,[286] they are used only figuratively, either to express Brahman's all-pervasiveness or to indicate its self-luminous nature. The *śruti* seeks to establish the reality of Brahman so their emphasis is on Brahman alone, while all other things are described insofar as they corroborate that idea. When the scripture[287] observes that Brahman must be visualised, stress is laid on the revelation of Brahman and not on the reality of the form of Brahman. The notion of any form of Brahman is against the doctrine of the Vedānta as held by the Śaṃkara's school, since the very idea places a limitation on Brahman and accordingly its absolute nature is nullified. The idea of a particular form is necessary only for the purposes of *upāsanā* and the utility of *upāsanā* lies in the purification of the worshipper's mind.

However, the necessity for a qualified Brahman does not end here. Illogical as Brahman the Absolute is, it naturally violates all ideas that come under the umbrella of logic. It is the logical mind that prompts human beings to seek an explanation of this creation and its cause. Where does the universe come from? What is its material cause? On whom are we to bestow its efficient causality? If Brahman is to be regarded as the substratum of everything and the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe,[288] then how can it remain unqualified? Whenever Brahman is described in relation to the universe, it becomes qualified by that relationship. Thus the qualified Brahman is to be looked upon as both the material and efficient cause of the universe. According to Madhusūdana, Brahman is the material cause of the universe, being the substratum of the ignorance that transforms into the universe. In fact, according to Madhusūdana, Brahman is the material cause of the universe insofar as, being the locus of *avidyā*, it is responsible for the world illusion.[289] As the object of *avidyā*, Brahman no longer remains unqualified, but serves as the material cause by becoming the reservoir in which the universe is created.[290] Hence, the qualified Brahman can be regarded as the material cause. The text 'He who is omniscient' (*yaḥ sarvajñaḥ*)[291] may be considered in this connection, wherein it is also indicated that the omniscient God is the creator of the universe. This omniscient God is no other than Brahman itself in its qualified condition. Likewise, Brahman may be regarded as the efficient cause insofar as Brahman created the universe with a desire to create it. Brahmānanda defines efficient cause as that possessing the knowledge conducive to the generation of the effect.[292] That is why the scriptural text mentioned above states that Brahman, as omniscient, created the universe.[293] Thus the concept of the qualified Brahman is not regarded as completely worthless. This qualified Brahman is, however, none other than the Absolute viewed as such as long as the creation persists. When the universe is no more, the Absolute Brahman is revealed as unqualified. Just as *māyā* or *avidyā* is beginningless, so is the qualified Brahman. So long as *avidyā* exists, the qualified Brahman, as the locus[294] of *avidyā*, must also exist. When this *avidyā* ceases to exist, the unqualified Brahman shines in its pristine glory as Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Bliss and unique, divorced from all kinds of duality. This is salvation.

Brahman as knowledge

Unlike the Naiyāyikas, the Śaṃkara's school contends that knowledge is not a special attribute of Brahman, since that conception leaves room for duality. At the same time, however, the reality of knowledge cannot be denied, because the ultimate goal of humans is to achieve a state of consciousness of absolute, unceasing blissfulness or *ānandatva*.[295] Therefore, at the time of self-realisation, when an individual completely identifies himself with Brahman, consciousness and bliss must be recognised as existing. That is why the scripture describes them as constituting the very nature of Brahman.[296] So what sort of knowledge includes self-realisation? Madhusūdana explains knowledge as that which reveals objects.[297] However, Vyāsarāja contends that at the time of salvation, when all objects have vanished, knowledge, if any, has to remain without an object, thus negating Madhusūdana's definition. Brahman by itself cannot be regarded as serving as the object of knowledge, for knowledge, according to the Advaita school, is the essence of Brahman and so Brahman cannot become its own object. Madhusūdana replies that knowledge reveals an object in the sense that such knowledge leads to the practical usage of that object; for example, the use of a pitcher is based on the revelation of the object in the mind of the speaker. Thus, knowledge is characterised by this revelation. Revelation is consciousness reflected on a mental mode (*citta vṛtti*), which dispels the ignorance of the cogniser regarding the existence of that object. Knowledge, therefore, is consciousness, limited by a mental mode. In other words, knowledge is nothing but Brahman conditioned by a *vṛtti*. Such a mental mode may embrace an object or it may embrace pure Brahman. In this way, knowledge of Brahman is possible. It then follows that knowledge in order to maintain its character, need not always be associated with an object. It is sufficient to say that it occasionally reveals an object but certainly not always. Therefore, in the state of salvation, knowledge may exist without an object as its content.[298]

It should be noted here that Brahman is not affected by the result of knowledge (*phalavyāpyatva)*. The meaning of *phalavyāpyatva* is the nature of being pervaded by the result (*phala*) of *vṛtti-jñāna*. Such a result is the revelation of the object of *vṛtti-jñāna*.[299] Unconscious objects await such a result for their revelation. Brahman, being self-revealed, does not need the help of such a result to reveal itself. However, *vṛtti-jñāna* is essential for the removal of *ajñāna*, which covers the real nature of Brahman from *jīva*. Hence, *vṛtti-jñāna* may embrace Brahman, but the result of such *vṛtti-jñāna* cannot.

Brahman as bliss

Bliss is also Brahman's essence. This means that Brahman is the object of unconditional desire.[300] According to Brahmānanda,[301] this means that bliss is sought for its own sake. Even though, from the ultimate viewpoint, both knowledge and bliss are identical, both words are used in the *śrutis*[302] on the presupposition of

two apparently different characteristics, blissfulness, (*ānandatva*) and being of the nature of knowledge, (*jñānatva*). In order to avoid attaching any positive attribute to Brahman the non-dualist explains these two essential characteristics of Brahman in a negative way. They are explained to be contradictions of the very lack of blissfulness and not being essentially ignorant, *nirānandatva* and *ajñānatva*, respectively. Brahman is knowledge and bliss and so it is distinct from the world that consists of ignorance and suffering. Thus it becomes clear that the two words are semantically different, although the object indicated by them is one and the same – Brahman. Hence, when both words are used in the context of Brahman, they are *not* mere repetitions. Being only indicatory marks (*upalakṣaṇa*), however, they do not make Brahman qualified.[303] Brahman therefore is bliss insofar as it is the state of unconditional desirability. That essence of Brahman is indicated by the word 'desirability' (*paramapremāspadatvam*),[304] and as this essence is experienced at the time of liberation, liberation is also bliss.[305]

Brahman, as existence, knowledge and bliss, is regarded as being absolute and eternal. It is one, devoid of all kinds of duality. The *śruti* '*na tu taddvitīyamasti*'[306] states that Brahman is without a second. This means that Brahman is marked (*upalakṣita*) by the absence of a second. It may be contended that if this absence of a second is regarded as real, then this very absence becomes a second to Brahman. If, on the other hand, it is regarded as unreal then Brahman cannot claim to be without a second because of the presence of the universe.[307] Madhusūdana avoids this dilemma by accepting the view of the Prabhākara school of Mimāṃsā, that the absence of a thing is the same as the substratum of that absence. For instance, the absence of a pot on the earth is nothing other than the earth itself; so also the absence of a second in Brahman is real because such an absence amounts to Brahman, the substratum of the absence. However, Madhusūdana also justifies the absence of a second in Brahman even when the absence of a second is regarded as different from Brahman, its substratum. He observes that the reality of the absence of a second does not enforce reality on its positive counterpart as well. The counterpart can be the object of real negation just as a dream object is negated when the dream gives way to waking states.[308] The main purpose of the scripture is to establish the reality of Brahman, as indicated by the absence of a second, '*dvitīyābhāva*'. In order to establish this reality the empirical reality of all worldly objects is accepted for the purpose of negation. Empirical objects may indicate the absolute, and for this purpose they need not possess the same degree of reality as possessed by Brahman indicated by them.

Brahman is self-revealing

Absolute Brahman, being knowledge itself, is self-revealing (*svaprakāśa*). Brahman is self-revealing in the sense that not being known like an ordinary object, it is still liable to be used as 'revealed' in the form 'I am Brahman' (*ahaṃ Brahmāsmi*).[309] The author of *Pañcadaśī* compares the self-revealing nature of Brahman to that of a burning lamp. While it is burning, the lamp reveals everything

but does not require a separate light to reveal its own self. This nature of Brahman to be automatically revealed (*vyavahārayogyatā*), Madhusūdana interprets in terms of negation; therefore, no question of duality (i.e. the existence of a quality of Brahman) arises.

This establishment of a direct relationship between the known and the knower is called *phalavyāpyatva*. It is stated that Brahman cannot be regarded as an object of knowledge in this sense, for such a relationship presupposes a distinction between the knower, which is after all consciousness, and the known. Brahman, being consciousness itself, cannot simultaneously be split into the knower and the known.[310] Even though, in this way, Brahman cannot be an object of consciousness, still it reveals itself when the ignorance regarding its nature is dispelled by '*akhaṇḍākāra citta vṛtti*'.[311] Brahman is self-revealing in that by itself, it provides for its own usage. In other words, it does not require another knower for its usage, as is the case with all ordinary objects, such as a pitcher. Brahman is self-revealing and being consciousness itself, is not an object of consciousness.

The identity between jīva and Brahman

According to the Advaita-vedānta, truth is one and unique, and that truth is Brahman, which is consciousness itself. Thus consciousness is truth. From this standpoint the *jīvas*, the conscious individuals, cannot be false. However, the admission of the reality of *jīva* robs Brahman of its absolute existence as one and devoid of all kinds of differences, whether homogenous (*svajātīya*), external (*vijātīya*) or internal (*svagata*). If the existence of *jīva* is not denied, absolute identity between *jīva* and Brahman cannot be established. In fact, the apparent difference between the two is created by *avidyā*. As *avidyā* is false, so the difference brought about by *avidyā* is equally false and non-existent from the ultimate viewpoint. By veiling from *jīva* the true nature of Brahman, which is self-revealing, eternal and absolute, *avidyā* subjects the individual self to illusion and provides enjoyment for it. Thus *jīva* undergoes pleasure and pain accordingly, as it achieves merit and demerit. However, *jīva*, as marked by empirical life brought about by ultimately non-existent *avidyā*, also does not exist. That is not to say that *jīva* by itself is non-existent. On the contrary, as consciousness, *jīva* is identical with Brahman and as such it is bliss per se. The limitation of *jīva* and its misery are caused by *avidyā* and so they persist while *avidyā* persists. Salvation (*mukti*) means the realisation of *jīva*'s true nature as bliss. In order to attain salvation it is necessary to realise *jīva*'s identity with Brahman. Such realisation of a person's actual self dispels *avidyā* along with its limitations and automatically the person is released (*mukta*).

Arguments in favour of difference, bheda

This is a concept the bhakti-theologians especially the Vaiṣṇavas, cannot accept. Dualists such as Madhva and his followers challenge the above view. Among the

five distinctions recognised by them to be absolute,[312] one is that of *jīva* from Brahman, that is, God. This distinction is proved by perceptional evidence. Ordinary knowledge of *jīva* fails to recognise *Īśvara* as distinct from *jīva*, because *Īśvara* is not the object of ordinary knowledge. However, *jīva* always feels its distinction from God as evident from such experiences as: 'I am not omniscient like God', 'I am subjected to sorrow', etc. Furthermore, if *jīva* were identical with God, it would possess omniscience, which again should be experienced. As there is no such experience, *jīva* does not possess omniscience. Moreover, unless the cognition of distinction (*bheda*) is accepted, the Advaitins cannot negate it as such negation requires a pre-affirmation of the negated subject (*prasaktapratiṣedha*). The statement of God in the *Bhagavadgītā*, 'I know all my previous births but oh, Arjuna, you do not know them',[313] implies that God, (*Īśvara*) always perceives His distinction from the *jīva*. Therefore, the distinction of *Īśvara* (i.e. Brahman) from the *jīva* is established by the infallible perception of God.

Distinction (*bheda*) can also be established by following three inferences:

1 *Jīva* and *Īśvara* are mutually different; because they are substrata of mutually conflicting qualities; the qualities of the *jīva* are in total conflict with those of *Īśvara*, just as fire and snow are opposed to each other.
2 Brahman, being omniscient is, in fact, different from the *jīva*, as that which is not omniscient is none other than *jīva*; for example, the *jīva* itself.
3 *Īśvara* is the locus of the difference, the positive counterpart (*pratiyogin*) of which is the *jīva*; because *Īśvara* is omniscient, omnipotent, the agent of all activities and independent; the negative example (*vyatireki-dṛṣṭānta*) is the *jīva*.

The scripture also proves this fact. Thus the *śrutis*, such as '*dvā suparṇā*,'[314] '*ye ātmani tiṣṭhan*,'[315] and '*Ajo hyeko juṣamāṇo'nuśete jahatyenaṃ bhuktabhogama-jo'nyaḥ*,[316] confirm the difference between the *jīva* and Brahman. Moreover, in order to establish identity the Advaitins must at first choose one of three options:

1 accept the existence of the *jīva* as known by direct knowledge and then establish its identity with Brahman;
2 accept the existence of Brahman, known from the scripture, as distinct from *jīva* and then establish its individualness (*jīvatva*);
3 accept the existence of both of them separately and then establish their identity.

In all of these cases, however, before the Advaitins establish the identity between the *jīva* and Brahman, they are forced to accept their distinct existence. Therefore, the realisation of identity depends upon the realisation of the distinctiveness of Brahman and *jīva*. As the latter is the fundamental meaning of the scriptures, it possesses greater strength than the former; thus, the theory of identity, which is based on such a foundation, does not stand up to logic.

The validity of the scriptural statement confirming duality is further emphasised by the fact that from the introduction of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* and the concluding portion thereof, it is evident that the main thesis of this scripture is to establish duality. For example, it begins with 'the two birds' (*dvā suparṇa*)[317] and ends in 'attains great harmony' (*paramaṃ sāmyamupaiti*).[318] Moreover, the same view is repeated over and over again in the same scripture in order to make the conclusion free from all doubts.[319] Further, as the *śruti* has to present a novel idea (*apūrva*), which in this case is difference (*bheda*), its validity is unquestionable. The knowledge that establishes the distinction of *Īśvara* from the *jīva* presupposes knowledge of *Īśvara*, the positive counterpart of such distinction. Only the *śruti* present both these forms of knowledge. Again, knowledge of duality is not fruitless inasmuch as it helps to discriminate between merit and demerit. Therefore, the validity of distinction between the *jīva* and Brahman goes uncontested whereas the view of their identity, being contradictory to that of the former, cannot be accepted.[320]

Refutation of the experience of difference (bheda)

Madhusūdana critically examines all the arguments of the dualists and nullifies them by following counter-arguments: Realisations such as 'I am not omniscient' or 'I am not devoid of sorrow' do not establish *jīva* as being distinct from absolute Brahman. However, they do indicate the difference between consciousness limited by a person's internal faculties (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and consciousness unlimited by this. Scriptures emphasising the difference between *Īśvara* and the *jīva*, present only the difference between the individual and the Lord (*Īśvara*) both of whom have limited consciousness. However, it does not establish the difference between the *jīva* and Brahman, the unlimited consciousness. The scriptures establishing their identity (*abheda śruti*) may indeed establish the absolute identity between the *jīva* and Brahman on the mere presumption of distinction (*bheda*), but *bheda* as an absolute fact is not the prerequisite for such *śruti*.[321]

It is not possible to assert that the difference between Brahman and the *jīva* is proved by perception. Madhusūdana explains that pure Brahman, as such, is beyond the reach of ordinary perception. Any conscious entity (*jīva* or *Īśvara*) is Brahman itself, since Brahman is the consciousness and allows no division. The apparent difference between the *jīva* and *Īśvara* lies in the nature of limitation (*upādhi*). Limitation is the creation of *avidyā*, and as *avidyā* is false, the difference created by it is also false.

Refutation of opponent's inferences about bheda

Inferences put forward by the opponents are all fallacious. Thus, the argument establishing the difference between *jīva* and *Īśvara*, on the basis of their being loci of contradictory qualities, is invalid, since neither of them possess contradictory qualities such as sorrow and absence of sorrow. The reason for this is that they are

all qualities of mind.[322] Moreover, as the presence and absence of sorrow are found in the same locus, the differences between qualities cannot establish the differences of their locus. If the dualists accept difference to be false, the Advaitins also do the same. If difference is claimed to be real, the *probandum* (*sādhyā*) is yet to be proved. Other inferences are equally erroneous. In all cases the difference cannot be said to be real (*tāttvika*) for its reality is not yet established.[323]

Refutation of scriptural evidence on difference

Even the sacred scriptures on *bheda* have to be construed otherwise. The *śruti* '*dvā suparṇā*' is stated by the *Paiṅgī-rahasya Brāhmaṇa* as a description of *buddhi* (intelligence) and the *jīva*,[324] and not of *jīva* and God, as claimed by the dualists. Therefore, this *śruti* cannot be accepted as evidence of difference (*bheda*) between the *jīva* and *Īśvara*. What about the other *śrutis* such as '*Yaḥ ātmani tiṣṭhannātmānamantaro yamayati*,'[325] '*cetanaścetanānām*,'[326] and '*ajo'nya*'[327], which seem to emphasise the relationship between the container and the contained, between *jīva* and *Īśvara*? To posit the specification of one out of many (*nirdhāraṇa*) and to posit *bheda* can be justified by the assumption of an empirical *bheda*, which, nevertheless, need not be real. Moreover, reality of difference (*bheda*) would go against the *śrutis*, which establish the identity between *jīva* and Brahman.[328] Therefore the '*bheda śrutis*' may be interpreted as expressing only empirical difference, (*vyavahārika bheda*). They are just '*arthavāda śrutis*'[329] and thus they do not possess any independent validity apart from those giving injunction and prohibition. The '*bheda śrutis*' concern themselves with empirical intercourse only. In fact, according to the Advaitins, all the sacred texts depict directly or indirectly the sole existence of unlimited, unqualified and absolute Brahman. Madhusūdana holds that the scripture and *Smṛtis* describing *bheda*, the existence of enjoyment and the difference between *Īśvara* and *jīva* and so on, are meant for *upāsanā* of the qualified Brahman, which is an indirect means for attaining salvation. However, that does not mean that knowledge of *bheda* is necessary for salvation. Such *śrutis* provide the preliminary steps for the purification of mind. Final and absolute salvation comes when complete identity between the *jīva* and Brahman is realised. Such realisation follows the cognition of the meaning of the scriptural statements such as '*tat tvam asi*',[330] or '*aham Brahmāsmi*'.[331]

Vedic statements, such as '*tat tvam asi*' or '*aham Brahmāsmi*' are called 'great sentences' (*mahāvākya*) because they distinctly establish perfect identity between *jīva* and Brahman, which is the purport of the Vedas. Madhusūdana states[332] that these great sentences generate directly the correct knowledge of the aforementioned identity. In elucidating this statement of Madhusūdana, Brahmānanda, the commentator[333] says that these sentences, namely '*tat tvam asi*', etc., are the instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) for the generation of direct knowledge of identity between *jīva* and Brahman. Even though it is verbal knowledge, it is direct because the object of this knowledge is nothing but Brahman. According to Brahmānanda, direct knowledge is that whose content is not generally covered by *ajñāna*. In

other words, in direct knowledge the essence of an object is so exposed that knowledge reveals it at once in all its bearings. Although insentient objects like the pitcher never directly become objects of *ajñāna*, since *ajñāna* operates only with reference to Brahman, nevertheless, the consciousness limited by the pitcher becomes the object of *ajñāna*. Being the limitation of such consciousness the object, namely the pitcher, is falsely regarded as covered by *ajñāna*. When a sensuous mode of mind (*cākṣuṣādi vṛtti*) reaches the object, here a pitcher, the consciousness limited by the pitcher no longer remains covered. Thus the cover of *ajñāna* having gone, the pitcher can be said to be an object of direct knowledge.[334] Being the limitation of such consciousness, it may be stated that such objects have been embraced by ignorance, (*ajñāna*).[335] The mental mode arising from 'great sentences' (*mahāvākyas*) embraces the identity of *jīva* and Brahman, and thereby dispels the knower's ignorance regarding Brahman. In this way, the identification between *jīva* and Brahman is the content of the mental mode, this mode being called direct even though it is derived from a sentence. Thus the knowledge imparted by the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' is direct. The sense conveyed by a sentence depends upon the knowledge of the sense conveyed by the words constituting that sentence. As the senses imparted by the words '*tat*' and '*tvam*' are not obtainable from any other source, they are also furnished by the scripture. For example, the senses of Vedic words like '*yūpa*' (sacred post) and '*āhavanīya*' (the ritual fire) can only be known from the scriptures. These two expressions are found in Vedic statements such as 'the sacrificial animal is to be tied to the post' (*yūpe paśum badhnāti*) and 'sacrifice is made in the ritual fire' (*āhavanīye juhoti*). The meaning of '*yūpa*' is sacrificial post made of bamboo, which has been cut and properly shaped. This meaning is found in Vedic statements such as '*yūpa takṣati*'[336] and '*yūpamaṣṭāsrīkaroti*'. Likewise, *āhavanīya* refers to a domestic fire that has been duly sanctified by offerings made during the daytime. This meaning is given by the *śruti* as '*vasante brāhmano'gninādadhita, naktam gārhapatyamādadhāti divāhavanīyam*'.[337]

In the case of '*tat*' and *tvam*', their sense is expressed in several Vedic statements. Thus, the word '*tat*' directly means the omniscient God, who is the creator. This meaning is derived from the *śrutis*; for example, 'that from which all created beings are born, by whose efforts the created beings continue to live' ('*yato vā imāni bhutāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti*')[338] and 'that which is omniscient and is aware of all' (*yah sarvajñaḥ sarvavit*.)[339] However, the secondary meaning of the word is pure Brahman as described in the *śruti* '*satyamjñānamanantam*'.[340] The primary sense of the word '*tvam*' is stated in *śrutis* such as 'like a great fish that swims along both banks (of a river) alternately' (*tadyathā mahā matsya ubhe kule anusanncarati*)'[341] and means limited *jīva*. The secondary sense of '*tvam*' is, however, the pure consciousness (or self) as expressed in *śrutis* such as 'it is this person – the one that consists of perception among the vital functions, the one that is the inner light within the heart' (*yo'yam vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hṛdantarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ*)[342] and 'you can't see the seer who does the seeing' (*na dṛṣṭerdraṣṭāram paśyeḥ*).[343]

If the primary meanings of '*tat*' and '*tvam*' are adopted, then the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' becomes incongruous, because the *jīva*, being of limited consciousness, can never be identified with God, the Omniscient Creator. Therefore, for the sake of consistency, '*tat*' and '*tvam*' must be taken in their secondary meanings.[344] Madhusūdana explains this process as follows. First, the primary sense of the words '*tat*' and '*tvam*', as stated above, are apprehended; then the disagreement between the two primary senses is felt, since the limited *jīva* can never be identified with unlimited God. This disagreement gives rise to the recollection of the secondary meanings of '*tvam*' and '*tat*' – pure self and Brahman. This is recollection rather than direct knowledge, the knowledge of pure self and Brahman having already been acquired through Vedic statements such as '*satyam*' etc. Thus although *jīva*, because it is limited, cannot prima facie be the same as the Omniscient, Omnipotent Creator, as pure self and Brahman they can be identical. The relationship between the pure self and Brahman is experienced in deep sleep (*suṣupti*), thus giving credence to the purport of '*tat tvam asi*'.

Here both '*tat*' and '*tvam*' are taken in their secondary senses (*lakṣyārtha*). The *lakśaṇā* herein is known as *jahadajahatsvārthā* (that which has partly abandoned its primary sense and partly retained it). Although both words denote qualified consciousness, and the difference in meaning between them lies in the difference of the limitation (*upādhi*) of consciousness, by their secondary power (*lakṣaṇā*) they just indicate Brahman, which is devoid of all attributes. Thus both words abandon the adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*) parts of their senses and retain the nominal (*viśeṣya*) portion.[345] In this way, by establishing complete identity between the *jīva* and Brahman, the sentence imparts the integral sense in relation to Brahman, which is the true nature of the self (*ātmatattva*).[346] Although both '*tat*' and '*tvam*', by indication, mean one integral object – pure self – there is no question of repetition,[347] since their primary senses are different. It cannot be said that acceptance of the secondary sense (*lakṣaṇā*) in both the words, constituting the sentence '*tat tvam asi*', is courting defeat. As the purport of the sentence is identity, it is logical to admit more than one *lakṣaṇā* to support this. It should also be borne in mind that the power of the constituent words in a sentence are guided by the purport.[348] Therefore, the Vedic statement '*tat tvam asi*' establishes complete identity between the *jīva* and Brahman.[349]

The dualists[350] claim that at the beginning and the end of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, which is included in the *Atharva Veda*,[351] by the repeated mention of the difference existing between an individual person and the Lord,[352] and further, by the description of the fruit of the knowledge of difference, it is evident that the *Muṇḍaka* has established the validity of the knowledge of palpable difference between the *jīva* and *Īśa*.

However, this conclusion is not tenable. In the first *muṇḍaka*, (chapter),[353] of that *Upaniṣad*, 'Śaunaka, a wealthy householder, once went up to Aṅgiras in the prescribed manner and asked: 'What is it, my lord, by knowing which a man comes to know this whole world?' This is what Aṅgiras told him:Two types of knowledge a man should learn – those who know *Brahman* tell us – the higher and the lower.

The lower of the two consists of the Ṛgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, the Atharvaveda, phonetics, the ritual-science, grammar, etymology, metrics and astronomy; whereas the higher is that by which one grasps the imperishable.[354]

'What cannot be seen, what cannot be grasped, without colour, without sight or hearing, without hands or feet; what is eternal and all-pervading, extremely minute, present every where – that is the immutable, which the wise fully perceive'.[355] This statement is the real answer to the question put by Śaunaka.[356] Therefore, it is evident that the identity of *jīva* and Brahman is the subject on which the *Upaniṣad* begins, otherwise the answer would become irrelevant. In the second *Muṇḍaka*, the same point is again dealt with in the statement 'all this is simply that Person – rites, penance, prayer (Brahman), the highest immortal. One who knows this, my friend, hidden within the cave, cuts the knot of ignorance in this world'.[357] At the end of the third *Muṇḍaka*, it is observed, 'the knower, freed from name and appearance; reaches the heavenly Person, beyond the very highest. When a man comes to know that highest *Brahman*, he himself becomes that very *brahman*.'[358] Thus scriptural extracts found in the three *Muṇḍakas* clearly establish the validity of identity (*abheda*). Therefore, all the places where seemingly the *MuU* is making a dualistic statement one should not mistake that for the scripture's true purport. Moreover, the statement 'he attains the highest identity' ('*paramaṃsāmmyamupaiti*')[359] confirms that the scripture really teaches total identity between the individual and *Brahman*. Therefore, the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* does not establish any difference.[360]

The opponent raises a query. This identity is the very essence of the self. Just as the self is revealed, so is identity. How then, can justification be given for the daily intercourse on the part of the self, when the root of intercourse – *avidyā* – can never appear in the face of this everlasting sense of identity?

The answer is that this identity per se is not opposed to *avidyā*, which then envelops the identity until it is dispelled by the undifferentiated and integral cognition (*akhaṇḍārtha vṛtti*) embracing Brahman. Until that *vṛtti* arises, the pragmatic intercourse, based on duality, is not considered to be void (*śunya*). This is contrary to the view of the Buddhists who hold that the *śunya* does not possess any essence, whereas the self does. Madhusūdana observes that *jīva* is identical to Brahman, in the sense that Brahman has become the essence of *jīva* in such a way that no attribute that is irrelevant to Brahman can be relevant to *jīva*.[361]

Neither can it be argued that the mere fact that the concept of identity depends (*upajīvya*) on the presupposition of the concept of difference makes the latter of greater validity. Although knowledge of difference is a pre-requisite for the knowledge of the significance of the scriptures depicting non-difference (*abheda śruti*), the latter does not require the scriptures depicting difference (*bheda śruti*) to yield the knowledge of real difference in order to prove its validity.[362] The reality of *bheda* need not be taken as the basis for scriptures depicting non-difference (*abheda śruti*). When in the case of the cognition that contradicts the false experience of shell-silver, the non-dualists do not accept that the negative experience required the shell-silver negated here should be ultimately real (like Brahman).

Inference also proves that the individual is, in fact, non-different from Brahman. The syllogistic formula runs thus:

> The *jīvas* are not really different from the highest self (*paramātman*) by virtue of their being the self (i.e. it possesses self-hood).
>
> As the highest self, being self (i.e. possessing self-hood) does not differ from the highest self, so also the individual, being self, is identical to the highest self.
>
> It should be noted that even though the theory of uniqueness of self (*ātman*) makes the idea of any class conception of self-hood (*ātmatva jāti*) impossible, yet the idea is used here by assuming its relative reality (*vyavahārika sattā*).

Jīva is not a part of Brahman

Rāmānuja and his school of Vaiṣṇavas hold that the *jīva* is a part of the self of Brahman, another part being the universe. The doctrine purports that Brahman is the whole, having the universe and *jīva* as integral parts; this is known as '*Viśiṣṭādvaita vāda*'. The idea is confirmed by several texts from the *śruti* and other religious texts of authority. For instance one may cite Vedic statements like: 'one quarter of him (Brahman's) comprises of the universe and the selves...' ('*pādo'sya sarvā bhūtāni*')[363]; 'In this world my own part has become the eternal *jīva*' (*mamaivāṃśo jīva-loke jīvabhūtaḥsanātanaḥ*),[364] and so on. In order to refute this theory, Madhusūdana proves that these scriptural quotations in fact depict identity. The *jīvas* cannot be component parts of Brahman. As Brahman is beginningless, limited *jīva* cannot be regarded as the fragments that construct its whole being; nor can they be the dividing parts, because Brahman is indivisible. The conception of the part and the whole invariably refers to a form. Brahman, having no form, cannot be conceived in terms of the part and the whole. As Brahman is devoid of any parts, its parts, if any, have to be imagined. It is ignorance that produces the concept of false limitation. For example, though space is unlimited, one falsely imagines it to be limited by objects that sometimes enclose the space. The space inside a water jug is not really a part of the unlimited space; because, when the jug is full of water the space inside it becomes just the great space. Therefore, when the sacred scripture states that *jīva* is part of Brahman, the word 'part' is not to be understood in its literal sense. To avoid this apparent contradiction in the scripture (*śruti*), the secondary sense of this word, that is, illusory part, should be accepted to be the real meaning.[365] Even in the *sūtra* '*aṃśo nānā vyapadeśāt*'[366] the difference implied by the word 'part', *aṃśa*, is taken in its secondary sense in order to be congruous with the scriptures on identity (*abheda śrutis*).

The dualist may ask whether the Advaitins consider the *jīva* to be part of pure Brahman or as part of the Lord, *Īsvara*. The first option does not correspondent with the meaning contained in the *śruti* and *smṛti* (sacred literature elaborating

scriptures) mentioned earlier, because the scripture and the *smṛti* statements quoted here clearly refer to *Īśvara*. If the second option is accepted, the conclusion becomes irrelevant for the present discussion, because *Īśvara* is not pure *Brahman*. In addition, the second option also goes against the Advaita view, since according to the Advaitins, *Īśvara*, being limited consciousness, stands almost on the same footing with the *jīva*. That is to say, both *Īśvara* and *jīva*, being distinct from pure Brahman, are illusory entities; so *jīva* cannot be regarded as being part of *Īśvara*. In reply to this, Madhusūdana states that the pronoun used in the aforementioned quotation, that is, *tat*, indicates pure Brahman only.[367]

Now Madhusūdana starts to defend the theory of identity between the individual and Brahman. *Jīva* is reflection of Brahman on the individual's internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), which is inherently transparent due to the predominance of *sattva guna*.[368] The reflection (*pratibimba*) and its prototype (*bimba*) are always identical. Even though they may appear to be different, close scrutiny reveals their identification with each other. When an object is reflected on a clear mirror, the reflection exhibits almost complete identification with the reflected object. The appearance of difference between the two is brought about by the attributes of the mirror falsely imposed on the reflection. The reflection should not be taken as the shadow of the reflected object. Shadow means contradiction or absence of light, but a reflection is not opposed to light. Therefore reflection and shadow are different. When the mirror is blurred the reflection appears quite different from the object reflected. This analogy shows that the defects of the inner organ of every person affects the person by imposing false affectations, but that does not in reality affect the individual, *jīva*. Hence one must admit that *jīva*, being a reflection of Brahman, is identical with Brahman.

Identity between the reflection and the object reflected can also be established by formal inference.[369] The reflection is identical with its prototype for one of three reasons:

1 Because it possesses the attributes peculiar to its prototype.
2 Because it does not possess any attributes contradictory to its prototype.
3 Or, because it is not produced by any cause which has not produced its prototype.

This last reason (middle term/*hetu*) is put forward in accordance with the view of the Pratyagātman, who held that *bimba*-consciousness is *Īśvara*, while *jīva* is His reflection. The second reason may be open to criticism on the grounds that *jīva* possesses several virtues that are diametrically opposite to the essence of pure Brahman. It may be said in answer to this criticism, however, that these contradictory virtues do not really belong to *jīva*, but are superimposed on it by its limiting inner organ, a product of *avidyā*. Hence they are false, so none of them are natural to *jīva*.[370] It may further be objected that if *bimba* is regarded as identical with its *pratibimba*, how can one of them be subjected to the cycle of birth and death while the other is free? In answer, it has been said that as the specks of dirt

on the mirror spoil the beauty of the reflected face, so also the attributes of the limitations enwrap the *pratibimba* with false attributes, although the blemishes of the mirror do not affect the *bimba*.[371]

So *jīva* is in substance identical with Brahman. Anything that can be called real in *jīva* is its consciousness, which is nothing but Brahman. Every other aspect and attribute of the individual, *jīva* – its mind or body, its birth or death, its instincts and impressions – are nothing but creations of *avidyā*. Thus the existence of *jīva*, being extremely relative, conditional as well as limited, cannot be regarded as real. Hence real, absolute existence belongs solely to Brahman. Brahman manifests itself through *avidyā* in two aspects: the enjoyer, that is *jīva*, and the object of enjoyment, that is the universe. But the perception and the enjoyment, being the creation of *avidyā*, are as false as *avidyā* itself. Thus, the reality that subsists free from these objects, names and forms, is Brahman – the absolute existence, the absolute consciousness and the absolute bliss.[372]

Likewise, from an ultimate point of view, this universe does not exist at all. This is because Brahman is the only existing reality and it possesses no difference or duality (*bheda*) whatsoever. Furthermore, as the universe is identical with Brahman, there is no place for any duality. Madhusūdana wrote a separate treatise, the *Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa* to refute the views of the dualist Naiyāyikas. By his own confession Madhusūdana followed Śrī Harṣa, the author of the polemical work *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-khādya*.[373] It is argued there that duality does not exist because it cannot be cognised.

Madhusūdana critically analyses the Naiyāyika view of determinate knowledge arising from direct experience, which according to the logicians, is said to yield duality.[374] He shows how their arguments are full of fallacy, and therefore this view is not logical. It then follows that duality is never perceived. The appearance of *bheda* is merely illusion and moreover, *bheda* is practically identical with the locus (*adhikaraṇa*). The idea that the pitcher is not cloth in fact denotes that the pitcher is the negation of cloth. Therefore, distinction cannot be determined and determinate knowledge cannot manifest it either. Likewise, difference is also never grasped by indeterminate knowledge, since it only concerns itself with the essence (*svarūpa*) of an object. Therefore, such knowledge cannot be employed to prove either difference or non-difference, and as this knowledge comprehends only the unqualified essence of the object, it should be regarded as evidence of non-difference, *abheda*.[375] In this way, difference cannot be confirmed by any kind of evidence. Hence the theory of identity advocated by the scripture remains unchallenged.

Therefore, difference is non-existing as neither determinate nor indeterminate knowledge can prove its existence. The advocates of the concept of difference cannot establish it as the reciprocal negation of identity (*anyonyābhāva*) or, as the essence (*svarūpa*) of objects. Since the concept of difference cannot even be determined, little remains to speak of the existence of differentiated objects. This universe is non-different from Brahman. In fact, there exists the complete negation of the universe in Brahman. The Vedānta never contradicts the pragmatic

existence of differences, nor does it negate the pragmatic existence of the universe. As in the case of the rope-snake illusion, the snake exists so long as it appears and ceases to exist when the rope, that is, its locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*), is cognised as such. Likewise, the universe remains so long as the *avidyā* remains and ceases to exist when the integral and undifferentiated cognitive mode (*akhaṇḍākāra-citta-vṛtti*)[376] reveals Brahman, the locus of the universe. Hence, like the illusory snake, the universe is also identical with its substratum, Brahman.

The scripture also confirms that the world has no separate existence from Brahman. It states that 'there is no plurality in the universe'.[377] The negation of Brahman's pervasion prohibits any real contact of Brahman with the universe. Brahman is the absolute truth and consciousness itself, whereas the universe, being created by false *avidyā*, is itself false and unconscious. Therefore, Brahman can never be influenced by the illusory qualities of this illusory world, just as a desert never bears the water that a mirage suggests is there.[378] The negation of the universe is Brahman itself, as Brahman is the substratum of the false identity between the universe and Brahman. Thus, when every object of the universe becomes negated in Brahman, only Brahman remains as eternally and absolutely existent.[379]

It may be noted here that a non-dualist does not regard difference (*bheda*) to be absolutely non-existent. This is because, as Madhusūdana explains, the concept is necessary for the daily intercourse of human life. The non-dualists accept three kinds of existence. Brahman is absolutely existent (*pāramārthika sat*), the shell-silver is illusorily existent (*prātibhāsika sat*) and the physical universe is pragmatically existent (*vyavahārika sat*). Thus the Advaita-vedānta school accepts the empirical, *vyavahārika* existence of *bheda*.[380]

To answer Vyāsarāja's objection to the concept of three types of existence, Madhusū-dana answers that the quality of non-refutability (*avādhyattva*) is common in all three types of existence. Even the superimposed object, though subjected to contradiction at other times, is not contradicted at the time of its existence. The *prātibhāsika* phenomenon too, should be recognised as being just as incapable of being contradicted as the *vyavahārika*, at least for the time being. Unless this is done, it is impossible to explain why a person, when he mistakenly sees a shell-silver, would react in exactly the same way, as he would do when confronted by empirical silver.[381]

The distinction between *vyavahārika* reality and *prātibhāsika* reality lies in the fact that while the former is contradicted only by *akhaṇḍākāra-citta-vrtti*, the latter is contradicted by ordinary empirical knowledge.

5

THE SENTIENT WORLD: *ĪŚVARA, JĪVA* AND *SĀKṢĪ*

Having established that Brahman is the only immutable eternally real consciousness, Madhusūdana turns his attention to other conscious entities mainly belonging to the empirical level of experience, namely the individual person, *jīva, Īśvara*, the Lord and Creator of the world of phenomena and *Sākṣī*, the revealer of all objects of perception. The Vedānta divides the pragmatic world of experience into two categories – perceiving consciousness and the perceived (*dṛg-dṛśya*). The pure Self, in accordance with the nature of its false relationship with the primordial *avidyā*, is viewed as, *Īśvara*, *Jīva* and *Sākṣī*.[382] In reality, pure self is the essence of all three of them. On this point, there is unanimity amongst different teachers of the Advaita-vedānta school. However, there are sharp differences among these teachers when it comes to the nature of their relationship with *avidyā* and the type of *avidyā*. Broadly speaking, there are two views: those who regard *jīva* to be many (*aneka jīva-vāda*) and those who hold that there is only one *jīva* (*ekajīva-vāda*). The former is further sub-divided into *ābhāsa-vāda*, or the theory of semblance; *pratibimba-vāda*, or the theory of reflection; and *avacceheda-vāda*, or the theory of delimitation.[383]

According to *ābhāsa-vāda*, the self, when reflected on the primordial *avidyā*, becomes identified with that *avidyā*. It must be noted here that pure Self does not, in fact, become identified with the *avidyā*, but only the reflection-self (*pratibimba ātmā*), limited by *avidyā*, becomes identified with its limitation. This limited self is not the pure Self. However, due to this failure of apprehending this distinction between the two, the limited self is regarded to be the ever-abiding essential self (*Antaryāmin*), the witnessing-self (*Sākṣī*) and the Creator-self (*Īśvara*) though they are all in fact pure Self. Likewise, the pure Self (*ātman*) being reflected on the mind (*buddhi*) becomes limited by it. Thus, the limited, reflection-self becomes identified with mind, and due to the absence of the knowledge of difference between the pure Self and this limited self, the limited self is regarded as the person (*jīva*), the agent, the enjoyer and the knower. As the mind is different in each body, and there are innumerable bodies, the semblances of the self in the minds are also many. Since the self is undifferentiated from the semblances it too appears to be many. The *avidyā* being one, however, means that the reflection of the pure conscious Self in it (*cidābhāsa*), undifferentiated from *avidyā*, always

appears to be one.[384] As the semblance is quite distinct from the pure Self, the semblance of Self is false.[385] The identification between *jīva*, a false entity, and Brahman, occurs only when the *jīva* aspect of the Self is totally eliminated by true knowledge of the real nature of Self dispelling the primordial *avidyā*.

Madhusūdana provides another interpretation of this view, that is, *ābhāsa-vāda*.[386] He observes that the pure Self, reflected upon the primordial *avidyā*, is *Īśvara*, a reflection of Self misunderstood through the primordial *avidyā* as the creator-self. Likewise, this same Self, when reflected upon the mind, which is then falsely identified with the reflection-self, is the individual (*jīva*). Pure Self is real, while its qualifying adjuncts (*upādhis*), *avidyā*, in the case of *Īśvara*, and mind in the case of *jīva*, are unreal. Thus, once the *upādhis* are removed through the removal of ignorance the identity between *jīva* and Brahman can be established without any further problem. The main conclusion is *jīva* as Pure consciousness, eternally exists.[387]

In the first interpretation of the *ābhāsa-vāda*, pure Self as the prototype (*bimba*) of the two reflection selves, *Īśvara* and *jīva*, is the *Sākṣī* (witnessing-self), while the self that has no reference to either *Īśvara* or *jīva*, is the pure (*śuddha*) consciousness. In the second interpretation, *Sākṣī* cannot be separated from *Īśvara*. Therefore, both the concepts of *Sākṣī* and *Īśvara* become merged in the *Īśvara* concept. In considering the second interpretation, Madhusūdana remarks that the author of the *Vārtika* – the upholder of *ābhāsa-vāda* – does not separate *Sākṣī* from *Īśvara*.[388] It should be noted that *Antaryāmī* is never differentiated from *Īśvara*.

According to *pratibimba-vāda*, followed by the *Vivaraṇa* school, *Īśvara* is the Self limited (*upahita*) by the primordial *avidyā*, the source of *saṃsāra*, transient life. As we shall shortly see, *avidyā* with the aid of the five subtle cosmic elements, produces mind. At the time of deep sleep, the mind remains dormant in its cause (*kāraṇāvasthā*), while during the states of waking or dreaming it remains manifest (*kāryāvasthā*). The reflection of *Īśvara* on *avidyā* conditioned by mind (dormant or manifest), is called *jīva*.[389] *Sākṣī* here is the pure Self (*śuddhātmā*) that pervades both *Īśvara* and *jīva*.

Sarvajñātma Muni suggests some modifications in the theory of reflection. He holds that pure consciousness limited by *avidyā* is the prototype (*bimba*). This *bimba* reflects itself on *avidyā* and this reflection-self is *Īśvara*. On the other hand, when the same *bimba* is reflected on the mind that reflection-self is *jīva*. As there are countless minds, *jīvas* are similarly countless. In this view, the *bimba*-consciousness is *Sākṣī*. Thus, according to both the *Vivaraṇa* and *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka* schools, the *bimba*-consciousness is the *Sākṣī*.[390]

The *pratibimba-vāda* differs from the *ābhāsa-vāda* in that while in the latter view the reflections are absolutely false, according to the former they are not so, since in *pratibimba-vāda*, the prototype and its reflection are one and the same. The reflection-consciousness is non-different in substance from the prototype-consciousness. This being so, the reflection is as real as its prototype. The difference between the views of the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka* mainly lies in

the fact that while the former regards *Īśvara* as the prototype-self which is limited by the primordial *avidyā*, the latter considers even *Īśvara* a mere reflection-consciousness, just like *jīvas*. The prototype limited by the primordial *avidyā* and common to both *jīva* and *Īśvara* is the witness-consciousness, *Sākṣī*.

According to the *Avaccheda-vāda* held by the *Bhāmatī*-school, *Īśvara*, or pure consciousness, is the object (*viṣaya*) of *avidyā*, while *jīva* is the locus (*āśraya*) thereof. *Jīva* is regarded as the locus of *avidyā* because its empirical understanding and behaviour are based on that understanding namely, 'Brahman does not exist,' based on ignorance (*avidyā*). As both such false understanding and behaviour (*vyavahāra*) exist in *jīva*, *avidyā* which causes such false understanding and behaviour also rests in *jīva* for both cause and effect should exist in the same locus. According to this view, *jīvas* are many because empirical *avidyās* (*tulā*) are also many. *Jīva* as delimited (*avacchinna*) by *avidyā* is the material cause of the universe. As there are many *jīvas*, each *jīva* is therefore the creator of a separate universe. Thus the *jīva*, as delimited by *avidyā*, is the creator of a personal universe and as the locus of *avidyā*, such creator-*jīva* is deluded (*bhrānta*). Even though these universes are strictly personal, each *jīva* seems to perceive the same universe due to the extreme similarity of the universes. The fact that *jīvas* ascribe to *Īśvara* the act of creation is because basically *Īśvara* is the locus of the cosmic *avidyā* along with *jīva*s and their worlds.[391]

The aforementioned theories are founded on certain fundamental presumptions. The first of these is that although Brahman has to be recognised as the ultimate and single immutable Reality, the cosmic process of diversity, looming large in our everyday experience, has to be accounted for. *Avidyā* is an explanation of that diversity.

Philosophers of the Advaita school tried to visualise Brahman empirically in terms of *avidyā*; though, there being nothing real besides Brahman, no real connection can be recognised between the two. Still a working relationship (*vyavahārika sambandha*) has to be allowed to exist between the two. The difference of nature in the relationship has been responsible for the emergence of four types of consciousness: Brahman, *kūṭastha*, (i.e. *Sākṣī*), *Īśvara* and *jīva* (respectively, Pure consciousness, immutable consciousness, the creator consciousness and the individual consciousness). However, the number of these concepts varies due to other considerations.

To justify these concepts, the philosophers have further introduced the ideas of the limiting adjunct, (*upādhi*), agent of delimitation, (*avacchedaka*) and secondary, remote and modified sense of a word, (*upalakṣaṇā*). While *upādhi* and *upalakṣaṇā* circumscribe the nature of consciousness without being really related to it, the *avacchedaka* affects the nature of consciousness.[392] Thus *avidyā* is the *avacchedaka* of *jīva*, which thereby becomes involved in empiricism, while it is the *upādhi* of *Sākṣī* which leaves the latter unaffected by empiricism. *Upalakṣaṇā* differs from *upādhi* inasmuch as it has only a casual reference to its referent (*upalakṣita*). For example, the crows, which were once temporarily perched on a house, may serve as the *upalakṣaṇā* of the house. *Upādhi*, however, continues as long as the qualified

object (*upahita*) exists. For instance, a red object reflected on a piece of glass makes latter look red. Distinguished from both *upalakṣaṇā* and *upādhi*, *avacchedaka* is the adjective and so co-exists with the object it qualifies (*avacchinna*) and is included in the nature of it for instance, a red flower. That is why in the theory of *avaccheda* the state of consciousness as *jīva* is co-existent with *avidyā*.

The theory of reflection (*pratibimba*) has also contributed to the formation of some of these other theories. However, the mutual differences among philosophers who believe in the theory of reflection are based on the question as to whether reflection and its prototype are identical with each other or whether they are mutually different. In the case of identity, the reflection is recognised to be as real as the prototype, while in the case of their mutual difference the reflection is held to be false.

Avidyā, the reflection of consciousness thereon, *avidyā* as the *avacchedaka*, *upalakṣaṇā* or *upādhi*, the falsity or reality of reflection – all these concepts in various combinations have formulated the different theories stated above.

Eka-jīva-vāda

In the theory of a single individual self (*eka-jīva-vāda*) of Madhusūdana, the three concepts of *upādhi*, *avacchedaka* and reflection work simultaneously. Unlike the other three theories mentioned earlier, the *eka-jīva-vāda* (as the name suggests) holds that *jīva* is one and not many, because the *upādhi* of *jīva* is the collective (*samaṣṭi*) ignorance (*avidyā*) and not the individual effects (*kārya*) of *avidyā* such as, *antaḥkaraṇa*, etc. The upholders of this view are divided into two branches.[393] One holds that self, limited by (*upahita*) *avidyā*, is *Īśvara*. Thus, *Īśvara* as the prototype is reflected on *avidyā* while the reflection-consciousness is *jīva*. The second branch, on the other hand, holds that *Īśvara* is the pure consciousness (*śuddha caitanya*), which is not limited by *avidyā*, while *jīva* is the consciousness, limited by *avidyā*.

It is evident that in the latter view, *Īśvara* is totally removed from the relationship of *avidyā* as well as its creation, and is identified with pure consciousness. The *jīva*, independent of *Īśvara*, creates the universe through its *avidyā*.[394] Prakāśānanda, in his *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali*, expounds this view. Appaya Dīkṣita also gives a survey of both these views in the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṃgraha*.[395]

Madhusūdana accepts the first view,[396] that *Īśvara* is the consciousness whose qualifying adjunct is *avidyā* and is the prototype, while *jīva* is the reflection of *Īśvara* on *avidyā*. Thus *jīva*, covered by *avidyā*, becomes the material cause of the universe, both subtle and gross.[397]

Only the unmanifest creation (*avyākṛta*),[398] being beginningless, is omitted from the domain of *jīva's creative acts*. *Jīva* is the agent of the universe because it is the substratum, (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and as such possesses knowledge favourable for creation (*sṛṣṭyanukulajñānavattva*).[399] This *jīva* is the chief one, as it is the collective *jīva* (*mukhya samaṣṭyābhimānī jīva*). The individual *jīvas* are in fact semblances (*jīvābhāsa*) of this chief *jīva* and they are delimited by different minds, existing

in countless gross bodies. The chief *jīva*, being falsely identified with different minds, due to false superimposition (*adhyāsa*), is known as '*aham*' ('I') in each body.[400] When any individual *jīvabhāsa* enters the state of deep sleep, the other *jīvābhāsas* may remain in a waking state, for the collective, or cosmic, *jīva* itself remains in a waking state along with other *jīvābhāsas*. Superimposed by these, and with the help of the *avidyā*, the cosmic *jīva* continues to imagine the external world and the *jīvābhāsas*. The state of deep sleep of the cosmic *jīva* is known as the dissolution in the source matter (*prākṛta-pralaya)*. At that time, due to the absence of *minds*, the universe and *jīvābhāsas* and their minds remain dormant in primordial *avidyā*. During his deep sleep, the cosmic *jīva* remains covered with the primordial *avidyā*.[401]

The concept of the above-mentioned cosmic *jīva* corresponds to the common concept of *Īśvara*, as Omnipotent, Omniscient and Omnipresent. The cosmic *jīva* possesses Omniscience and the agency of all activities[402] and, as the substratum, pervades each worldly object as well as the semblance-*jīvas*.

Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda

In order to appreciate the neo-vedāntic *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*, that is, the view that holds the world just existing as long as there is a person, (*jīva*) experiencing it, the conventional view of creation, which accepts the existence of the created world before the individual selves experience it, (i.e. *sṛṣṭi-dṛṣṭi-vāda*), deserves first consideration. According to this latter view, *Īśvara* creates the world, common to all the percipient *jīvas*. As creation is the result of God's voluntary effort, God observed, (thought), (*tadaikṣata*)[403] before He created. This 'being conscious of' the imminent creation, is His innate virtue, so that God observes that is, is aware of the creation even before His act of creation. Such consciousness therefore is not ordinary knowledge dependant on an object, but belongs to the very nature of God (*svarūpabhūtajñāna*).

Besides God's cosmic creation, the traditional non-dualist view recognises *jīva*'s creation as well. This is *jīva*'s world of errors – the individual illusion that takes place frequently in its pragmatic life. The conventional view has analysed such illusion on the part of *jīva*. *Jīva* is possessed by *avidyā*, which, sometimes conceals from the *jīva* an object such as a rope. Consequent upon such concealment its *avidyā* creates an illusory snake there for that deluded *jīva*. Simultaneous with this creation of the snake, *avidyā* creates a mental mode comprehending that illusory snake. This mode helps in the revelation of the snake to that *jīva* and continues to exist so long as the illusory snake is not contradicted by valid knowledge disclosing the true nature of the rope. The result is that the illusory snake is perpetually revealed to the *jīva* as long as it exists. From this standpoint, *jīva* possesses constant knowledge of its own creation, parallel to the knowledge of God with regard to God's creation.

The *ekajīva-vāda* has substituted *jīva* for God, the creator, so that God's *sṛṣṭi-dṛṣṭi-vāda* is replaced by *jīva*'s *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*. In other words, the

conventional theory of illusion has been exploited in such a way that God's creation has lost its identity in the creation of *jīva*.[404]

The results of such exploitation are twofold:

1 The conventional difference between the pragmatic existence (*vyavahārika-sattā*) of God's world and the illusory existence (*prātibhāsika-sattā*) of *jīva*'s world, has been effaced. All creation – whether it is that of the mountain, the pitcher or the illusory snake – is stated to be illusory (*prātibhāsika*). The practical difference between the pitcher and the illusory snake is then a matter of the durability of the object of illusion. The knowledge of rope, although illusory in this view, may very well contradict the equally illusory snake,[405] as a dream object is discarded in dream by another dream object.
2 As God's knowledge has been replaced by *jīva*'s cognition based on a mode of ignorance regarding its 'illusory' creation, *jīva*, by means of this cognitive act, continues to know its own creation, as long as the creation lasts. This means until *jīva*'s *avidyā* is not dispelled by the knowledge of ultimate reality, *jīva* enjoys omniscience in its own sphere of creation.[406]

Madhusūdana has thus tried to explain *dṛṣṭ-sṛṣṭi-vāda* in terms of his *eka-jīva-vāda*. But he has also assigned an important place to the theory of reflection in this context. For him, the principal individual (*mukhya-jīva*), whose creation is the universe, is a reflection of *Īśvara* on *avidyā*. Distinguished from the *ābhāsa-vāda*, Madhusūdana's theory of reflection considers both the reflection and its prototype to be identical and equally true. Thus *jīva* is at the same time both identical with, and a reflection of, God.

Madhusūdana's theory of reflection, along with his *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*, leads to the conclusion that he omitted from the fold of *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda* several Vedāntic realities namely, the six conventional categories that are recognised as beginningless.[407] Thus, while the *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda* of Madhusūdana has exploited the conventional theory of illusion, even as an explanation for the cosmic creation, it has significantly left God untouched.

It is interesting to note in this context, that Prakāśānanda, who preceded Madhusūdana, took *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda* to its furthest extreme. He proposed that not only the cosmic creation, but also God, *jīva* and *avidyā* – in fact, all five beginningless entities except the Pure consciousness – are the creation of *jīva*'s imagination (*dṛṣṭi*). The other extreme is referred to above by the conventional theory of illusion.

Madhusūdana steers clear of these two extremes. He enlarges the scope of the conventional theory of illusion to comprehend the cosmic creation of God. But he stops at that, and thus leaves out the conventional Vedāntic postulates such as God and *avidyā*. Perhaps the theism of Madhusūdana leaves God to His sovereignty, without reducing Him to a figment of *jīva*'s imagination. While describing different forms of the Lord, Madhusūdana recounts the conventional holy triad, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra. He further expressed his opinion with regard to divine

incarnations (*avatāras*) who are, according to him, directly descending from *Īśvara*, who out of His boundless compassion for His devotees manifests them, for their liberation.[408] However, Brahmānanda, the commentator of Madhusūdana, has shown his approval for Prakāśāananda's point of view.[409]

Critics of the *ekajīva-vāda* argue that if it is accepted, then the sacred scriptures, as well as the preceptor's knowledge of the absolute truth, become reduced to fiction. Moreover, in these circumstances, *jīva* will never seek liberation from an individual body. If the scriptures are imaginary, then *jīva* imagines them without knowing the absolute truth. The knowledge of absolute truth puts an end to all imagination. If the scriptures are intended to impart such knowledge, then they cannot be the creation of *jīva*'s imagination. Again, when *jīva* imagines the existence of a preceptor who can impart true knowledge, then he must also imagine the true knowledge belonging to the preceptor. It means that *jīva*, at that time, possesses the knowledge of truth for the purpose of his imagination. As *jīva* is already wise, the necessity for a preceptor becomes superfluous. Again, if one *jīva* is encased in all the bodies, then release from a particular body does not ensure a better lot for the *jīva*, for other, innumerable bodies remain intact and perpetuate the suffering of *jīva* as before. So *jīva*'s endeavour to rid itself of a particular body is useless.

Madhusūdana, however, answers all these objections.[410] First of all, he states that the validity of the *śāstras* does not require that they should be based on valid knowledge. The *śāstras* impart knowledge inasmuch as the content of that knowledge is never contradicted (*avādhita viṣayatva*). The *śāstras* are valid because they supply us with the knowledge of Brahman, and as Brahman is the only existing truth, this is never contradicted.[411] His answers to the second objection are that *jīva* is able to imagine its preceptor by a general knowledge that the preceptor possesses knowledge of absolute truth; that *jīva* can possess the knowledge of truth unknown to itself; or, that *jīva* may possess previous indirect knowledge of Brahman so that the preceptor can say '*tat tavam asi*' (that are you). This explanation should be accepted, he claims, even by the dualists, otherwise the charges would revert against them since, according to them, a disciple must somehow be convinced that his preceptor possesses true knowledge, which means that the disciple must know what true knowledge is before he meets the preceptor. But what benefit will he derive from meeting the preceptor, when he already possesses the knowledge of truth?[412] Madhusūdana's answer to the third objection is that even though one *jīva* is common to all the physical bodies, it is subjected to ego, which is peculiar to each body. Such individual ego gives rise to the notion, 'I am in bondage.' The endeavour for liberation from a particular body is useful in the sense that that knowledge eradicates that particular ego, and the consequent notion with reference to a particular body.[413] In fact, Pure consciousness is unaffected by worldly diversity, but being covered by *avidyā*, which possesses two powers of concealment and projection (*āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa*), it appears to be subjected to birth and death, to be the author of world imagination, and to be aspiring for liberation.[414]

The theory of a single person (*ekajīva*), as propounded by Madhusūdana, throws light on the five different aspects of consciousness: *Īśvara*, *Sākṣī*, Brahman, *jīva* and *jīvābhāsas*. Of these, the first four are held to be real while *jīvābhāsas* are said to be illusory. *Jīva* means here, the cosmic person, which, with the aid of *avidyā*, creates the physical universe. *Jīva* is the reflection of consciousness on *avidyā*; *Īśvara* is the consciousness that is reflected on *avidyā*; *Sākṣī* is the consciousness that endures through both *Īśvara* and *jīva*; Brahman is absolute consciousness, free from all reference to *jīva*, *Īśvara* or even *Sākṣī*. As consciousness is one and absolute, there exists no real difference among these four aspects of consciousness. *Jīvābhāsas*, as depicted by *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*, are different from the above-mentioned four conscious realities, being the false appearance of cosmic *jīva*, delimited (*avacchinna*) by individual inner sense organ or mind. This brief summary makes it clear that Madhusūdana combined the *avaccheda-vāda* with *ābhāsa-vāda* in his concept of pseudo persons (*jīvābhāsas*). Therefore, these being conditioned by mind and also being just appearances (*ābhāsa*), are not real. In this way, in the *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda* of Madhusūdana, we have a combination of *pratibimba-vāda*, *ābhāsa-vāda* and *avaccheda-vāda*.

The concept of *Sākṣī* comes from the *śruti* '*sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaśca*',[415] which describes pure and absolute consciousness to be the witness of every object as distinguished from, say, the individual person, who has limited perception. One must remember that *Sākṣī* is the immutable consciousness with an emphasis to its distinctive revealing nature (*prakāśa*). *Sākṣī* is therefore consciousness that always reveals everything. In other words, Pure Conscious Self is designated 'witness' with reference to the empirical phenomena. Vidyāraṇya, author of the *Pañcadaśī* takes *Sākṣī* to reveal every empirical object including its knower and the cognitive knowledge of it.[416] Citsukha explained that Pure consciousness, *Sākṣī* and *jīva*, are essentially one and the same. Both *Sākṣī* and *jīva* are part of the empirical process of cognition. However, their distinction, being based on the conditioning of avidyā, is a false one.[417] As these two conditions are mere qualifying adjuncts (*upādhis*), *Sākṣī* and *jīva* can still be one and the same. Therefore, the basic identity between the Pure consciousness, *Sākṣī* and *jīva* remains undisturbed.

It may be noted in this context, that following Sarvajñātma Muni, Citsukha too holds the view that Brahman indeed is both the locus and object of *avidyā*.[418] A cognitive mode can focus only on such an object which is pervaded by *avidyā*, so all cognitive modes whether producing ordinary experience or, ultimate knowledge of Brahman, have to concern themselves with Brahman only, as the sole revealing entity. Thus, when Brahman becomes pervaded by a cognitive mode (ordinary or otherwise), it is called *Sākṣī*. It may also be noted here that the treatment of *Sākṣī* in light of the above, indicates that Citsukha has recognised *Sākṣī* as an epistemological reality. That is to say, Brahman is called *Sākṣī* when it becomes related to a cognitive mode (*vṛtti*). Such a neutral concept of *Sākṣī* seems to run counter to the concept of the essential Controller (*Antaryāmī*) as found in the '*antaryāmī Brāhmaṇa*', since the Upaniṣadic *Antaryāmī*, as the name indicates,

seems to be vitally concerned with the act of controlling *jīva*. Citsukha anticipates this objection and takes Upaniṣadic *Antaryāmī* to mean *Sākṣī*, which pervades all. In other words, *Sākṣī* is *Antaryāmī* insofar as *Sākṣī* is the only all-pervasive existence. Thus the so-called existence of *jīva* has no separate existence apart from that of *Sākṣī*. This concept of *Sākṣī* removes all distinction between the Lord (*Īśvara*) and *Sākṣī*.

Madhusūdana's concept of *Sākṣī* reveals two apparently distinct realities. In the first, *Sākṣī* is presented as a metaphysical reality, while in the other it represents an epistemological truth. Metaphysically speaking, *Sākṣī* is consciousness that endures through both *Īśvara* and *jīva*.[419] *Sākṣī* is not *Īśvara* (the prototype), *jīva* (the reflection) or Brahman (the Pure consciousness); it is consciousness limited (*upahita*) by a cognitive mode of *avidyā* and thus free from either being a prototype or, a reflection. In trying to visualise *Sākṣī* from the perspective of his *ekajīva-vāda*, Madhusūdana draws upon the metaphysics of the Vivaraṇa school, which he prefers above the others.

On the other hand, when elucidating *Sākṣī* as an epistemological concept, Madhusūdana states that *Sākṣī* is the consciousness limited by either just *avidyā* or a mode (*vṛtti*) of *avidyā*.[420]

The first definition, that *Sākṣī* is consciousness limited by *avidyā*, is apparently the reaffirmation of the metaphysical definition of *Sākṣī* as given in the *Siddhānta-bindu* and referred to above. For practical purposes Madhusūdana, in his epistemological context, confined himself to the second definition, that *Sākṣī* is consciousness limited by *avidyā vṛtti*.

In order to appreciate Madhusūdana's concept of *Sākṣī* as an epistemological reality, it is necessary to compare *Sākṣī*-knowledge with ordinary knowledge. The points of similarity in both are as follows:

1 a *vṛtti* is required for the revelation of an object;
2 consciousness limited by such a *vṛtti* is taken to be a form of cognitive knowledge;
3 the *vṛtti* has a double function to discharge; first, it takes away the veil of ignorance covering an object and second, it establishes a kind of relationship between the object on the one hand and the cognising consciousness on the other.[421]

Though consciousness, as the all-pervading reality, is always related to the object, such a relationship is not enough for the revelation of that object to a person. Had it been so, *jīva*, as consciousness, would be Omniscient. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that *vṛtti* forges a special type of contact between the object and the conscious individual, so that consciousness immediately reveals that specific object to the cognising self.

On the other hand, these two forms of knowledge (i.e., *sākṣī*-knowledge and ordinary knowledge) differ from each other in the following ways. Ordinary knowledge is consciousness conditioned (*upahita*) by a cognitive mode (*vṛtti*)

comprehending an external object. Such *vṛtti*, however, is a mode of the inner sense organ (see Chapter 3). In this view, the cognising subject (*pramātā*) is consciousness reflected on the inner sense organ and hence is circumscribed by the physical body.[422] In the *eka-jīva-vāda* under consideration, the cogniser is a mere appearance (*jīvābhāsa*) of the primary *jīva* (*mukhya-jīva*), which is the reflection of *Īśvara* on *avidyā*.

In *sākṣī*- knowledge, however, the requisite *vṛtti* is not a mode of the inner sense organ, but a mode of *avidyā*. This explains the memory in the waking state namely, 'I slept happily' (*sukhamahamasvāpsam*), based on what one feels about one's experience in deep sleep (*suṣupti*). In deep sleep, when the inner sense organ loses its identity, only *avidyā* remains. If this *avidyā* is recognised at that stage as having a *vṛtti* embracing the happiness that arises in deep sleep, then one is able to recall that experience of happiness in the waking state. Likewise, in the experience of happiness during the waking state, the same *avidyā vṛtti*, for the sake of economy of concept (*lāghavāt*), is also able to grasp that pleasure. Thus in both these types of experience (one in deep sleep, the other in the waking state) a mode of *avidyā*, (and not a mode of mind/inner sense organ), may be said to operate in such a way that pleasure is exposed to consciousness which then, on the basis of a special contact between the object (pleasure) and itself, reveals that object.

It would follow from this analysis that the epistemological *Sākṣī* that is, the sākṣī-knowledge of Madhusūdana is consciousness conditioned by a mode of *avidyā*, as distinguished from ordinary empirical knowledge, which is consciousness conditioned by a mode of mind. Even though in the *eka-jīva-vāda*, as shown earlier, the cognising person is a mere appearance, from the metaphysical point of view such a condition is basically identical with *Sākṣī*. Therefore, the experience of pleasure that really belongs to *Sākṣī* is ascribed to the experiencing person, and he feels happy.

Although *sākṣī*-knowledge is thus identical with *Sākṣī* itself and is therefore prima facie eternal, according to Madhusūdana, consciousness (*caitanya)* becomes *Sākṣī*, that is, revealer (*draṣṭā*) only when it is conditioned by *avidyā-vṛtti*. The result is that, although by itself consciousness is eternal, its power of revealing an object (*draṣṭṛtva*) is contemporaneous with the *avidyā-vṛtti*.[423] Hence, with the disappearance of the *avidyā-vṛtti*, consciousness' power of revelation of an object is kept in abeyance. The destruction of *avidyā-vṛtti* is thus called, from a broad point of view, the destruction of *Sākṣī*. In other words, in this way *sākṣī*-knowledge, though identical with *Sākṣī*, may be said to be liable of destruction. In this way, even the *sākṣī*-knowledge can produce a mental impression (*saṃskāra*) most conducive to subsequent memory as in the case of the experience of happiness and lack of knowledge during deep sleep remembered in the waking state.[424]

Although the metaphysical concept of *Sākṣī* as the all-pervasive reality, conditioned by *avidyā* and free from the *bimba-pratibimba* condition, and the epistemological concept of *Sākṣī*, as consciousness limited by *avidyā-vṛtti*, seem

mutually different, Madhusūdana accepted both the concepts to be equally plausible. For him the apparent difference may be merged in the following way. *Avidyā-vṛtti* is, after all, a special form of *avidyā* itself. Thus if the metaphysical *Sākṣī* is taken to be consciousness limited by *avidyā* in general, then such a concept certainly includes the epistemological *Sākṣī*, which is but consciousness limited by a special type of *avidyā*; in other words, *avidyā* in the state of having a *vṛtti*, a special mode. Indeed, according to Madhusūdana, all experiences, whether cognitive knowledge of *jīva*, the knowledge of *Sākṣī* or, *bhakti*, must be considered in terms of *vṛtti*, since knowledge is consciousness reflected on the *vṛtti* of *avidyā*. This *vṛtti* may be primordial, in the case of *Sākṣī*, or conditional, in the case of ordinary cognition or *bhakti*.

Advaita-vedānta establishes absolute identity between all types of conscious entities and Brahman. However the importance of the *jīva*, the percipient person and enjoyer of the universe, is undeniable. Brahman is the only existent and absolute reality, yet in the empirical world the individual person is the pivot around which the universe revolves. Moreover, the teachings of the Vedānta are meant for the *jīva*, in order to bring about his liberation. So Madhusūdana ascribes primary importance to the individual and clarifies his notion of the 'person' and its relation to the creator God.[425] It is equally important to understand the notion of *Sākṣī*, because without it, the non-dual epistemology is impossible to understand.

It is not easy to discover the real nature (*svarūpa*) of *jīva*, the support (*ālambana*) of 'I' consciousness (*aham-pratyaya*). Scrutiny of the nature of *jīva* raises serious controversies amongst philosophers. Thus gross materialists like the Cārvakas take the body or the senses for the *jīva*. The Buddhists regard the *jīva* as the momentary conscious entity. In fact, the philosophers give different expositions of the *jīva*'s nature according to the views peculiar to the individual systems to which they belong. According to the Advaita-vedānta, *jīva*, being ultimately identical with Brahman, is devoid of all limitations, eternal, and essentially identified with consciousness and bliss.

The existence of *jīva*, or the individual person, can be proved by the experience of deep sleep (*suṣupti*). When the body and the mind are called into inactivity, the individual still exists and enjoys the pleasure of deep sleep. The individual self, being identical with the ultimate Self, is always existent. Which means, it is not limited by time, space or matter (*kalā-deśa-vastu- pariccheda-śūṇya*). That the *jīva* is not limited by time is proved by the absence of its previous non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) and destruction (*dhvaṃśa*). Since the individual is the self (*ātman*) of the experiencing person, he cannot witness its non-existence.[426] Likewise, as existence itself, the self persists everywhere, so it cannot be limited by space.[427] The pattern of argumentation runs in the following manner: As the self is identical with Brahman, it alone exists; that which is not self is non-existent. Anything that is not self is the creation of *avidyā* and therefore illusory, like *avidyā* itself. These non-existing objects appear to be existent due to their superimposition (*adhyāsa*) on the self. Superimposition establishes a false identity between the

self and objects, although the self, being consciousness, cannot be bound down to a single non-conscious object. These arguments also prove the validity of the view that *jīva* is in essence *kūṭastha* (unchangeable, immutable) consciousness.

The witnessing self (*Sākṣī*), however, continues to be the same, even though the knower, the instrument of knowledge, the act of knowledge and the objects of knowledge may vary, (*mātṛ-māna-miti-meyāṇām vyabhicāritve'pi avyavhicārāt*).[428] It may be argued that the knower, who is the locus of valid knowledge (*pramāśraya*), is the agent (*kartā*) and the enjoyer (*bhoktā*), and this knower (*pramātā*) reveals other objects as well as its own self, just like a lamp. Therefore, it is unnecessary to imagine a separate witnessing-self as the revealer to the knower.

The answer to this criticism is that all these attributes of the knower, the agent or the enjoyer, are modifications of *avidyā*. *Jīva*, being a combination (*granthi* or, knot) of consciousness and these attributes, cannot by itself be the ever-revealed witness. This would mean that not only consciousness but also the aforementioned attributes, which are undoubtedly objects of cognition (*dṛśya*), would attain the status of being recognised as witness-consciousness. This would mean that they would be taken to be like consciousness itself. Hence consciousness divested of the capacity of becoming an object of knowledge (*dṛśyatva*), that is, the immutable self, (*kūṭastha ātmā*) is the witness of every object. The scriptures also confirm this view by statements such as '*tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvam tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti*,' (Him alone, as he shines, do all things reflect; this whole world radiates with his light); '*Na dṛṣṭerdraṣṭāram paśyeḥ*' (You cannot see the seer who does the seeing), and '*adṛṣṭo draṣṭā,... nānya'to'sti draṣṭā*.' (Unseen He sees,... there is no one besides him who sees).[429] The qualities of knowing, agency and enjoying belong to the mind, which is not the self. The mind, being transparent due to the predominance of *sattva guṇa*,[430] is capable of receiving the reflection of cosmic consciousness (*cit*). At that time the mind, being superimposed on the individual consciousness, becomes falsely identified with it. By mutual superimposition between the consciousness and mind, each is then influenced by the characteristics of the other, which enables the mind to receive valid knowledge (*pramājñāna*).[431] The formlessness of the cosmic consciousness, or Self, is not opposed to its reflection on the mind. Even in ordinary experience, the space, (*akāśa*) which is unperceivable and formless, is seen to be reflected on water. The reflection of *ākāśa* on water explains the appearance of depth in shallow water.[432] Scriptures such as '*rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhuva*' (Of every form of every being, the likeness he has assumed), '*ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat*' (like the reflection of the moon on the water, he, though single, appears manyfold),[433] also confirm the reflection of the formless Brahman. Moreover, unless this view of reflection is accepted, such Scriptures as '*sa eṣa iha praviṣṭaḥ*'(He it is who has penetrated this body), and '*tat sṛṣṭvā tadevānuprāviśat*' (After emitting it, he entered that very world),[434] become meaningless because Self being totally devoid of any action the verb to penetrate/enter cannot mean any positive action and must be explained as just being reflected.

Thus, *jīva* is essentially unlimited Self but is superimposed by the mind and becomes limited as the knower, the agent and the enjoyer. The argument in favour of this superimposition can be summarised as follows: The commonplace personal experience such as 'I am a man, the agent and the enjoyer' shows the individual self to be attributed with manhood, agency and enjoyment. This experience can neither be regarded as recollection nor valid knowledge (*pramājñāna*). It is not a recollection because it is direct knowledge.[435] It cannot be valid knowledge because scriptures contradict it in such statements as '*yo'yam vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hṛdyantarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ*' (It is this person – the one that consists of perception among the vital functions, *prāṇa*, the one that is the inner light within the heart); '*ayamātmā Brahma*', (Brahman is this self, *ātman*); and '*yo'śanāyāpipāse śokam moham jarām mṛtyumatyeti*' (He is the one who is beyond hunger and thirst, sorrow and delusion, old age and death).[436] Moreover, the experience 'I am a man' means that the self is a body; but the self cannot be a body, since a body is subject to changes (*vikāra*) and is a limited object. Changes and limitations are characteristics of objects that are not self. Furthermore, the body cannot be the self, for the self is the subject of knowledge that has the body as its object. Again, the body, being the object of knowledge, cannot be related to the self, which is knowledge itself. Thus, it is evident that the body cannot be regarded as being identical with the self. Likewise, the agency of the self cannot be taken as real, as in that case agency would persist even at the time of salvation. As agency is the cause of all worldly bondage, cessation from it would never be possible. Since the self is self-revealing, it can reveal other objects; otherwise, the worldly objects would never have been revealed. The self is the object of great love[437] because it is bliss in nature. Therefore, the self is by nature attributeless, eternally existent, self-revealing bliss.[438] The knowledge, 'I am the man, the agent and the enjoyer' is false and, as already discussed, is caused by *avidyā*. Due to the beginningless *avidyā*, the non-self is superimposed on the self. Failing to distinguish between the self and non-self, man experiences such illusions as 'I am the man, the agent and the enjoyer.'[439]

Following the conventional concept, Madhusūdana describes the triad forms of *jīva*, namely, *viśva*, *taijasa* and *prājña*, representing *jīva*'s three states of existence: waking (*jāgrat*), dreaming (*svapna*) and the deep sleep (*suṣupti*). The waking state of *jīva* takes place when, through the individual body and its senses, *jīva* enjoys the gross material objects of the universe. Thus this state presupposes the existence of the gross bodies, and also contact between the *jīva* and the gross bodies.[440] As it is based on superimposition (*adhyāsa*), this contact is illusory. The contact of the self with the gross body occurs in the following way. At the outset, *avidyā* is superimposed on the consciousness as ignorance. This ignorance then produces ego (*ahaṃkāra*) and the inner sense organ etc. and these, along with their qualities are also superimposed on the consciousness producing the individual *jīva* sensing such uncharacteristic personal experience as 'I am ignorant'. Due to the false identification between *jīva* and ego etc. the attributes of *antaḥkaraṇa* such as agency (*kartṛtva*), power to enjoy (*bhokṛtva*) and cognisance

(*pramatṛtva*) are superimposed on this limited consciousness. Lastly, the gross body is superimposed on consciousness, where the qualities of the senses are already attributed. It may be noted here that in this series of superimpositions, in each case the superimposition of qualities (*dharmādhyāsa*) is preceded by the superimposition of the subject qualified (*dharmī-adhyāsa*), except in the case of the attribution of the qualities of senses. In this case, the senses are not previously superimposed.[441]

In this way, *jīva* becomes connected with the gross body and through it makes contact with the gross external objects. At that time, *jīva* becomes limited by the gross body and the gross external world and goes by the name of '*Viśva*'(the world).

In the state of dreaming, *jīva* becomes possessed by a special *vṛtti* of *avidyā* known as sleep, (*nidrā*)[442] where *tamas guṇa* dominates. In that state, the gross physical body merges into the subtle body. Due to the absence of a physical body, the gross senses become inactive. At that time *avidyā*, with the aid of *vāsanā*, that is, impressions left in the mind by past actions and thoughts, produces objects called dream-objects. Just like the illusory objects of the waking state, these dream-objects also become known through the *vṛtti* of *avidyā* that produces them. The difference between the ordinary cognition and dream-cognition lies in the fact that in ordinary cognition, mind flows through the sense organs into the external objects and assumes the shape thereof (*vṛtti*). In dream-cognition, however, the sense organs cease to function. The *vṛtti* revealing dream-objects are, therefore, taken to belong to *avidyā*. Thus knowledge of dream-objects also belongs to *Sākṣī*. Even though *avidyā* creates the dream-objects, they are strictly personal because the special *vāsanā* of the individual mind is included among the causes of dream-objects. *Jīva* in this state is called '*Taijasa*' (dynamic).

From this state of dream, *jīva* enters the state of deep sleep. In this state its mind, along with the *vāsanā* imprinted on it, lies dormant in its cause, the *avidyā*. Madhusūdana quotes the author of *Vivaraṇa*,[443] who maintains that at the time of deep sleep there exists only one *vṛtti* and that also of *avidyā*, manifesting the witnessing consciousness (*Sākṣī*), happiness and this special *avidyā* also contains the individual's mind and its *vāsanās* both of the waking state and the dreaming state, albeit in a latent condition (*saṃskāratāpannam*). It also embraces the beginningless objects.[444] But there is another conventional theory adopted by Madhusūdana in *Siddhānta-bindu*, which holds that in *suṣupti* there exist three *vṛttis* of *avidyā*, namely, the *vṛtti* of the particular *avidyā* mentioned earlier, the *vṛtti* of happiness and the *vṛtti* of *sākṣī*-knowledge. According to the traditional point of view, these *vṛttis* cannot be reduced to one. The *vṛttis* in deep sleep embrace the aforementioned three objects without any reference to their particular characteristics. Therefore in the state of deep sleep, the comprehension of the three objects are indeterminate, as distinguished from the perception of objects in the waking state and in dream, which is always determinate. Thus if one *vṛtti* is substituted for the aforementioned *vṛttis*, and if the objects thereof become interrelated under one *vṛtti*, then the resulting knowledge cannot be indeterminate. Moreover, as ego

(*ahaṃkāra*) is absent in *suṣupti*, there can be no determinate knowledge at that stage. This is because in all cases of determinate knowledge, *ahaṃkāra* is a prerequisite condition. Therefore, these *vṛttis* cannot be replaced by one *vṛtti*, co-ordinating the happiness and the particular mode of *avidyā* present as deep sleep.[445]

It may be noted here that the reduction of these *vṛttis* to one, does not necessarily mean the existence of an interrelationship among the objects of knowledge, as presumed by the traditional view, as the named *vṛtti* can embrace the three entities connected with one another (*samūhālambanātmika jñāna*). If such a position is accepted, then there is no harm in accepting one *vṛtti* instead of three.[446] This is the view of the *Vivaraṇa*.[447] The presence of *vṛtti* distinguishes *suṣupti* from *pralaya* (total dissolution of creation), when *avidyā* is left to itself without any *vṛtti*.

Jīva in deep sleep (*suṣupti*) is known as *prājña* (wise). Madhusūdana describes three states of *jīva* from the conventional point of view, which is evident from his method of treating them without any reference to *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*. So, in *suṣupti*, only a part of the inner organ, where its cognitive power predominates, becomes dormant. The vital airs of the inner organ continue unaffected. This explains the existence of respiration etc. in the individual *jīva* at the time of deep sleep.[448] Otherwise, from the *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* viewpoint, this explanation is unnecessary, since according to that view the experience of respiration in a person in deep sleep is only illusory.

Refutation of *jīva's aṇutva* (atomic nature)

As a part of *Īśvara*, the Pervading Creator, *jīva* is held by the dualist Vaiṣṇavas to be of atomic dimension (*aṇu parimāṇa*). It goes totally against the view of Advaita-vedānta, which holds the *jīva* to be essentially identical with Brahman. As the abiding essence of the universe, Brahman is the all-pervasive reality and *jīva*, as identical with it, is also all-pervasive (*vibhu*). When the scripture[449] describes *jīva* to be of a very small dimension, it is merely to emphasise the fact that the nature of *jīva* is very difficult to comprehend.

Objections may be raised against the conclusion that the scripture often describes the movement of *jīva*.[450] Again, according to the scripture,[451] *jīva*, after leaving the body, attains the Brahman. All these statements indicate that *jīva* possesses a limited dimension. Had *jīva* been all-pervasive, it could never move from one place to another, nor could it *reach* Brahman.

Madhusūdana answers that *jīva* by itself has no movement, but the aforementioned scripture indicates the movement of *jīva*, as limited by its inner sense organ. Apart from this limitation *jīva* is, as described in the scripture,[452] as well as in the *Bhagavadgīta*,[453] eternal and all-pervasive self. As regards the scriptural statement denoting *jīva*'s approaching Brahman (*sa enān Brahma gamayat*) the meaning of the scripture, taken in its primary sense, is absurd. A limited object can approach another limited object, but unlimited Brahman being all-pervasive

need not have any object to move towards It, nor can It, being the unique reality, find another existent entity. Therefore, how can this scriptural statement really mean to say that the individuals are lead to Brahman? Thus the underlying meaning of the scripture is that *jīva*, by removing the limitation (of *avidyā*) that differentiated it from Brahman, becomes identified with Brahman. Moreover, if *jīva* is regarded as being of an atomic dimension, how can we feel it pervading the entire physical body? Hence, *jīva* must be regarded as all-pervasive, like Brahman itself. The opponent may argue that just as a lamp placed in a corner illuminates the entire space falling within its range, so the atomic *jīva*, abiding in a space within the body, may be said to pervade the whole body through its attribute of feeling (*anubhūti*). However, this solution is not tenable. As an attribute of *jīva*, feeling cannot exist apart from *jīva*. How, then, can feeling pervade the entire body while the *jīva* is left in a corner? An attribute must always remain with the subject. Moreover, from this standpoint, the light of a lamp cannot be regarded as an attribute of the lamp when the light wanders and the lamp is left behind. Thus the analogy of a lamp does not stand up to scrutiny.[454] Hence, the *jīva* cannot be regarded as possessing an atomic dimension.

6

MATERIAL WORLD AND COSMOGONY

Having dealt with the empirical world of the perceiving conscious entities (*dṛk*), Madhusūdana next concerns himself with the contents of their experience (*dṛśya*). Madhusūdana, in his *Siddhānta-bindu*,[455] has enumerated the views of the various *Vaiṣṇava* sects and of the *Pāśupatas* concerning the status of the empirical world. This is interesting for our purpose of recounting how Madhusūdana, a great devotee of Lord Kṛṣṇa, refuted the theistic view of the reality of the created world.

First of all Madhusūdana discusses the different theories of causation held by the various schools of Indian philosophy. Following Sarvajñātma Muni, he states, that the cosmological theory of evolution (*pariṇāma*) of the Sāṃkhya philosophy is acceptable as far as men of ordinary limited intelligence are concerned. It implies that in order to prepare their mind and intellect for initiation to the Advaita-vedānta theory of illusory transformation (*vivarta*), which is a difficult concept to realise, one has to, as a preliminary step, understand the theory of *pariṇāma*. Moreover this theory is useful for contradicting other views, such as that held by the realist *Naiyāyikas*, as well as those that are completely idealistic, such as the views of the Buddhists.[456] The main difference between the Advaita-vedānta and *Naiyāyika* theories is that the former totally denies the cause and effect relationship, since from the monistic viewpoint the relationship presupposes a difference between the two which they do not accept. Hence no relationship can exist between a cause and its effect.

According to the *Nyāya*-school, before its creation, the effect is non-existent, that is, the cause produces a completely new object, which, begins (*ārambha*) to exist only just at the moment of its creation. Prior to that moment, there exists that object's antecedent absence (*prāgabhāva*) in its cause.

Madhusūdana construes that this produced object can neither be existent nor non-existent before its production. In the first case, because the effect remains previous to its production, the causes become useless. In the second case, it is illogical because non-existent objects, like horns of a hare, cannot be brought into existence by any means.

It may be said that the latter objection is based on an incorrect analogy.[457] The Naiyayikas state that the non-existence of a horn of a hare is an instance of absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*), whereas the non-existence of a pitcher,

which is produced by joining its constituent two halves (*kapāla*), in either of those two halves in their separated states, is an instance of its antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*). Hence there is no similarity between the two cases.

To that argument Madhusūdana answers that according to the Vedāntins, prior to the creation of an object, its non-existence cannot be specified as a case of *prāgabhāva*, because Advaita-vedānta does not recognise this notion. Naiyāyikas may further argue that antecedent non-existence must be accepted as a really specified non-existence. Because, this particular non-existence of an object includes in its connotation the imminent creation of that object which is now non-existent, from its inherent material cause (*samavāyī kāraṇa*) where its antecedent non-existence is located.

Madhusūdana[458] contends that the concept of *samavāyī kāraṇa*, that is, the material cause that inheres in the effect is invalid, for the relation of inherence (*samavāya sambandha*), which the Naiyāyikas accept to be existing between the constituent material cause and its effect, is not valid. Such a relationship cannot possibly exist between an existent (*sat*) cause and a non-existent (*asat*) effect. Moreover, knowledge cannot arise about a non-existent object for nothing can exist between the knowledge and the non-existing object that might be known.

Naiyāyikas may argue that without the acceptance of *prāgabhāva*, one of the auxiliary causes, that produce an effect, the particular combination of other causes will go on producing an unceasing recurrence of effects. However, if the concept of *prāgabhāva* is accepted as a cause, this inconvenience cannot arise since with the production of the first effect, this cause no longer exists. Madhusūdana replies that it is a nature or quality of any causal system that a particular set of causes should produce a single effect.[459] Therefore, the above-mentioned disadvantage of not accepting the *prāgabhāva* cannot hold good. For the sake of simplification it is better to imagine the existence of a quality than imagining a new phenomenon like *prāgabhāva*. Moreover, after the production of the effect, the particular *adṛṣṭa*[460] which is a part of the auxiliary causes of it, is destroyed. Therefore, as no relationship can exist between the cause and the non-existent effect, neither one can be the regulator of the other. Hence, the whole Naiyāyika notion of the cause and effect relationship is baseless and invalid.

The upholders of the theory of *pariṇāma* hold that the effect exists even before its production (*sat-kārya*), when it lies dormant in its material cause. Hence, the effect is *sat* or real, that is, it exists even when it is not manifest; but not eternal, that is, existing endlessly. Madhusūdana refutes this theory by proving this conclusion as logically fallacious.[461] He asks whether, before the process of its creation, this dormant effect exists in its causes, partly or entirely? The former is impossible because no other part than the causal one can then exist. However, if this proposition is accepted, the fallacy of self-dependency (*ātmāśraya*) will arise. The latter theory is also unworkable because if the effect exists in each part of the cause, then each part should have the same utility as the whole effect. It may be contended that the idea of the theorists of *sat-kārya* is that the effect exists in

the cause as the cause, in which case the question of partial or entire existence does not arise at all. However, such contention is futile, because just as one may question as to whether 'cow-ness' (*gotva*) exists in each particular part of the cow or in the entire cow, and endless argumentation cannot really prove anything either way. So also in this case nothing can be settled beyond any doubt. It is useless to argue that just as 'cow-ness' exists in each cow so the effect exists in each cause, since experience does not confirm this theory. Anything that is completely different from its effect cannot be its material cause.[462] Therefore, the theory of *pariṇāma* is as illogical as the theory of *ārambha*. The nihilistic theory of *śūnyatā* also does not stand scrutiny. Thus, none of the above-mentioned theories of causation is rational enough to be acceptable.

On the other hand, the view that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe appears to be more logical. Brahman creates the universe through the medium of *avidyā*. Thus, *avidyā*, in this sense, is regarded as the instrumental cause of the universe. Just as a magician projects illusory objects by his magical power, so Brahman projects this universe by its *avidyā* or *māyā* power. Questions may arise as to how Brahman can be the material cause of the universe, because a cause must evolve into the effect. Since Brahman is unchangeable, it cannot be seen as the material cause, a view accepted by Madhusūdana himself.[463] Reiterating the view of Prakāśānanda, he states that Brahman is not the evolving cause of the universe (*pariṇāmī kāraṇa*), rather it is the base or locus where false transformation (*vivarta*) is projected. Advaita-vedānta accepts *avidyā* as the *pariṇāmī kāraṇa* of the created universe; to be more exact, it is the material cause of the universe and Brahman, being the locus of *avidyā*, is accepted as the indirect cause. The śrutis – such as '*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyane* . . .'[464] – confirm the view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe. Brahman is the material cause of the universe because it is the substratum of all appearance (*vivarta*). The world is produced in Brahman by *avidyā*.[465]

If both Brahman and *avidyā* are regarded as the material causes of the world appearance then, Vyāsarāja observes, this can be in three ways:

1 If both are considered to be equally responsible for the creation of this universe then the scripture should not have portrayed Brahman as unchangeable. Moreover, just as a piece of cloth made of two different colours has the threads of both colours running through it, so should the universe made of Brahman and *anirvacanīya avidyā* be both real and *anirvacanīya*.[466] Madhusūdana may argue that the relationship of Brahman with the universe, being illusory, does not make the universe real. By the same logic, the relationship of *avidyā* with the universe may also be illusory. Hence, the universe should not be regarded as *anirvacanīya*. Brahman and *avidyā* cannot be equally regarded as the material cause of this world appearance.[467]
2 If Brahman, with its *māyā* power, is regarded as the material cause and the scripture depicting the changelessness of Brahman is likewise interpreted in that light, the monists still cannot escape criticism. If Brahman undergoes

change in its contact with *māyā* then it becomes as evolving as the clay producing the earthen pot. If Brahman is regarded as qualified by *māyā*, then the scripture confirming unqualified monism becomes invalid. On the other hand, if Brahman is regarded as unqualified, the scripture cannot cite it as the cause of the universe. It cannot be said that as qualified, Brahman is regarded as the evolving cause whereas as pure, Brahman is regarded as the *vivarta* cause, because even in pure Brahman the imposition of changeability is necessary for the sake of appearance. If it is acknowledged that pure Brahman, being the object of *avidyā*, serves as the material cause of appearance, then it should be also acknowledged that the change in the form of the destruction of that quality is also manifested in pure Brahman. Hence the scripture depicting Brahman as unchangeable becomes meaningless,[468] so this theory must also be rejected.

3 The third probable explanation is that Brahman is the material cause of the world-appearance through *māyā*, in the same way as fibre is considered to be the cause of a piece of cloth through the threads spun of it. That is to say, Brahman is the material cause of *māyā* and *māyā* is the material cause of the universe. However, this explanation is also unacceptable, because Brahman is not the material cause of *māyā*. Therefore, it is evident that Brahman cannot be regarded as the material cause of this universe.

Madhusūdana replies, that although both Brahman and *avidyā* are equally considered to be the material causes of the universe, Brahman is the cause through appearance (*vivarta*) while *avidyā* is the evolving cause (*pariṇāmī kāraṇa*). Therefore, the *vivarta* cause Brahman remains unchangeable, whereas *avidyā* as *pariṇāmī kāraṇa* undergoes change. The reality of Brahman[469] does not make the universe real because the rule that the effect must have the same degree of reality as possessed by its evolving cause, is not applicable here, inasmuch as Brahman is not the evolving cause of the universe. Hence the universe need not possess the same degree of reality as Brahman does. Thus Brahman, having a different category of reality, may remain unchanged. Nevertheless, the conception of *avidyā* as the ancillary material cause is necessary, because in common experience the conception of an evolving material cause is inevitable. The earthen pot has its material cause, clay, which evolves into that very object.[470]

It may be argued that not all the appearances require an evolving cause. For example, the shell-silver appearance does not possess an evolving cause because the material cause, which evolves into an effect, always produces an empirically real object (*satyarūpāpatti*). In the case of shell-silver, however, the unreal effect means that *satyarūpāpatti* does not take place. Hence it may be presumed that shell-silver does not possess any evolving material cause. As the Advaita-vedāntins regard the existence of the universe as an appearance only, the supposition of *avidyā* as its evolving material cause is superfluous.[471]

Madhusūdana further argues that according to Advaita-vedānta, evolution does not mean changing into a real form (*satyarūpāpatti*), because in this system both the

evolving cause and the effect are equally non-existent. Moreover, as a changing (*vikārī*) cause, *avidyā* must be regarded as the material cause of the universe. Brahman cannot be a material cause in this sense because, in that case, the destruction of the world-appearance by the knowledge of the truth would not be possible. The knowledge of absolute truth can destroy the *ignorance* covering the truth (Brahman) and all evolving effects of *ignorance* (*ajñāna-pariṇāma*) can be destroyed immediately.[472]

Vyāsarāja objects that Brahman cannot be regarded as the creator of this false universe, just as no creator (or agent) is found to produce the false silver. But Madhusūdana construes that such objection does not stand scrutiny because even false silver is a creation of *Sākṣī*.[473]

Vyāsarāja further argues by raising the question 'what is really meant by agency (*kartṛtva*)?'[474] It cannot be the quality of the substratum, nor can it be the quality of being the observer of the illusion, that is, a person who takes an illusion to be real, because such a person cannot be the agent of illusion if he/she as the agent, sees it as illusion before creating it. It cannot even be the quality of creating illusion for others, like a magician, because, in this case, unless the creator is aware of the existence of the *jīvas* who will be illusioned, there is no need for the creator to possess this quality. On the other hand, if the creator is seen as being conscious of the existence of the *jīvas*, he also becomes merged into illusion. It cannot be said that this illusion is imposed on the creator, for that conclusion gives way to the fallacy of reciprocal dependency; that is, to justify illusion one has to presuppose illusion. Moreover, this notion goes against the scripture which states, 'I shall change into name and form,'[475] because a magician, before projecting his illusion, resolves not to 'make' it but to 'show' it to the spectators.

Moreover, the three alternatives mentioned earlier cannot justify the omniscience of the creator.[476] A fourth alternative might be that the creator is he who possesses the volition which is favourable to the evolution of the material into the effect.[477] However, this theory is also open to criticism because in the case of illusion, such evolution is impossible.

Madhusūdana states that the fourth alternative is free from all criticism. Agency means the possession of knowledge favourable to creative activities.[478] The omniscience of Brahman is justified because Brahman possesses the required knowledge as a *vṛtti* of *māyā*, which is the material cause of the universe. Thus Brahman, by the *vṛtti* of *māyā*, is directly connected with all physical objects and directly knows every object.[479] Therefore, Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe.

Scriptural evidence, such as 'y*ato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante yena jātāni jīvanti yat prayantyabhisaṃviśanti*',[480] establishes Brahman as the locus of the creation, existence and disappearance of the universe, thereby making it the material cause of the universe. The scripture also states, 'I establish the distinctions of name and appearance',[481] conveying the idea that Brahman is the agent of this universe. Other scriptural evidences include 'After emitting it, he entered that very world.

And after entering, he became [both] visible and invisible [phenomena]'.[482] He had this desire: 'Let me multiply myself. Let me produce offspring.'[483] 'In the beginning this world was the non-existent, and from it arose the existent.'[484]

Vyāsarāja further objects that *tejas*, etc. cannot be the creation of Brahman,[485] as they possess, like God, the power of observation and creation and as such, are conscious phenomena. Hence, Brahman cannot be their material cause, for Brahman cannot be the material cause of any conscious entity.

To this, Madhusūdana's reply is that as consciousness per se cannot be created, when the scripture describes the creation of the elements, it refers to the revelation of consciousness as limited by those elements. The śrutis, such as 'the heat thought to itself' (*tattejo aikṣata*) and 'it created water' (*tadāpo 'sṛjata*),[486] merely say that consciousness limited by the preceding element is responsible for the creation of the successive element. For example, consciousness limited by space (*ākāśa*) is the creator of wind (*vāyu*), consciousness limited by *vāyu* is the creator of fire (*tejas*), and so on. As consciousness is thus recreating itself in the sense stated earlier, śruti states '*tadātmānam svayam akuruta*' ('it created itself.'),[487] indicating that Brahman is the material cause of creation. The preceding sentence from this śruti, which states '*tato vai sadajāyata*'[488] ('from that, all this manifested world comes into being'), indicates that Brahman is equally the efficient or agent cause. In this way, the *śruti* cannot be accused of repetition.[489]

In justification of his view Madhusūdana quotes a syllogism suggested by the author of *Vivaraṇa*, which is based on the scriptures, and confirms the view mentioned earlier.[490] Moreover, both Sureśvara in his *Vārtika*[491] and Sarvajñātma Muni in his *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka* support the view of Brahman's being the material cause of the universe through *avidyā*.[492] Madhusūdana's interpretation of this theory closely resembles that of Prakāśānanda Sarasvatī.[493] Prakaśānanda states that the actual evolving material cause is *avidyā*, as the material cause is that which evolves into effect. It is impossible to ascribe such causality to Brahman, in which no change is possible. For Brahman to be the material cause, it has to be indirect, as the *Vārtika* states. *Avidyā*, the direct material cause, has Brahman as its locus. Thus Brahman creates the universe by projecting the universe-illusion through the instrument (*kāraṇa*) of *avidyā*. *Avidyā* may therefore be seen also as the instrumental cause, a view shared by Sarvajñātma Muni. It may be conjectured, therefore, that the active evolving cause of this world-illusion is *avidyā*. This *avidyā*, by virtue of its twofold power, creates the world on the one hand and the percipient individual, *jīva* on the other. By its concealing power (*āvaraṇa śakti*), *avidyā* hides the real nature of Brahman as unlimited, infinite and unchangeable, and causes it to be seen as limited and finite, subjected to the worldly bondage of birth and death. Ignorance is the cause of *jīva*'s non-recognition of its own self-revealed, unlimited and transcendental nature. By its projecting power (*vikṣepa śakti*), *avidyā* creates this universe on Brahman, just as a false snake is projected on a rope by human-error. Brahman is therefore necessary as the substratum of illusion and for imposing a false existence on these illusory objects, derived from their illusory identification with Brahman.

Advaita-vedānta cosmogony

Avidyā, which manifests itself as the varied world, is timeless (*kālātīta*) in the sense that it creates the notion of time and thus is superior to time. This view encompasses *dik* or directions in the concept of space, (*ākāśa*) and the concept of time (*kāla*) in primordial *avidyā*, which contains all in its fold. Thus, acceptance of time as a distinct category is superfluous. Although time and the directions are included in this ontology, unlike the Naiyāyikas, they are not placed on a similar footing. Time is one of the primal causal factors from which everything, including space and quarter, is produced. Space, however, is considered as the starting point of all other phenomenal appearances. Time, as explained by Puruṣottama, the commentator of Madhusūdana,[494] is conceived as consciousness conditioned by *avidyā*, which is thus identical to *Īśvara*. Therefore, time is the first creation of *avidyā*. It is interesting to note that in the Pañcarātra theology time is equated with Aniruddha who creates the empirical world.[495] It is the first admixture of real and unreal, providing the impetus for creation. Its conscious portion is real but its *avidyā* portion is unreal. Hence *kāla* is also a phenomenal appearance (*anirvacanīya*). Apart from *jīva*, *Īśvara* and *ajñāna*, all objects come within the fold of time and so are manifested as related to time. That is, the pragmatic world exists as long as time exists.

The *dṛśya* – the universe viewed apart from the percipient *jīva* – is the world of names and forms. The author of *Digdṛśyaviveka* distinguishes clearly between the perceiver and the perceived (*dṛk* and *dṛśya*) in that while *dṛk* possesses existence, revelation and bliss, *dṛśya* is characterised by names and forms only (*nāma* and *rūpa*). *Dṛśya* is divided into three groups: unmanifest (*avyākṛta*), subtle (*amūrta*) and gross (*mūrta*). *Avyākṛta* is the primordial *avidyā*, which is the root cause of both the subtle and gross universe. It is co-existent with *Īśvara*, the relationship between *avidyā* and consciousness, the difference between *jīva* and *Īśvara*, and the *jīva*. They are all unmanifest and beginningless on a similar basis. As *avidyā* exists they also exist, but when *avidyā* is removed they too cease to exist. *Avidya*, being inert, cannot by itself evolve into the universe. The potential influence of the consciousness and the existence of *jīva*'s *karma* make *ajñāna* create the universe. It is *Īśvara*, Himself, who supplies potentiality to *avidyā*.[496] In this way, Madhusūdana accepts *Īśvara* as the creator. The inert, primordial *avidyā*, having been associated with the reflection of *caitanya*, proceeds to produce the universe.

Primordial *avidyā* consists of three constituents called *guṇas: sattva, rajas* and *tamas*. The five cosmic subtle elements that directly emerge from *avidyā* possess the nature of all three *guṇas*. These five elements, having the predominance of *sattva*, produce in combination a category that is extremely transparent and pure. This category has two aspects, showing the power of knowledge or intelligence and the power of action, respectively.[497]

The scriptures state that the *māyā-śakti* of Brahman has three powers: knowledge (*jñāna*), volition (*bala*) and action (*kriyā*).[498] However, Madhusūdana accepts

only two of these, as *bala* and *kriyā* may be merged into one *kriyā-śakti*. When *jñāna-śakti* predominates, the category is known as *antaḥkaraṇa*, whereas when *kriyā-śakti* predominates the category is called *prāṇa*. *Antaḥkaraṇa*, having two different aspects, is further divided into *manas* and *buddhi*. *Prāṇa* consists of five elements – *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*.[499] Dharmarājādhavarīndra states that *antaḥkaraṇa* has four modes (*vṛttis*): doubt, *saṃśaya*; determination, *niścaya*; pride, *garva*; and recollection, *smaraṇa*. According to these *vṛttis*, *antaḥkaraṇa* has four aspects known as mind, *manas*; intelligence, *buddhi*; ego, *ahaṃkāra*; and, thought, *citta*, respectively. They are not different from *antaḥkaraṇa* but have acquired different designations only because each of them shows a distinct state of *antaḥkaraṇa*.[500] Furthermore, while describing the genesis of the universe, Dharmarājādhvarīndra enunciates that the five subtle elements, characterised by their *sattvaguṇa*, collectively produce *manas, buddhi, ahaṃkāra* and *citta*. That means these four aspects of mind collectively are taken as equivalent to *antaḥkarana* (obviously consisting of *jñāna-śakti*). Vidyāraṇya Muni[501] states that *ahaṃkāra* is the embodiment of *jñāna-śakti* and *kriyā-śakti*. He further identifies it with *antaḥkaraṇa*, which ascribes transient life, *saṃsāra* to *jīva*.[502]

Ahamartha or ahaṃkāra

The notion of *ahaṃkāra* or ego has differed to a considerable extent at the hands of the philosophers of the Advaita-vedānta school. Dharamarājādhvarīndra describes *ahaṃkāra* as a special mode of *antaḥkaraṇa*, where the element of *garva* (ego) predominates. In this sense, *ahaṃkāra* is merely an aspect of *antaḥkaraṇa*, as are *manas, buddhi* and *citta*.[503]

Vidyāraṇya Muni, in his discussion of the concept of *ahaṃkāra*, reiterates two different views. He begins his discussion of *ahaṃkāra* by stating that it is the creation of *avidyā* with the addition of both *jñānaśkati* and *kriyāśakti*.[504] He further identifies it with *antaḥkaraṇa*. However, in the course of further elucidation of the concept of *ahaṃkāra*, Vidyāraṇyta Muni takes it to mean the Upaniṣadic *hṛdaya granthi*,[505] which he explains as the combination of *cit* (consciousness) and *jaḍa* (insensate). By *cit*, he means the self, which is the locus, and by *jaḍa* he means *antaḥkaraṇa*. However, when looking at the notion of *ahaṃkāra*, Vidyāraṇya seems to vacillate between *antaḥkarana* and *hṛdaya-granthi*. Madhusūdana dispels this uncertainty by accepting *ahaṃkāra* as the combination of consciousness and the unconscious that is, Vidyāraṇya's alternative interpretation. However, while, according to Vidyāraṇya, *ahaṃkāra* is the unity of the unconscious mind (antaḥkaraṇa) and its conscious locus, Madhusūdana takes it to be the combination (or mutual identification) of *antaḥkaraṇa* and the consciousness limited by that *antaḥkaraṇa*. Thus, *ahaṃkāra*, or *ahamartha* (the phenomenon 'I') as described by Madhusūdana, is neither just pure consciousness nor *antaḥkaraṇa*, but a 'third' entity brought about by the mutual identification

between the consciousness and the unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa* (*cidacidgranthira-haṃkāra*).[506] Thus the entity *aham*, 'I' cannot be combined within the category of *antaḥkaraṇa*.

Madhusūdana justifies such a concept on the basis of a common experience, 'I cognise and am the agent' (*aham anubhavāmi karomi ca*). If the *aham anubhavāmi* aspect of the experience is analysed separately, it may be concluded that the sensation (*anubhuti*) is not merely the mental mode encompassing a particular object, it is consciousness reflected upon the mode. Therefore if 'I' is taken to be the consciousness, then the experience 'I am experiencing' (*ahamanubhavāmi*) would mean 'I am identical with the consciousness reflected upon the mental mode containing a particular object.' Such an interpretation would lead to the conclusion that *aham* in *aham anubhavami* is consciousness itself. This would also lead to the conclusion that the *aham karomi* aspect of the experience means 'I am the locus (*āśraya*) of the agency,' when, in fact, this is *antaḥkaraṇa*. Therefore, *aham* in *aham karomi* should mean just the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself.

It is apparent that *aham* in both aspects – 'I feel' (*aham anubhavāmi*) and 'I act' (*aham karomi*) – refers to two different entities: consciousness in the first instance and the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) in the second. Viewed in this light, it is difficult to see how *aham* – as in *aham anubhavāmi karomi ca* – could be interpreted as a form of consolidated knowledge. Apparently *aham*, as expressed here, seems to refer to an entity that is neither mere consciousness nor mere inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). According to Madhusūdana, *aham* in this consolidated knowledge should be recognised as a third entity distinct from both consciousness and the unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa*.[507] However, Madhusūdana wants to conceive this third entity in terms of *aham* meaning both consciousness and the unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa*. In other words, Madhusūdana takes the 'I'-entity, (*ahamartha*) of the consolidated knowledge to arise from the mutual superimposition (*anyo'nyādhyāsa*) of both phenomena. He says that 'the knotted state of conscious and unconscious is ego while antaḥkaraṇa is just unconscious' (*cidacidgranthirahaṃkāraḥ, acinmātramantaḥkaraṇam*).

The primordial *avidyā*, being charged with activity by the reflection of *Īśvara*, and with the help of the impressions of the actions of *jīva* in its previous birth (*pūrva karmasaṃskāra*), produces five cosmic elements: space or ether, air, fire, water and earth (*ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, ap* and *kṣiti*). However, each preceding element transfers its specific characteristic into the succeeding element because *avidyā*, having evolved into the preceding element, is taken to be the material cause of the succeeding element. For this reason, a subtle sound can be found in the category of air, a tactile subtle element can be found in *tajas*, and so on.[508] It may be noted that according to the Sāṃkhya School, these elements are called 'the five *tanmātras*', all of which are independent of each other, while the Advaita-vedānta school sees them as connected with each other by a relationship of cause and effect.

From the primordial *avidyā*, positive and physical phenomenon of darkness is produced, thus demonstrating that darkness is not merely the absence of light. The only characteristic of darkness lies in its being liable to immediate destruction by light: it quickly appears from *avidyā* and disappears into it. Being subject to creation and destruction, darkness should be regarded as one of the positive empirical objects. The opponent asked when describing the genesis of the universe, none of the scriptures mention darkness as being generated, it is difficult to see why the author is describing its creation here.

In reply, Madhusūdana states that the main subject matter of the scriptures is Brahman.[509] Other subjects are dealt with in the Vedas insofar as they are relevant to the discussion of Brahman. For example, the percipient self (*jīva*) with its physical body is discussed in the *Vedas* in order to establish the identification of the *jīva* with Brahman. While describing *jīva*'s physical body, its genesis is also discussed as a relevant topic. As darkness makes no contribution to the creation of the body, it is omitted in that context. However, its absence does not amount to non-recognition.[510]

As stated earlier, the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), the collective product of the five subtle elements, possesses both the power of knowledge (*jñāna śakti*) and the power of action (*kriyā śakti*). Therefore, each of these subtle elements must be recognised as having the power of both knowledge and action. Hence, from each of the subtle elements, taken individually, emerge two organs of knowledge and action. The organ of knowledge is the product of the particular element when *sattva* dominates therein, whereas the organ of action is produced with the preponderance of *rajas*. Thus from *ākāśa*, the sense of audition and speech are created. The sense of touch and the organ of the hands are created from *vāyu. Tejas* creates the sense of sight and the organ of the feet. Water evolves into the sense of taste and the organ of excretion, while earth creates the sense of nose and the organ of procreation. Corresponding to the products stated above, the deities are quarters and fire, wind and Indra, the Sun and Viṣṇu, Varuṇa and Mitra, and the two Aśvins and Prajāpati, respectively.[511]

The combination of five sense organs, five action organs, and five vital airs, mind (*manas*) and intelligence (*buddhi*),[512] constitute the subtle body (*linga-śarīra*). Hence this subtle body is dominated by cognitive power; it is called *hiraṇyagarbha* and *sūtrātmā* (the pervader). The relationship between the cosmic subtle body and the cosmic gross body is similar to the relationship between the individual *linga-śarīra* and the individual gross body. Essentially, *Hiraṇyagarbha* and *Sūtrātmā* are identical. The name *hiraṇyagarbha* suggests that in this aspect, the cosmic *jīva* is the self-revealing knowledge that illuminates everything. It is called *sūtrātmā* because, just as a string of a gem necklace endures through all the gems, so *Hiraṇyagarbha* endures throughout all empirical existences and guides their actions.[513] Just as primal *avidyā* is the limitation of *Īśvara*, so is the subtle (*amūrta*) creation – consisting of the five subtle elements and the *linga-śarīra* – the limitation of *jīva*, both in its cosmic and individual aspects.

The empirical world: *Mūrta prapañca*

In order to create the gross body as well as the gross physical world, the five subtle elements undergo a special kind of mutual admixture. The process involved herein is known as the quin-quepartite process (*pañcīkaraṇa prakriyā*). The special feature of this process is that each gross element created by *pañcīkaraṇa prakriyā* possesses all five elements in disproportionate degrees. This is achieved in the following way. Each subtle element is divided into two equal portions; one part is further divided into four equal parts and is then distributed equally among the intact halves of the other four elements. Thus, each gross element arising out of this process possesses one-half of one element and one-eighth of each of the other four elements, with the gross element being named according to the element that predominates it. However, there is an alternative theory that instead of the quin-quepartite process described above, a tripartite process takes place. This view is based on the śruti,[514] which states 'each of them will be divided into three by me'. However, as the latter theory begins with *tejas* and excludes both space and wind from the fold of creation, *pañcīkaraṇa prakriyā* should perhaps be regarded as, even if later, the more widely accepted explanation.

These gross five elements in combination create a single effect that is the seat of all organs and the instrument of all empirical enjoyment of *jīva*. Such an effect is known as the gross body (*sthūla śarīra*). Bodies are of three kinds. Those dominated by *sattva guṇa* are known as divine bodies; those dominated by *rajas guṇa* are known as human bodies; and those dominated by *tamas guṇa* belong to inferior animals and plants. All three bodies, although made of the same five elements, vary in nature and dimension according to the variation of the proportion of elements. The external world is also from each of the individual gross elements. The external universe consists of fourteen worlds, all with their particular objects. These worlds are situated high above, down below or in the middle and the objects therein vary according to the proportion of the three *guṇas* within each. All the creations of the five subtle elements – the gross body, the fourteen worlds and the objects therein – are inert and gross, and are known in combination as the *Brahmāṇḍa* delimiting the consciousness known as *Virāt* (the vast).

The process of evolution can thus be summarised as follows.[515] The un-evolved (*avyākṛta*) evolves into un-manifest (*amūrta*) and *amūrta* that is, the five elements, evolves into manifest, *mūrta*, creation. A combination of a*vidyā* and conditioned consciousness is the material cause of the entire creation. In other words, it is the semblance (*ābhāsa*) of consciousness, and not real consciousness, that is the material cause of the universe. *Avidyā* is the evolving cause and the evolution is caused by *cidābhāsa*. However, *kūṭastha caitanya* remains inert throughout and unaffected by the process of creation.

The process of involution follows the same sequence, but in reverse order. Thus, the gross creation merges into *amūrta* and *amūrta* merges into *avyākṛta*.[516]

When the *mūrta* merges into the *amūrta* creation, the consciousness corresponding to it – *Virāṭ* – merges into *Hiraṇyagarbha*, which is the consciousness limited

by the cosmic subtle body. This process is known as daily *pralaya*. When the *amūrta* merges into *avyākṛta*, *Hiraṇyagarbh*a merges into *Īśvara* (the consciousness qualified by *avidyā*). This is known as the *prākṛta pralaya*. The unmanifest creation, being timeless, has no inert material cause therefore it has no state of dissolution in the sense that there is no material cause wherein it might dissolve. This is because the definition of *laya* is existence in a latent form within the material cause. The ultimate dissolution (*ātyantika pralaya*) occurs through the true knowledge of Brahman as identical with *jīva*, which discards *avidyā*. This absolute destruction is the eradication of all objects, since *avidyā* (the material cause of the universe) is itself destroyed and the universe disappears once and for all.

The doctrine of karma

The doctrine of karma has been drawn up by the Advaita-v*edānta* as a corollary to the conception of a moralistic universe. It is taken to be actions, and the results of those actions, which pursue the performer of that action in his later birth. It continues to do so until it is exhausted by the resulting pleasure or pain. Thus, *jīva*'s experience of pleasure and pain is determined by the quality of karma in his previous birth and also controls his future course of action. To that extent, it prevents lawlessness and settles man into a disciplined expression of conduct. Although pleasure or pain represents the fruition of karma, such pleasure or pain is also dependant on other factors. For example, it requires a gross physical body, an organic instrument and a physical universe which can serve as its object. To make this possible, karma has to assist the primordial cause, *avidyā*, in its creation. This is called *adṛṣta*. In the case of the theory of creation from a person (*dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*), karma lies in the *avidyā* of the individual person which then has the nature of individual karma. In the case of creation from God having *māyā* as His limiting adjunct (*upādhi*), as distinguished from *avidyā* of *jīva*, the totality of karma lies in *māyā* while individual karma exists in individual *avidyā*. Such totality helps *māyā*. While an individual transmigrates from one gross body to another, karma abides in his/her subtle body (*liṅga śarīra*) with which it enters into a fresh gross body.

When an individual person attains enlightenment all his karmas, except *prārabdha*, are destroyed before they can produce pleasure or pain. *Prārabdha*, the karma that has produced the existing gross body of the enlightened person, continues for some time until it is entirely exhausted. Preceding such exhaustion the individual continues to exist, although it is no longer subject to illusion and is therefore called *jīvanmukta* (liberated while still continuing to live).

Thus karma, accumulated in numerous previous births, produces the experience of pleasure or pain. To make that experience possible it helps *avidyā* in producing the world, consisting of the gross body, the sense organs and the physical objects necessary for the realisation of pleasure and pain.

In this enjoyment of pleasure or pain a person (*jīva*), in the state of waking, has to accept the help of his sense organs, for it is through these organs that a person's

inner sense organ conveys the physical world to him or her. These senses are created by *avidyā* having Brahman as its substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*).

When *jīva*'s store of karma (that produces the physical objects of enjoyment) becomes exhausted, the false identification between the gross body and *jīva* is temporarily removed by a modification of *tamo-guṇa* known as sleep (*nidrā*). At this time, divested of the superintendence of the presiding deities, the sense organs cease to operate. *Jīva* then enters into another world known as the world of dreams (*svapna prapañca*). The dream condition means the state in which objects are cognised by virtue of the mind's latent impressions (*vāsanā*) of the individual's waking experiences.[517] There are two views as to the source of the dream-objects. The first (which appears to be influenced by Buddhism) holds that they are the modifications of the mind cognised by *avidyā-vṛtti*. According to the other, *avidyā* evolves both into the objects of dreams as well as the cognitive *vṛtti* thereof. Madhusūdana accepts the latter view because it favours the generalisation that in all cases of *adhyāsa*, including dreams, *avidyā* may be regarded as the material cause.[518] It is believed by some that *jīva*, limited by the mind should be regarded as the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*), while others hold that the *adhiṣṭhāna* is Brahman qualified by *ajñāna*. The argument in favour of the first view is that as the error of dreams is contradicted by knowledge of the waking state, the locus of the dream illusion has to be taken as known at that time, since illusion is removed only by the knowledge of *adhiṣṭhāna*. However, if Brahman is regarded as the *adhiṣṭhāna* of dreams, when that illusion is removed in the waking state the waking state itself cannot exist, since knowledge of Brahman is always followed by total disappearance of the universe. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that *jīva* is the a*dhiṣṭhāna* of dreams and in the waking state knowledge of *jīva* removes dream illusion. If the waking state removes dream illusion, such illusion is explicable by the assumption of a special *avidyā* which might serve as the material cause of such illusion. This particular kind of *avidyā* is removed by the waking consciousness (*jāgrat bodha*).[519] As this conditional *avidyā* (i.e. *avasthājñāna*) is limitless, when one dream illusion is removed by ordinary knowledge, there is a possibility that another will take its place. As in the case of the shell-silver illusion, the removal of one such illusion does not guarantee that a similar illusion will not occur again in the same person.

Those who hold that Brahman limited by primordial *ajñāna* is the locus of dream-objects argue that just as the illusion of the 'rope-snake' is removed by another illusion, that of the 'rope-stick' (*rajjudaṇḍa*), so also the dream illusion may be removed by the knowledge of waking state, which itself is an illusion. In both cases, the knowledge of the locus is unnecessary. Although the locus is the same Brahman, the dream-objects of each *jīva* vary according to the various latent impressions (*vāsanā*) of the individual mind. Thus both views are justified and as such, either *jīva* or Brahman would adequately serve as the locus of dream-objects.

Tiring of enjoyment in the waking and dream states, *jīva* sometimes enters into a third state known as *suṣupti* which means deep sleep. The proof of the existence

of this state is the waking experience of the *jīva* of having had a pleasurable dreamless sleep. At that time, the inner sense organ of the person, which is limited by *jñānaśakti* and retains all the impressions (*vāsanā*) latent within it, merges into its material cause, *avidyā*. At that time, there exist only *Sākṣī* and *vṛttis* of *avidyā*, that is, *vṛttis* in the forms of personal ignorance, (*ajñāna*) and happiness.[520]

7

ADVAITA-VEDĀNTA SALVATION

The ultimate goal, a Śāstra aims at to teach is the liberation from suffering. But for Madhusūdana, it also brings about transcendental bliss. We must not loose sight of Madhusūdana's love for Kṛṣṇa which I shall be discussing soon. For him bliss is Brahman and hence is desired and loved (cf., *parama premāspadatvāt*).

In Advaita-vedānta, liberation, is not the resultant state that *jīva* should attain. According to this school, liberation (*mukti*/*mokṣa*) is an ever-accomplished fact; it is nothing but Brahman itself. It is the revelation of absolute bliss.[521] Absolute cessation of misery, which precedes liberation, implies the blissfulness of liberation, and *jīva* aspires to achieve it for that bliss. Vedāntic *mokṣa* is thus not mere cessation of misery. It is absolute bliss.[522] Madhusūdana maintains that liberation is in fact identical with one's own real self, *ātman*, which is integral, all-blissful, non-dual consciousness. It is pure and transcendental existence.[523] Such liberation is, however, indicated by (*upalakṣita*) knowledge, known as the special cognitive mode that presents an integral, monolithic undifferentiated and non-conceptual content (*akhaṇḍākāra cittavṛtti*), which comprehends the unity between *jīva* and Brahman. This true knowledge dispels *avidyā* and the cessation of *avidyā* by knowledge leaves *ātman* the only existent entity. There is therefore no question of a second reality, namely the state of cessation of *avidyā*, apart from Brahman.[524] Although liberation of the soul is an established fact and therefore does not require any effort, the spiritual endeavour prescribed by Vedānta is far from useless. Because it is prescribed in the Vedic injunction embodied in the śruti, *ātmā vā are śrotavya* etc.[525] *Śravana*, brings about realisation, embracing the unity between *jīva* and Brahman. With the dawning of such knowledge, the primordial ignorance absolutely ceases to exist and the self, being free from the cloud of ignorance, bursts forth in its pristine glory. This self-revelation of the self is liberation.

A question arises challenging the operation of knowledge to terminate all ignorance. The Advaitins hold that knowledge brings about the cessation of *avidyā*, but this contention seems to be unwarranted, since the external world does not furnish any evidence to that effect.[526]

Madhusūdana maintains that though no ordinary illustration may be available to bear upon this issue, evidence can still be drawn upon for that purpose:

The *śruti* states that *jīva* can become identical with Brahman by knowledge of Brahman.[527] To attain such identification, one has to remove the ignorance which, as the *śruti* itself states, separates Brahman from *jīva*.[528] Hence, on the authority of *śruti* it is proved that knowledge of Brahman removes ignorance regarding Brahman. Ignorance conceals truth from *jīva* but this veil of ignorance is discarded forever by the dawning of the ever-shining truth, that Brahman is identical with *jīva*.

This knowledge, which finally breaks down the wall of ignorance in respect of the knowledge of the identification of *jīva* with Brahman, is imparted by great scriptural statements such as, 'That thou art' (*tat tvam asi*)[529] and 'I am Brahman (*aham Brahmāsmi*).'[530] These great sentences generate direct knowledge of Brahman, at once destroying ignorance, and Brahman thus becomes revealed. They communicate one undifferentiated, integral meaning, namely *ātman* or Brahman. Though all the Vedāntic texts indicate Brahman, these statements directly shatter the ignorance standing between *jīva* and Brahman. Hence they are regarded by the Advaita-vedāntins as principal Vedāntic statements.

The exposition given by Madhusūdana on the Vedic statement '*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* etc.' throws an interesting light upon this issue. Madhusūdana takes it to mean that '*darśana*, that is, direct experience of Brahman' is the goal of this statement. Such seeing produces *akhaṇḍākāra cittavṛtti*. Hearing, reflecting and meditating, as prescribed by the aforesaid *śruti*, are useful inasmuch as they remove impurities from the mind. Thus, *śravana* means *vicāra* (discussion) that results from the determination of the intended denotative meanings of the constituent words of the Vedic statements producing knowledge of identity. Such determination discards doubt from the mind as to whether the Vedic statements can establish any identity between *jīva* and Brahman, insofar as the Vedas, according to the Mīmāṃsā school, cannot be other than a prescription of an act or its prohibition. This identity, being a fact, does not fall within the purview of either prescription or prohibition.[531] *Manana* is the discursive thinking that reaffirms the subject matter which in the present context, is the identity between *jīva* and Brahman. It removes from the mind the distractive misgivings about this identity. Concentration of mind is dependant upon the removal of doubts regarding the reality of Brahman and its identity with *jīva*. *Nididhyāsana* is deep contemplation, that is, an intense mental effort (*prayatna*) regarding the identity between *jīva* and Brahman. Such contemplation brings about, in due course, a preparedness of mind for the uninterrupted flow of *akhaṇḍākāra cittavṛtti* regarding this identity. *Nididhyāsana* removes from the mind the deep-rooted impression based on the false identity between the physical body and the individual soul. *Nididhyāsana* therefore must be conceived to culminate in knowledge which contradicts the false knowledge of identity between *jīva* and its body.[532] Such knowledge, however, precedes and is therefore different from, *akhaṇḍākāracittavṛtti*, which is the special contribution of *Mahāvākyas*.

In this way, *śravana* establishes that the great sentences have their final import in the identity of *jīva* and Brahman. *Manana* reaffirms the same truth by disabusing the mind of all misgivings and doubts that might arise from the logical plane of mind regarding the stated truth. *Nididhyāsana* ingrains the same truth so deeply in the mind that the false identification of *jīva* with the physical body, which has pursued the person from time immemorial, becomes shaken. In this way, when the mind becomes free from all misconceptions regarding the identity between *jīva* and Brahman – in other words, when the mind becomes adequately receptive – then the great Vedāntic statements present to the mind *akhaṇḍākāracittavṛtti*, which brings *avidyā* to its end.[533] Since most of the discussion of how such realisation can remove primordial ignorance has already been dealt with in previous chapters I shall only mention the fact that Madhusūdana makes a departure from both the *Vivaraṇa* and *Bhāmatī* schools of thought regarding this issue.

Sevenfold steps leading to liberation

We have seen that in the Advaita-vedānta soteriology deep meditation on one's self and its identity with Brahman leads to the salvific gnosis of truth. Madhusūdana recognises seven steps of yogic stance leading to the realisation of the true nature of self and for these he draws upon the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*.[534] The names of these steps given by *Yogavāsiṣṭha* are:

1 śubhecchā;
2 vicāraṇā;
3 tanumānasā;
4 sattvāpatti;
5 asaṃsakti;
6 padārthabhāvinī;
7 turyagā.

Madhusūdana explains them as follows. The first step, namely *śubhecchā*, is the fourfold preparatory practice namely, (1) discriminatory knowledge of what is permanent and what is transitory; (2) total indifference to the this worldly and other worldly enjoyment; (3) acquiring physical, psychological and moral self control; (4) true desire for salvation, (*nityānityavastuviveka, ihāmutraphalabhoga virāga*, *śamadamādisādhanasampat* and *mumukṣutva*), which represent the general preparedness of the mind. The second stage, *vicāraṇā*, consists of *śravaṇa* and *manana*. This means the meaningful discussion of Vedāntic statements, under the guidance of a preceptor. The third stage is *tanumānasā*, which is when the aspirant meditates deeply upon Vedāntic teachings. This meditation concentrates his mind and enables it to realise subtle realities. The first three states described above, therefore, mean the fourfold Vedāntic preliminary practice, '*sādhana*'. Moreover, *śravaṇ*a, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are included in this list and are also considered to be the means for the attainment of liberation. Madhusūdana

makes a further equation. As these three states presuppose knowledge of a pluralistic world, which are characteristic of a waking state (*jāgrat avasthā*), they are called the waking state of a seeker of salvation (*mumukṣu*). The fourth state is called *sattvāpatti*, when reality (*sattva*), namely the identity between *jīva* and Brahman, becomes revealed to the aspirant by an indeterminate form of knowledge (*nirvikalpaka jñānam*). This is for Madhusūdana equivalent to the dream state, in that the aspirant realises the falsity of the universe.

The last three of the seven states are the different stages of a person who is released even when he is alive, *jīvanmukta*. Of these, the fifth stage is *asaṃsakti*. In this state, the '*jīvanmukta*' practises '*savikalpaka* (determinate) *samadhi*' and by that practice his mind experiences '*nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) *samadhi*' marked by complete detachment (*asaṃsakti*). This Madhusūdana called the state of deep sleep, *suṣupti*, insofar as the aspirant voluntarily returns from there to the world of everyday life.[535]

The sixth stage is known as *padārthabhāvinī*. In this state, the *jīvanmukta* lives for a long time in *samādhi*. He returns to the waking state only when he is aroused only when some other person intervenes. He is held to be worthier than the *jīvanmukta* of the previous stage, for he is more advanced towards final emancipation.[536]

In the seventh state ('*turyagā avasthā*'), the *jīvanmukta* remains completely at ease and besides meditation gives up all physical efforts and responsibility towards himself. God keeps him alive and well while the ordinary physical functions are discharged with the help of others. Such a *jīvanmukta* remains settled in integral and transcendental pleasure. After this stage, the *jīvanmukta* never returns to the ordinary world of action. This state results in salvation at death, *videhamukti*, when, with the total exhaustion of his *prārabdha karman*, his physical body falls away.[537] At the seventh stage, the *jīvanmukta* already becomes identical with Brahman, the absolute bliss.[538] It is interesting to note that in this connection Madhusūdana accepts the theistic view that at the seventh stage the bodily functions of a *jīvanmukta* are carried out by God Himself. In this connection, Madhusūdana cites the *Bhāgavata* to establish that, at this stage, the *jīvanmukta* possesses no consciousness concerning his/her body.[539]

Thus, Madhusūdana classifies the seven stages of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* in a set scheme. This reveals his close acquaintance with the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* method of yogic practice. Even when he was deeply influenced by the Caitanya-school of bhakti, he never moved from his tradition of non-dualist Vedāntic yoga and its practice.[540]

Jīvanmukta

It is perhaps necessary to add a few words about the concept of *jīvanmukta* (achieving salvation in this life). In the *jīvanmukta* state – when, by the ultimate knowledge of identity between *jīva* and Brahman, the *avidyā* of the person comes to an end – all the previously acquired karma of that person together with his future *karman*, are destroyed. However, even then he cannot be completely free

from the influence of *avidyā*, since even this ultimate knowledge cannot destroy his *prārabdha karman*, which is exhausted only by enjoyment (*bhoga*).[541] Thus, although the concealing power (*āvaraṇa-śakti*) of *avidyā* becomes discarded by ultimate knowledge, the *vikṣepa-śakti* of *avidyā* continues to operate so that the *jīvanmukta* has to retain the body to exhaust his *prārabdha karman*. So it cannot be said that a *jīvanmukta* aspirant immediately completely merges into Brahman. From the time when the *mumukṣu*'s self-realisation takes place, he is considered to be *jīvanmukta*. But he is considered really released (*para-mukta*) only when he leaves his body and finally merges into Brahman, the ultimate bliss. The state of *jīvanmukta* is the intermediate stage, lying between a person's self-realisation and the ultimate merger into Brahman. At the *jīvanmukta* stage, even though a person's *avidyā* does not remain, its impression (*saṃskāra*) does. This impression is termed *avidyāleśa*, which Madhusūdana explains as the *ākāra*, that is, a form of *avidyā*. This is the power of projecting illusory objects (*vikṣepa śakti*) of *avidyā* which continues until the end of *jīva's prārabdha karman* – the final emancipation from the bodily bondage.[542] The final stage of a *jīvanmukta* is the seventh state of knowledge as described earlier. The culmination of this state is disembodied liberation (*videha-mukti*).[543] *Videha-mukti* is not described as a separate state of knowledge because at that time no separate existence of the *jīva* can be detected, since *jīva* completely merges into Brahman, the absolute bliss. For Madhusūdana even this seventh stage can be called *videha-mukti*, insofar as the *jīvanmukta* has no consciousness of his physical body and surroundings; and all his physical functions are performed with the help of others. At this stage, the existence and non-existence of the physical body do not feel any different to the *jīvanmukta*. Indeed, the pluralistic world and the sense of all diffentiation become non-existent to him.[544]

Madhusūdana does not believe in the Madhva's view of different gradations of *mukti*, namely *sālokya, sāmya, sārūpya* and *sāyujya* (considered to be the most superior of the four). Madhusūdana contends that of these four, only *sāyujya-mukti* is *parā-mukti*, the others being only conditional emancipations (*aparā-mukti*).[545] As stated in the *śruti* 'He who knows Brahman attains ultimate reality' (*brahmavidāpnoti param*).[546] This attainment means identification of *jīva* with Brahman, so *sāyujya* should also mean being Brahman itself.[547]

It may be noted here that the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* accepts these different grades of salvation to be identical with Brahman.[548] But for Madhusūdana, the non-dualist Vedāntin, these concepts are unorthodox and so he rejects these. Even when explaining his concept of bhakti, which very much follows the *Bhāgavata*, he remains silent on this topic.

8

BHAKTI

The concept of *bhakti*

In the previous seven chapters I have given a synopsis of Madhusūdana's own exposition of the philosophy of non-dualistic Vedānta. I have purposely elaborated on his views on the concept of *avidyā*, that is, mistaken knowledge, because the dualist Vedāntins refused to accept Śaṃkara and his followers' view of non-duality and refuted the notion of avidyā. For the opponents it is but a negation of valid knowledge and not an ontological phenomenon as non-dualists suppose it to be. Madhusūdana defended *avidyā*.

It should now be clear that Madhusūdana, a great philosopher of non-dualist Vedānta, took over the responsibility of rescuing his system from the damaging criticisms of all dualist philosophers who considered non-dualism to be incoherent and going against the teaching of the Scriptures. He specially addressed the Mādhva teacher and philosopher Vyāsatīrtha. His fierce attack against the non-dualist Vedāntins almost shattered the upholders of this latter school of Vedānta. Vyāsatīrtha in his Nyāyāmṛta attacked every important argument, proposed by the non-dualist school in favour of the existence of *avidyā/ajñāna* and thereby demolished the theory of non-duality of the Śaṃkara school. Madhusūdana accused the Mādhva Vaiṣṇavas to be false Vaiṣṇavas.[549] However, it is obvious that he considered himself a Vaiṣṇava, albeit, the right type of Vaiṣṇava. Clearly the concept of *bhakti* played a vital role in the philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. As a prominent teacher of the non-dualist vedānta philosophy, he was anxious to uphold the monistic views of that school of soteriology. He firmly upheld that the realisation of Brahman is the immediate source of salvation. Such realisation instantly removes all experience of duality and the idea of a self as a separate entity from Brahman.[550] But paradoxically, he was personally deeply influenced by his contemporary Vaiṣṇava views, which was a dominant religion in Bengal where Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva is held as the supreme God.

He obviously knew Śrī Caitanya's teachings as well as the teachings of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (*BhP*). In his exposition on *bhakti* in the *Bhakti-rasāyana* he used the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* as his scriptural source and illustrated each of his views with extensive quotations from that text.

We do not know if he ever met Rūpa Gosvāmī or his brother Sanātana Gosvāmī or their nephew Jīva Gosvāmī. Nor do we know if he ever read any of their works. He expanded the *BhP* theory of *bhakti-rasa* (aesthetic enjoyment of *bhakti*), in the conventional literary way,[551] as did the above-mentioned three exponents of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava school of *bhakti*. Thus it is clear how deeply *BhP* influenced Madhusūdana's Vaiṣṇava theology. His commentary on the first verse of the *BhP* shows an independent approach to the non-dualistic metaphysics and does not quite resemble Śrīdhara. Probably he was familiar with the exposition of *bhakti* in the *Muktāphala* by Vopadeva along with Hemādri's commentary. The *BhP* amalgamated the Alvār and other south Indian Vaiṣṇava traditions as well as the Pāñcarātra theology and philosophy.[552] The *bhakti* propagated by the *BhP* is focused on Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa. Madhusūdana's chosen deity was also Gopāla Kṛṣṇa or Vāsudeva.[553] But one should not forget his philosophical background, and, although it was passionate love for his deity he sought after, he still followed Rāmānuja's *bhakti-yoga* or *upāsanā* in his attempt to define *bhakti*. However, his personal feelings was clearly always closer to the passionate love for Gopāla Kṛṣṇa than to the sedate bhakti-yoga of the earlier Pāñcarātra tradition.[554]

A brief review of the historical development of the later concept of *bhakti*, which influenced Madhusūdana most, may make my point clear. I start with the most important work on *bhakti*, namely, the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, which has influenced almost all later theologians of Vaiṣṇava *bhakti*. The *BhP* has defined *bhakti* in such a way that this mystical and often, passionate experience is elevated to the position of the 'goal' that a follower of *bhakti* aspires to achieve.

The *BhP* concept of *bhakti*

The *BhP* has defined unqualified (*nirguṇa*) *bhakti* as a stream sweeping the mind (*manogati*) along towards the Supreme Person (Puruṣottama), that is, Nārāyaṇa.[555] This stream begins to flow at the slightest reference to the Lord and having begun, cannot be interrupted by any extraneous consideration. Just as the water of the Ganges flows uninterruptedly and inevitably towards the ocean, so the mind flows inexorably towards Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva. This flow is not motivated by any expectation of reward nor is it vitiated by any awareness of duality. In fact, such unqualified *bhakti* is like the instinctive reaction to a stimulus. Totally devoid of any motive (*ahaitukī*) and uninterrupted (*avicchinnā*), it is a spontaneous (*svābhāvikī*) and innate (*avyavahita*) experience of Reality.[556]

Unlike the unconditional flow of the mind, which operates from instinct alone, worship of God is usually a voluntary act. A particular goal might motivate such worship, or a higher sense of duty may bring it into operation.[557] In either case it is still voluntary; though worship that also acts as a fulfilment of a duty is of a higher order than that prompted only by personal motives. Compared to the instinctive and unqualified (*nirguṇa*) *bhakti, bhakti* as a voluntary process is of inferior quality insofar as it depends upon the voluntary will of the worshipper and does not flow towards God automatically, without stress or strain. In other

words, in the former the worshipper's ego remains active whereas in the latter it is merged into the personality of God.

The *BhP* further classifies *bhakti* into two categories; borne out by an observation of the *BhP* that *bhakti* itself produces *bhakti*.[558] The commentator Śrīdhara explains the first *bhakti* as a process (*sādhana*), that is, the practice of *bhakti* and the other as the *premalakṣaṇā bhakti* (*bhakti* that is defined as passionate love), that is, the *bhakti* that is a devotee's soteriological goal (*sādhya*).

Concept of *bhakti* in the *Bhakti-sūtras*

There are two famous *Bhakti-sūtras* – the *Śāṇḍilya-bhakti-sūtra* (*ŚBhS*) and the *Nārada- bhakti-sūtra* (*NBhS*). We can infer that the *ŚBhS* preceded the *NBhS* because while the latter refers to the former with some reverence a number of times, there is no mention of *NBhS* in the *ŚBhS*. Like the *BhP* and *BhG*, these two are sometimes taken as authoritative works on *bhakti*. I take up these two *Bhakti-sūtras*, not because of their antiquity, (they are obviously late and certainly later than *BhP*), but because they have made an attempt to introduce *bhakti* as a *Śāstra* in the model of the six *Darśana*. These two *sūtras* are the first systematic presentation of the doctrine with definitions, etc. They depicted *bhakti* with reference to God Vāsudeva and described Him as the object of supreme loving attachment (*parānurakti*).

Bhakti is defined in the *ŚBhS* as the supreme love for the Lord (*Īśvara*).[559] The commentator Bhavadeva explains that the love, whose object is *Īśvara*, is of the highest kind.[560] When the object of love is a limited and imperfect human being, then that love also remains limited and imperfect. Conversely, when the object of love is the absolute and infinite *Īśvara*, it then becomes the greatest of all forms of love. Thus *bhakti* is primarily the supreme love for the Divine, a view confirmed by Nārada, who takes *bhakti* to mean supreme passionate love (*parama-prema*).[561]

Śāṇḍilya-bhakti-sūtra also accepts another sense of *bhakti*, which he calls the secondary (*gauṇī*) sense of the term '*bhakti*'. In its secondary sense the term includes such devotional acts of piety as listening to the Lord's glory (*śravaṇa*), singing God's eulogy (*kīrtana*) and so forth as listed in the group of ninefold acts of *bhakti* in the *BhP*.[562] These devotional acts are quite distinct from '*bhakti*', in the primary sense of the term, namely, supreme love for the Lord (parānurakti). The devotional acts are deemed secondary because they only purify the devotee, which help to make him/her ready for receiving divine grace. Only then the devotee is capable of feeling the passionate love for the Lord. This is the goal of a devotee's devotional acts and aspirations. Once the love is dawned, gradually it saturates him/her through and through. Totally immersed in God, all other empirical awareness recedes from the devotee's mind.

Bhakti as conceived by the Gauḍīya (Bengali) Vaiṣṇavas

The Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism, was propounded by the followers of Śrī Kṛṣṇa Caitanya – the Gosvāmīs who mainly resided in Vṛndāvana, a place near Mathura

and haloed by the mythological exploits of Kṛṣṇa, the Lord of all. A quick look at their definition of *bhakti* should put Madhusūdana's views in proper perspective. I shall mainly deal with the *Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu*, a monumental work by Rūpa Gosvāmī, one of the eldest of these Vṛndāvana Vaiṣṇava scholars and his nephew Jīva Gosvāmī, the great commentator of the *BhP* and other important works of theology of this school.[563]

The best type of *bhakti*, according to Rūpa Gosvāmī, is constantly practising with one's body, speech and mind, only such actions that just concern Kṛṣṇa and are agreeable to Him (*ānukūlyena kṛṣṇānuśīlanam*).[564]

Jīva Gosvāmī explains that this constant practice involves both ordinary actions and mental disposition. These should have no selfish motive. It is not vitiated by the dry metaphysical vision of ultimate Truth, nor is it restricted to the performance of duties enjoined by religious texts (*anyābhilāṣitāśūnyaṃ jñānakarmādyanāvṛtam*).[565] This mental disposition is simply a natural and innate state of a devotee's personality.

Such spontaneous *bhakti* cannot be cultivated in the ordinary way as one may cultivate an attitude of mind. Such a disposition of devotional mind appears only through the divine grace and indeed a manifestation of God's essential power (*svarūpa-śakti*). Thus, *bhakti* is totally different from ordinary emotional feelings in that these are manifestation of *māyā*, God's power of delusion. *Bhakti* is therefore, according to this school, an eternal principle operating in the devotee for all time to come.[566] As creatures are essentially not distinct from God, and as *bhakti* is identical with God's intrinsic power, *bhakti* as the essential divine principle always abides in all individuals. But they are not usually aware of this fact. After realising this principle through divine grace the devotee thenceforth, never loses sight of it. *Bhakti* grows spontaneously until the individual is completely immersed in it. It should be remembered that this *bhakti* is in fact *prema-bhakti* (passionate love for God), the taste of which is the goal of all devotees.

Rūpa Gosvāmī classified *bhakti* into three categories: (1) *sādhana-bhakti*, that is, *bhakti* that is instrumental to generate true *bhakti*, the goal of a devotee; (2) *bhāva-bhakti*, that is, a permanent mental state of the devotee's love for God; and (3) *prema-bhakti*, that is, ecstatic love for god which is a devotee's ultimate goal.[567] It should be noted here that the second and the third categories are but two aspects of their soteriological goal, *sādhyā-bhakti*, which are in fact a person's innate nature.

Bhakti as religious practices (*Sādhana-bhakti*) originates through the purposive operation of the sense-organs emulating feelings of respect and total trust in God's mercy. In other words, *sādhana-bhakti* consists in physical acts of the devotee to express his/her feelings of *bhakti*, that is, actively pursuing devotional acts which are instrumental in achieving direct realisation of *sādhyā-bhakti*.

Although expressions of *sādhana-bhakti* of Rūpa Gosvāmī are psycho-physical acts, yet an attraction (*śraddhā*), of the devotee's mind towards Lord Kṛṣṇa endures through them all. It may vary according to the personality of the devotee, but *śraddhā* is the seed of all *bhakti*.[568] Jīva Gosvāmī describes such a focusing

of mind on God as *tatsāmmukhya* (approaching Him face to face). He further states that the term *sāmmukhya* is the same as *upāsanā*, which encapsulates both worship and deep meditation on God. The purpose of *upāsanā* is to realise God, which is the first stage of *prema-bhakti* and thus bringing about an end to suffering.[569]

Sādhana-bhakti is of two kinds, *vaidhī* and *rāgānugā*. *Vaidhī-bhakti* covers the performance of rites prescribed by the religious texts (*śāstra*). The devotee performs these out of respect to the *śāstras* and out of devotional faith and a sense of duty, but not through personal and impulsive attachment (*rāga*).

Rāgānugā, on the other hand, is inspired by and akin to the devotional love which the mythical people of Vṛndāvana possess for Kṛṣṇa. The latter is called *rāgātmikā-bhakti*, the strong attachment and passionate desire a lover possesses for the object of his/her love.[570] *Rāgānugā-bhakti* not only follows this type of love but also seeks to share the bliss experienced in *rāgātmikā-bhakti*. Jīva Gosvāmī maintains that such activities as *śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana*, that is, the soteriological practices of the seekers of the realisation of Brahman, are included in *upāsanā*. As such they are also included in the *sādhana-bhakti*. But the *bhāgavata-dharmas* such as *śravaṇa, kīrtana*, etc. are close to *sādhyā-bhakti* than the Upaniṣadic injunction on *śravaṇa, manana*, etc. because these only lead to the revelation of the true nature of Brahman, the reality, but do not move the realising person into any passion.[571]

Constantly practising *sādhana-bhakti*, the devotee may feel the dawning of *bhāva-bhakti* and this *bhakti* is a manifestation of the intrinsic power (*svarūpa-śakti*) of Lord Kṛṣṇa and is co-terminus with God pervading the creation and creature as their essence. Individuals are not aware of the presence of this *śakti*, nor of God innate in them. *Sādhana-bhakti*, especially the *rāgānugā* type, opens the practising devotee's mind, which becomes receptive to the emotions of attraction and desire for Kṛṣṇa, the first stage of emotional love (*bhāva* or *rati*). Lord Kṛṣṇa's intrinsic power is the same as *prema-bhakti* and has bliss as its essential nature (*hlādinī*). Therefore, when the devotee's mind receives the vague inkling of this love it softens and saturates the mind not only with the desire to obtain the Lord's attention, but also to be prevailed upon by Him and to develop ever-increasing intimacy with Him. The devotee falls in passionate love with the Lord. That is why it is also termed *rati*, or, sexual desire. Though *rati* being an experience, is self-revealed, it also appears as an object of revelation: it is itself a pleasure to be enjoyed. Nonetheless, it is also the cause of enjoyment for Lord Kṛṣṇa.[572] One should however, keep in mind that not merely the practice of *sādhana-bhakti* can bring about the realisation of *rati*. Lord Kṛṣṇa's grace is the essential prerequisite for that. Sometimes, through the special grace of the Lord, this *rati* dawns in the devotee's mind even without any practice of *sādhana-bhakti*.

Rati culminates in passionate love for God, (*prema-bhakti*). Jīva Gosvāmī calls this type of intensely passionate *bhakti* as *prīti*. In other words, when *bhāva-bhakti* completely saturates the mind through and through and deepens in

such a way that a bond of an intimate relationship is established between God, the object of that love, and the devotee, it assumes its mature form, known as *prema* or *prīti*.[573] Here also Rūpa Gosvāmī describes two causes that generate *prema-bhakti*. One is *bhāva-bhakti*, deepened by the constant and passionate practice of the *sādhana-bhakti* such as *śravaṇa, kīrtana*, etc. The other is Lord Kṛṣṇa's great divine grace (*atiprasāda*), expressed in His granting His companionship to His favoured devotees. The company of Lord Kṛṣṇa is said to have generated fully matured *prema-bhakti* among the *gopīs* (cowherd maidens) of Braja, even though they never practiced any *sādhana-bhakti* or experienced any first sensation of love in the form of *rati*. Theirs were from the very beginning *prema-bhakti* for Kṛṣṇa.[574]

Jīva Gosvāmī states that *prīti* has two aspects. On the one hand, it means *sukha*, or pleasurable experience, an indeterminate rapture, which is too diffuse and indefinable to be attributed to any one object. On the other hand, *prīti* means *priyatā*, a rapturous feeling derived from three conditions. These conditions are (1) enlightenment as to the true nature of love; (2) perpetual submissiveness of the mind to the object of love; and (3) an ever-increasing craving springing from this malleability of the lover's mind.[575]

In this way Jīva Gosvāmī elucidates the twofold aspect of *prīti*. One aspect is an enjoyment coupled with knowledge; the other exhibits a voluptuous desire for and attachment to the object of love. His understanding of the interrelation between *sādhana-bhakti* and *prema-bhakti* may be described thus: *sādhana-bhakti* generates the knowledge of the supreme Lord. This knowledge, once arisen, automatically destroys all misery. It then generates the consummate love for the supreme Godhead, marked by intense attachment to and desire for Him.[576]

Rūpa Gosvāmī's own explanation of the three stages of a devotee's *bhakti* runs as follows: The primary requisite of the devotee is a well developed trust in God, *śraddhā*, which leads the votary to the company of Vaiṣṇava saints and practitioners. Their example then induces the devotee to the practice of *sādhana-bhakti*. These practices remove all causes of misery, so that the devotee becomes settled (*niṣṭhā*) on God. It can be deduced from this description and from Jīva Gosvāmī's commentary that this really indicates *bhakti-yoga* of the *Bhagavad-gītā* as well as the *BhP*, III.25.25. This constant dwelling upon God (*bhagavad-niṣṭhā*) in turn leads to an automatic inclination towards passionate *bhakti*. Gradually this inclination starts to operate spontaneously, which is conducive to the first awakening of *bhāva/rati* that is, passionate love for God. This then culminates in *prema-bhakti*. As *bhāva* and *prema* are both manifestations of one and the same *hlādinī-śakti* or, divine bliss (*ānanda*) it gradually engulfs the devotee in rapturous enjoyment of this blissful *bhakti*.[577]

Rūpa Gosvāmī, naturally drew extensively on the ancient Indian literary theory of *rasa* that is, the aesthetic enjoyment. In his work on dramaturgy and allied subjects entitled the *Nāṭya-śāstra*, Bharata, (*c*.300–400 CE), introduced the *rasa* theory. Since ninth century CE the theory took its important position amongst the

authors on literary theories and philosophy of religions in Kashmir who dealt with literature and its aesthetics. The names of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta top the list and from there it spread all over India. In theology, *rasa* theory has been thoroughly developed and popularised by the *BhP*.[578]

Madhusūdana's concept of *bhakti*

In his exposition of *bhakti*, Madhusūdana follows faithfully the definition of *bhakti* in the *BhP*, which has been mentioned previously. For he, too, regards *bhakti* as a mental mode (*vṛtti*) corresponding to the *manogati* of the *BhP*. Such a mode is a continuous flow (*avicchinnā*) of mind's awareness of God (*bhagavad*) that arises in a mind that has become totally melted (*drūta*) by love for God. Though the *BhP* does not expressly referred to this state of the mind as arising at the same time the love for God does, Madhusūdana develops the *BhP* analogy that compares the mind to the water of the Ganges.

Madhusūdana maintains that, passionate *bhakti* springs in the mind by constant practice of *bhagavaddharma* which is the same as *sādhana-bhakti* of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theology. At the same time, *bhakti* melts the mind of the devotee due to his/her great passionate desire for and attachment to God. As a result, the devotee's experience of passionate *bhakti* has a deeper and lasting impact on him/her than any other form of experience. His authority is the *BhP* where it says that such melting of the mind is caused by constantly listening to God's praise. Madhusūdana takes this to be the same as the nine types of *sādhana-bhakti*, namely, *śravaṇa* etc., which he terms *bhagavaddharma*. Finally he explains that such *bhakti* only concerns the Lord.[579] I should point out that Madhusūdana never really admits that the realisation of sādhyā-bhakti is his soteriological goal. The goal remains the self-realisation. Only there is a difference in the mental condition of the individual who experiences the dawning of the final realisation of Brahman as identical with self and the realisation of the true nature of God (bhagavān). In the case of the *akhaṇḍārtha-citta-vṛtti* revealing Brahman's identity with self, the experiencing individual's mind is completely free of any emotion. But in the case of *bhakti-vṛtti* revealing God, the experiencing individual's mind is saturated by divine love. Moreover, Brahman, the bliss is actually the passionate love (*prema*) the individual experiences.

Two elements of this definition are noteworthy: (1) the melting of the devotee's mind which results from the practice of *Śravaṇa* etc.; and (2) *bhakti* is a mental mode and hence a cognitive process that captures God's reflection (*pratibimba*). Further, it is a constant flow of this awareness towards God. The first element is important to understand the *rasa* theology of *bhakti* while the second one is close to the notion of *bhakti-yoga* greatly elaborated in Madhusūdana's commentary on the *BhG*. Rāmānuja (eleventh century CE) introduced the latter concept of *bhakti*[580] and since then it has exercised wide influence on the Vaiṣṇava theology. The former concept was widely explored by Vaiṣṇava theologians nearer to

Madhusūdana's time – for instance, the followers of Śrī Kṛṣṇa Caitanya. Thus our author tried to combine the notions of emotional devotion and *upāsanā* that included, perhaps, the ritual practices, but heavily emphasised on the practice of one-pointed meditation. He insisted on combining upāsanā with ecstatic experience of love. We shall try to see how far he was successful in this effort.

Madhusūdana's own exposition of *bhakti* may be summarised as follows: by the practice of ninefold *bhakti, śravaṇa*, etc. the votary's mind melts. Such a melted mind spontaneously develops an uninterrupted flow of consciousness fixed on the Supreme Lord. This constant flow of one-pointed mental awareness of God drives away all other empirical knowledge with their source *māyā*, thus removing all sufferings. The devotee's innate propensity for loving God increases by the intimate knowledge of God's divine blissful nature, and swiftly brings about in him/her the ecstatic state of divine aesthetic enjoyment of *bhakti*. This is the soteriological goal of a devotee. The devotee not only realises God's true nature but also enjoys that realisation . Although, this may imply a notion of separate identity of the devotee from his/her beloved God, yet Madhusūdana employs all the arguments of his non-dualistic stand to identify the *bhakti* experience and the content of that experience that is, Lord Kṛṣṇa to be one and the same. Therefore, in both cases, the experience is the identity of one's self with the supreme Reality, be it Brahman or Kṛṣṇa, the embodiment of blissful love.

He differentiates between the realisation of self as Brahman which, according to Advaita-vedānta, releases one from sufferings (*mukti*), and the realisation of *bhakti* of the Kṛṣṇa-devotee which is an ecstatic experience. His explanations run as follows: *Bhakti* is the soteriological goal of a theist just as gnosis of the true nature of one's self is the soteriological goal of the Advaita Vedāntin. Both the realisations of self as Brahman and *bhakti* are forms of experience appearing in one's mind, which is trained into a special mode. The difference between the two modes is that: for the mental mode called *bhakti* melting of the mind is a precondition and there exists an element of enjoyment in that experience, whereas, the *akhaṇḍākāra-citta-vṛtti*, which realises the self as Brahman, is free from all differentiation.[581]

Madhusūdana introduces an interesting analogy to explain the process of the melting of the mind, which serves as the condition for the rise of *bhakti-vṛtti* that is, the cognition of *bhakti*. He compares the mind with sealing wax. The sealing wax is solid by nature but it melts when it comes into contact with fire. Similarly, the experiencing mind is, normally, not in a state that readily develops a passion. But when it is stirred by some internal stimuli such as love, anger, fear, affection, joy, grief or compassion, it melts and becomes prone to develop a passion. In other words, the mind is emotionally deeply moved and has the potential for great lasting passion for the object of those emotions. In adopting these stimuli into his discourse, Madhusūdana, once again follows the *BhP* as his authority, where it is said that kindled by any of these, the mind melts.[582] But Madhusūdana puts a note of caution here. He points out that this state of mind requires intensity of feeling and thus should be distinguished from a mere slackening (*śithilībhāva*) of the

mind brought about by temporary conditions, which are not adequate to produce the really lasting and overwhelming passionate love for God, (*prema-bhakti)*.[583]

Madhusūdana further explains that when the melted mind of a devotee receives the impression of his/her beloved God with all His transcendental qualities, the impression abides in his/her mind for all times to come, even when the mind is not conscious of any special stimulus. Once imprinted on the melted mind, the divine impression (*pratibimba*) becomes its permanent attribute. So much so, that even when the mind becomes hard afterwards, or, may even make excursions into other objects, that impression persists.[584] This permanent imprint of the mind is described in four ways: *saṃskāra* (permanent impression), *vāsanā* (latent impression of the mind), bhāva (mode of mind) and *bhavanā* (constant contemplation). All four expressions show different aspects of the experience of *bhakti*. *Saṃskāra* and *vāsanā* mainly express the quality of the experience being innate to the mind. The expression *bhāvanā* naturally connects the mental state to the idea of *bhakti-yoga*. The term *bhāva* is interesting in connection with the concept *rasa* or aesthetic enjoyment.[585]

Bhakti-experience reveals God in his glorious full form. This revelation being a reflection, is identical with its prototype, and is therefore itself all-bliss. This blissful permanent mood (*sthāyi-bhāva*) of mind is, for Madhusūdana, comparable to the mind of an aesthete, which climaxes in *rasa*. Similarly, *bhakti-bhāva* through practice of *bhakti*, reaches its climax in ecstatic enjoyment of *bhakti-rasa*.[586]

When Madhusūdana brings in the concept of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*) to explain the nature of *bhakti-rasa* , he confronts a few problems. *Rasa* is, states the *Naṭya-śāstra* (*NŚ*), produced through the interplay of various fleeting moods (*vyabhicāri-bhāva*), (generated in the mind of the main character of the play, which reinforces his/her dominant mood). This dominant and permanent mood (*sthāyi-bhāva*) is aroused and sustained by the determinants (*vibhāva*) – first, the person who is the focus of the dominant mood, and then other congenial elements and expressed through various psychological and physical reactions (*anubhāva*). *Vibhāva* is divided into two categories – the support, that is, the object (*ālambana-vibhāva*) of the dominant mood and the elements of excitement (*uddīpana-vibhāva*).[587] To apply this formula to *bhakti-rasa*, Madhusūdana admits that the supporting *vibhāva* of *bhakti* is Kṛṣṇa. Therefore, if he claims that the dominant mood that is, *bhakti* is identified with Kṛṣṇa, the *rasa* theory becomes inapplicable. For instance, it is impossible to say that one's feeling of love is identical with one's beloved. Therefore, divine love and the focus of that love, that is, the divine, must be separate entities.

Madhusūdana answers this as follows: It is true that both the *ālambana-vibhāva* and the *sthāyi-bhāva* of *bhakti* share substantially the same identity in the case of both being all-bliss Bhagavat. Still Bhagavat as the *ālambana-vibhāva* is the prototype (*bimba*) whereas Bhagavat, revealed in the *bhakti*-experience is His reflection (*pratibimba*). Hence though these are the same entity, in appearance they are as it were, separate. Much the same way as the individual (*jīva*) and the Lord (*Īśvara*) though basically one, are treated for all practical purposes as two

different realities.[588] As the *bhakti-sthāyi-bhāva* (*rati*) is thus all-bliss, it is only one further step to conceive it as developing into the all-bliss *rasa*, which again is the manifestation of Bhagavat in all His glory and sweetness.[589]

Out of allegiance to the literary theory of *rasa*, Madhusūdana tried to establish a link between ordinary *rati*, which develops *into śṛṅgāra-rasa*, and *Bhagavad-rati*, which develops into *bhakti-rasa*. In the case of ordinary experience of *rati* for a person, the experience embraces the person as the essential consciousness (*cit*) conditioned by the illusory qualities making up the individuality of the beloved person. Thus in epistemological terms, the lover is experiencing *rati* for the beloved as a form of object-consciousness (*viṣayāvacchinna caitanya*).[590] Ordinary *rati*, therefore, differs from *Bhagavad-rati* insofar as the former is a reflection of object-consciousness, while the latter is a reflection of pure consciousness in its all-bliss glory, that is, Bhagavat Himself. But both are *rati*, being the reflection of consciousness on the mind that has already been melted by the heat of passion. Very interestingly, Madhusūdana's sequence of reaching the all-consuming experience of passionate love for the Divine is initially to realise the true nature of the glorious God. This leads the devotee to a state of total detachment (*kaivalya*) from all empirical phenomena, including his/her individual ego. Both these states fully depend on God's grace. Having reached *kaivalya*, the devotee is capable of the realisation of true *prema-bhakti*.

Thus, Madhusūdana clearly states that both *rati* and *bhakti* are in fact a single experience arising in a special mode of mind (*citta-vṛtti*). But this remains a determinate experience where the revealed God appears as an attribute of the mind in a special state. Clearly it is not just the mental mode, as we have been previously told.[591] We may assume that the author first followed the *Bhāgavata* tradition of explaining *bhakti-rasa*. There as we have seen, *bhakti* is a constant flow of a state of mind (*manogati*). But as he continues to follow the course of daring exploration into the region of metaphysics and the literary theory of rasa, he lands himself into a spiritual territory whereby *bhakti* becomes *Bhagavat* Himself rather than a mere state of mind. This shifting of position can be attributed to his anxiety to see that *bhakti* should be understood as all-bliss – the experience and the experienced just one integral entity. The concept is not basically different from the experience that reveals *Brahman*. In both cases, a determinate process of cognition reveals an indeterminate and transcendental experience. Only in the case of *bhakti* the determinate process of cognition produces the transcendental experience of all-bliss God producing an ecstatic state. *Bhakti* differs from the revelation of *Brahman* in that in the latter the experience is undifferentiated while in the former it is a differentiated experience of ecstatic joy.[592] Nevertheless it is transcendental and beyond the reach of mind which is a product of *māyā*.

Does *bhakti-rasa* qualify to be called a form of cognition, a gnosis? For our author it certainly does. His description of *Bhagavat* is 'essentially gnosis and bliss' (*bodha sukhātmakaḥ*). He is self-revealed, not just as consciousness but also as all-bliss. Hence *bhakti-rasa* as identical with *Bhagavat* is also a self-revealed experience as well as being all-bliss.[593]

In Madhusūdana, therefore, we come across something of a climax in the concept of *bhakti*. In the *BhP, bhakti* is a mental mode focused incessantly on God. It is an experience of spontaneous ecstatic joy. In the *bhakti-sūtras, bhakti* is taken as love and attachment, but the precise metaphysical and epistemological implications of this were left unexplored. In the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism *bhakti* is a rapturous knowledge. It was also recognised as an expression (*vṛtti*) of God's innate blissful power (*śakti*).

Following the Vivaraṇa, Madhusūdana accepts that, every cognition is a reflection of consciousness on the mental mode rather than the mode alone. Therefore, he arrives at the conclusion that *bhakti* in its mature state is a revelation of the glorious all-bliss God – a revelation that is not different from what it reveals. He takes a bold step to equate *bhakti* gnosis with the *brahma* gnosis and thus he shows a logical distinction between *bhakti* as a soteriological means (*sādhana*) and *bhakti* as the soteriological goal, the *sādhyā* or *prema-bhakti*.

What is then the epistemologial process of the *bhakti*-cognition? It is the reflection of *Bhagavat* on a mode of the melted mind of the cogniser. The difference between the *bhakti*-cognition and the cognition of self as identical with Brahman lies in the nature of *Brahman* and *Bhagavat*. The latter is transcendent and yet qualified with what Rāmānuja called God's auspicious qualities (*kalyāna guṇa*) as well as with the transcendental qualities (*bhaga*), while the former is totally devoid of any quality. Therefore, unlike the realisation of *Brahman*, realisation of *Bhagavat*, that is, *bhakti* is a differentiated knowledge. Thus *bhakti*-experience not only arises in a melted mind, not only it is identical with *Bhagavat*, but additionally it is a differentiated experience. Being a strict Advaita-vedāntin, Madhusūdana did not recognise the existence of an innate divine power. He also left alone the question of the enjoyer of the ecstatic *bhakti*-experience, leaving it to the realm of mysticism.

Coming back to the actual mental process of grasping the form of Bhagavat; Madhusūdana explains the genesis of the comprehension of Bhagavat by the mental mode (*bhagavat-ākāratā*) in the following way: In every empirical cognition the image in mind has two aspects. As far as the basic comprehension of the indeterminate part of the grasping goes it comprehends 'something' which is the locus of all phenomena. But the other aspect of such comprehension is the determinate knowledge of the object as say the cognition of a pot. As far as the indeterminate comprehension is concerned (i.e. in our example 'this is something'), it is a true knowledge because it indicates something existing is grasped by the mind as the locus of the content of the comprehension. The mind grasps the pot as an existing phenomenon, and *Brahman* as existence is indeed the locus of that phenomenon. For the devotee *Bhagavat* as identical with Brahman can replace the latter. The error of cognition occurs in grasping the determinate part of the cognition, namely, a pot, as the pot is a mere product of illusion (*māyā*). When the illusion is gone by grasping the real nature of existence as *Brahman* or, *Bhagavat*, the locus of the pot, the pot disappears. Thus grasping the *bhakti*-experience, which is *Bhagavat*, the locus of all erroneous experiences caused by *māyā*, the

devotee emerges out of the influence of *māyā* which caused all his sufferings, and he/she attains salvation.

Madhusūdana further elaborates on the subject of this experience. That leads him to claims that, like the experience of *Brahman, bhakti* embraces *Bhagavat* exclusively as just bliss free of any qualification. This experience of bliss is similar to the experience of bliss in deep sleep.[594] He asserts that the mind naturally grasps the reflection (*ākāra*) of *Bhagavat*. But in the empirical cognition the reflections it grasps are caused by such external causes as the sense organs and the latent impressions retained by the mind of previous experiences and thus the reflection becomes distorted. Mind is able to grasp the reflection of *Bhagavat* because it is a product of *avidyā* which has *Brahman/Bhagavat* as its locus. Besides, Bhagavat is the inner controller (*antaryāmī*) of all phenomena and pervades (*anusyūta*) all. Thus once the identity between Brahman and Bhagavat is accepted there is no incongruity in accepting the mind to grasp *Bhagavat*.[595]

In the empirical state, though the mind grasps *Bhagavat* in all its cognitive acts, it is not opposed to the appearance of other forms in mind. By the practice of devotional acts (*sādhana bhakti*) a devotee purifies the mind of all these other farms and impressions. Cleared of all such erroneous forms the mind finally grasps the unimpeded form of *Bhagavat*. In other words the mind directly experiences *Bhagavat*. Prior to that the mind, during the devotional practices, gets only an indirect reflection of God. The direct revelation totally settles the mind in God.[596]

In saying this, Madhusūdana has created a new synthesis in which the doctrines of monism are reconciled to devotional theories. He recognises *sādhana bhakti* as a means of eradicating *avidyā*, a removal that leads to ultimate self-realisation. *Bhakti*, for Madhusūdana, is as effective as activities such as *śravaṇa* and *manana*, advocated by the Advaitins.[597] As *bhakti* is a form of experience that leads to salvation through self-realisation, knowledge serves, both in the theory of devotion and in the monistic view on salvation (*mokṣa*), as the direct cause of salvation from worldly sufferings and from their cause, avidyā, the wrong knowledge. But according to the tenets of devotion, salvation is not the *summum bonum* of human life. Following the *BhP*, Madhusūdana puts divine love above salvation, where divine love at its climax places the devotee in a state of perpetual ecstatic bliss. The devotee enjoys at that stage the ecstasy of supreme love for *Bhagavat*. As has already been noted, such an ecstatic experience is regarded, by the followers of the *BhP*, as the highest goal of a person. Madhusūdana accepts this view.[598] The endeavour of the Advaitins ends in achieving identity with *Brahman, Brahma-kaivalya*, which Madhusūdana calls *parā-mukti*, or supreme salvation.[599] But in the context of *bhakti*, this indeterminate experience lacks the element of enjoyment (*rasa*). The successful devotee achieves the determinate experience of the enjoyable All-bliss God, *Bhagavat*. We shall soon see that the author puts this experience above the experience of undifferentiated *Brahman*.

In this context, Madhusūdana reinterprets Vaiṣṇavite terms such as *sālokya* and *sāyujya* to fit in with monistic thought. He equates *sāyujya* with a lack of

differentiation (*bhedābhāva*) between *jīva* and *Brahman*. In relation to the highest stage of beatitude *(sāyujya*) he refers to the attainments such as *sālokya* as limited salvation (*aparā-mukti*).[600] Monistic *kaivalya* is the identity with *Brahman* achieved after death, *videha-kaivalya* where even the tiniest remnant of mistaken knowledge (*avidyā-leṣa*), which causes the continuance of the gross body of the *jīvanmukta*, is exhausted. In the description of different stages of the spiritual evolution of the devotee (*bhakti-bhūmkā*) in his/her pursuit of bliss, *jīvanmukti* is described as the sixth stage, but *videha-kavalya* is avoided in order to enjoy the bliss of divine love, *bhakti*. In order to justify the exposition of the theory of *bhakti*, Madhusūdana points out the difference between *bhakti* and *Brahma-vidyā*, the goal of the Advaita school. The differences are as follows:[601]

1. *Brahmavidyā* (i.e. *akhaṇḍākāra-citta-vṛtti*) is an undifferentiated mental mode (*nirvikalpaka-manaso-vṛtti*), comprehending the non-dual reality (*Brahman*). *Bhakti*, on the other hand, is a differentiated *savikalpaka* mode of a melted mind, having *Bhagavat* as its content.
2. While the great sentences such as '*tat tvam asi*' produce *Brahma-vidyā*, activities involving ninefold devotion (*navadhā-bhakti*), that is *śravaṇa, kīrtana* and the like, are said to bring about *bhakti*.
3. *Brahma-vidyā* results in the eradication of primordial *avidyā*, the root of all suffering. But *bhakti* reaches its climax in supreme love (*prema*) for Bhagavat.
4. *Brahma-vidyā* is a special privilege accorded to some rare individuals, who have achieved four states of mind (*sādhana-catuṣṭaya*;).[602] *Bhakti*, however, is open to all. The melting of the mind is the only prerequisite for the dawning of *bhakti*.[603]

Though Madhusūdana has thus drawn a series of distinctions between *Brahma-vidyā* and *bhakti*, his syncretic mind has yet managed to assimilate *Brahma-vidyā* into the texture of *bhakti* and has equally integrated it into the hierarchical evolution of *bhakti* in its different stages. Madhusūdana's thinking starts its movement in this direction in his commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, where he says that *jīvanmuktas*, being purified by knowledge, develop love for Bhagavat.[604] In this Madhusūdana again confirms the place of the *BhP* as his main authority.[605]

The eleven stages of *bhakti*

However, this syncretic attitude assumes a fully fledged form only in the *Bhakti rasāyana*, where he expressed his views by assigning a slightly lower place to *Brahma-vidyā* as a stage in the evolution of *bhakti*. In order to bring this into a clearer perspective, and also to appreciate the workings of the syncretic mind of Madhusūdana, we now propose to deal with the stages of *bhakti* that culminate in the highest flight of divine love (*prema prakarṣa*). Madhusūdana enumerates the

stages as follows:[606]

prathamaṃ mahatāṃ sevā
taddayā-pātratā tataḥ.
śraddhātha teṣāṃ dharmeṣu
tato hariguṇaśrutiḥ.
tato ratyaṃkurotpattiḥ
svarūpādhigatistataḥ.
prema-vṛddhiḥ parānande
tasyātha sphuraṇaṃ tataḥ.
Bhagavaddharamaniṣṭhātaḥ
svasmiṃstatguṇaśālitā.
premno'tha paramā kāṣṭhetyuditā
bhakti bhūmikā.[607]

Stage 1: service to the great (*mahatām sevā*). By the great, Madhusūdana[608] means primarily Bhagavat Himself and, secondarily, the devotees of God.
Stage 2: acquisition of the grace of the great *(taddayāpātratā*). Such grace may require endeavour or it may be spontaneously achieved.
Stage 3: a favoured votary develops a taste (*ruci*) for the practice of spiritual methods (*śraddhātha teṣāṃ dharmeṣu*) consisting of the ninefold devotion.
Stage 4: the actual practice of the ninefold devotion according to one's capacity (*hariguṇaśruti*).

These four stages are exclusively means (*sādhana*) to achieve the end (*sādhya*); the following stages are achievements (*sādhya*), though they allow for still higher stages. In other words, the following stages consist of both *sādhya* and *sādhana*:

Stage 5: reception of the reflection of *Bhagavat* by a mode of the melted mind. This stage is *bhakti* in its narrower sense, which Madhusūdana has already presented in his definition of *bhakti*, while the other stages that follow represent the hierarchical maturity of this stage.
Stage 6: *svarūpādhigati*. This stage is practically the same as the *Brahma-vidyā* of the Advaita school and allows three hierarchical sub stages: (1) the realisation of the true nature of *jīva* as distinct from the gross and the subtle bodies; (2) the realisation of the identification of the true nature of *jīva* and Brahman, the all-pervading Self; and (3) the realisation of such identification which strengthens detachment (*vairāgya*) to reach its climax (*paravairāgya*).
Stage 7: increase of love in God is when with the dawning of *paravairāgya* the votary becomes overwhelmed with divine love in its ever-increasing intensity.

The stages that follow are ends, as distinguished from the above group of stages, which are, more or less, means.

Stage 8: *tasya sphuraṇam* means the direct revelation of *Bhagavat*, the reality that is all-bliss.
Stage 9: *Bhaghavaddharmaniṣṭhā* is the total absorption of the votary in *Bhagavat*, when all his senses are completely dedicated to the service of *Bhagavat*.
Stage 10: *svasmiṃstadguṇaśālitā* is when due to the devotee's total absorption in God his/her body manifests the majesty of *Bhagavat*.
Stage 11: *premnaḥ paramā kāṣṭhā* is the climax of divine love, characterised by extreme intolerance of separation, and resulting finally in the surrender of life (*prāṇaparityāgāvadhi virahāsahiṣṇutārūpā*).[609]

It is evident that *bhakti*, as defined by Madhusūdana at the beginning of his *Bhakti-rasāyana*, is the fifth stage which he describes as the dawning of love and attraction for the Divine (*ratyaṅkurotpatti*): in other words, Madhusūdana has taken the first four stages preceding this stage as purely the means (*sādhana*) for the attainment of the experience of *bhakti*, the fifth stage. Therefore, the usage of the word '*bhakti*' for the first four stages is secondary.

Madhusūdana gives recognition first to service to the great, which according to him leads to the showering of divine grace on the votary. In this way, Madhusūdana introduces the doctrine of divine grace in the delineation of his own theory of devotion. Though in conventional Vaiṣṇavism, divine grace is taken to be spontaneous, it appears, from Madhusūdana's exposition, that he believes that as a general rule, service to the great is the cause of divine grace. In some cases, however, Madhusūdana admits variations within this rule.[610] Through divine grace the votary develops a taste (*ruci*) for the practice of spiritual methods consisting in the ninefold devotion (*navadhā-bhakti*). Elsewhere in his *BhR* Madhusūdana observes, in the context of the exposition of one verse of the *BhP*, that the practice of *karma-yog*a, consisting in the performance of daily (*nitya*) and occasional (*naimittika*) rituals of an initiated devotee, may also bring about the above-mentioned taste (*ruci* or *śraddhā*). He further states that *karma-yoga* can lead to both the path of knowledge and the path of devotion.[611] Those aspirants whose minds become melted, follow the path of devotion, while the others develop detachment and follow the path of knowledge. Though Madhusūdana does not mention *karma-yoga* in his description of the stages of *bhakti*, in the light of these comments one might say that he considers *karma-yoga* and divine grace as the alternative cause of *śraddhā*. But his silence over *karma-yoga* in the context of the description of the stages of *bhakti* may be interpreted as his inclination to divine grace in preference to *karma-yoga*. Madhusūdana may be said to have reaffirmed the convention when he thus declared the sovereignty of divine grace in the path of devotion. Madhusūdana holds that out of *śraddhā* the devotee begins to perform spiritual exercises

consisting of the ninefold devotion described by *Pralhāda*.[612] This ninefold devotion is the immediate cause of *ratyaṅkurotpatti* – the sprouting (of the nucleus) of passionate love (for God).

When the Reality that is all-bliss becomes manifest to the devotee, he naturally becomes overwhelmed by such an occurrence. He no longer remains conscious of the external *Bhakti*, the fifth stage which Madhusūdana described at the beginning of the *BhR* for the purpose of definition. This is elaborated in his enumeration of the next three stages in an interesting manner. First, the sprouting of the divine love (*ratyaṅkurotpatti*) gains increasing intensity of love for *Bhagavat*, resulting in His direct revelation in the mind of the votary. Then, between the stages of the first dawning of *rati* and the development of intensity of love, Madhusūdana inserts the realisation of Self (*ātman*) of the Advaita-vedānta. That means, according to Madhusūdana, that *rati* is intensified by the realisation of the Self. This realisation is not the manifestation of *Bhagavat*, the reality that is all-bliss, but is the knowledge of reality as pure existence. For, *Bhagavat* becomes manifest only after the love of *Bhagavat* has gained intensity. The process whereby the mind receives the form of *Bhagavat* falls into four hierarchical phases: (1) the sprouting of *rati*; (2) the realisation of the Self; (3) the intensification of love for *Bhagavat*; and finally, (4) the manifestation of *Bhagavat* as all-bliss.

When the reality that is all-bliss, becomes manifest to the devotee, he naturally becomes overwhelmed by such an occurrence. He no longer remains conscious of the external universe and all his activities are absorbed in *Bhagavat*. As a result of such complete concentration (*tanmayatā*) on *Bhagavat*, the majesty of *Bhagavat* becomes manifest in the devotee. In this way Madhusūdana recognises the *sārṣṭi mukti* of the Vaiṣṇavas in his description of the stages of *bhakti*. The *Bhagavat-rati*, resulting in the manifestation of *Bhagavat*, is further crystallised by the spontaneous performance of *Bhagavaddharmas* and culminates in the perfection (*parā kāṣṭha*) of divine love. The climax of divine love is *bhakti-rasa* and, according to Madhusūdana, it is the manifestation of the entirely blissful nature of *Bhagavat* in all His splendour.

The final stage of *bhakti*, which Madhusūdana describes as *premnaḥ parā kāṣṭhā*, or the climax of divine love, deserves some consideration here. Madhusūdana does not expressly say in this context whether at the time of realisation of this stage the devotee becomes completely identified with Bhagavat, or whether some sort of distinction still remains between the two, as is generally believed in different Vaiṣṇava schools. Madhusūdana leaves it to his readers to guess the truth. He does state that long before *rati* develops into *rasa*, in fact before *rati* gains intensity, some process of identification between the devotee and reality is necessary. In other words, he takes this process of identification to be an inevitable prerequisite in the development of *bhakti*. It can therefore be presumed that the realisation of *prema* inextricably involves the experience of identification as well. It may be said that while the realisation of this shared identity, associated with the development of *rati*, was the identification of the devotee with reality manifested as pure Existence (*sanmātra Brahma*) so it is the case in the realisation

of *rasa*. There is one difference, however, in that in the latter case the devotee finds himself in perfect union with the Reality, manifested as pure Bliss. A confirmed monist like Madhusūdana could not have admitted to any other concept. One could take this identification with Bhagavat as a higher type of *sāyujya-mukti* than the *sāyujya* achieved previously when the devotee realised his/her identity with the Reality as pure Existence. That identification is the substance of such realisation of the climax of divine love, as borne out by another fact: Madhusūdana describes the climax of *prema* as marked by the most poignant intolerance of separation from the beloved. In other words, he takes it as the deepest intensity of the sentiment of love, dissolving into what may be described as the perfect union between the devotee and Bhagavat. Indeed, for Madhusūdana, intolerance of separation is a basic feature of love in all its manifestations, ranging from *rati*[613] to *rasa*.[614] Underlying all of these emotional stages of intense love, Madhusūdana's conception of *bhakti* as *rasa* presupposes a mystical identification of the devotee and *Bhagavat*. It may be noted here that intolerance (of separation) at its climax, disclosed at the final stage of *bhakti*, is also recognised as such by Jīva Gosvāmī. In his *Prīti sandarbha*, he called this state *mahābhāva*[615] – that is the climax of *bhāva* – a word which has its parallel in the word *rati* employed by Madhusūdana.

It is also interesting to observe that Madhusūdana, by recognising the identification of the devotee with Bhagavat, the Reality, pledges his allegiance to the literary theory of literary sentiment (*rasa*). This requires the identification of the enjoyer of *rasa* with the focus of the aesthetic sentiment (*nāyaka*) as a prerequisite for the revelation of aesthetic sentiment (*rasa*). Of course, in the case of the literary theory of the enjoyment of sentiment such identification is forged between the substratum (*āśraya*) of *rati* (for instance, *Rāma*) and the enjoyer (*pramātā*).[616] In the case of *bhakti-rasa*, however, the process of identification is intended to occur between the devotee, who enjoys, and the object of *rati* (*ālambana*). However, it may also mean that in the case of *bhakti-rasa* the substratum, of *rati*, and its object, are one and the same Reality: *Bhagavat*. In other words, *Bhagavat* is all-bliss, in that He Himself realises his own intrinsic sweetness and beauty. Here our author parts company of the Caitanya's theology by absolutely refusing to acknowledge any distinction (*bheda*) between God and His devotee.

In his conception of hierarchy in the stages of *bhakti* Madhusūdana relies mainly upon the authority of the *BhP*. It appears that the structure of his eleven stages of the development of *bhakti* (*bhakti bhūmikā*), is based on one verse of the *BhP*.[617] Here the *Bhāgavata* clearly states that in the company of the great, one can hear the praises of *Bhagavat*. These praises, once heard, lead to the unfolding of *śraddhā, rati* and *bhakti* in progressive order. Thus here we find the hierarchical order of (1) *sat prasaṅga*, which is equivalent to *mahatām sevā* of Madhusūdana; (2) *śraddhā*; (3) *rati*; and (4) *bhakti*, which Madhusūdana calls *premnaḥ parākāṣṭhā*. Elsewhere the *BhP* maintains[618] that divine grace is the prerequisite of *śraddhā* and the performance of *Bhagavaddharma*, consisting of

listening to the eulogy of *Bhagavat*, etc. Hence divine grace underlies all stages of devotion. Again, the *BhP* states that the performance of *paradharma* – that is, *Bhagavaddharma* – is the direct cause of *bhakti* – that is, *rati*.[619]

These *dharmas* consist in the ninefold devotion as described in the *BhP*.[620] Madhusūdana further maintains, on the basis of the *BhP*,[621] that divine grace is achieved by resorting to the great (*mahat*), who are compassionate by nature. The compassionate great, out of pity, shower grace on the devotee, which enables the devotee himself to obtain divine grace. We therefore come upon the following hierarchical stages that result in the advent of *rati*:

1. service to the great, which enables the devotee both to hear the praise of *Bhagavat* and to obtain divine grace;
2. divine grace;
3. *śraddhā* in *bhagavaddharma*;
4. actual performance of such *dharma*.

In this way, all preliminary *sādhana* stages, including *rati*, are found illustrated in the *BhP*. Madhusūdana, by drawing them together and by employing his syncretic genius, knits them into distinct stages whereby their internal hierarchy is brought into a perspective that is logical and clear. The stage after *rati* is described by the *BhP* in the verse 'Like a child who received a toy becomes engrossed in it being oblivious [of everything else] (*nyastakrīḍanako vālo jaḍavat tanmanastayā*' etc.[622] Madhusūdana takes this as the stage of *premadāḍhya*, where an ever-increasing intensity of love finds expression in the devotee's being totally unconscious of the external world. In between the stages of *rati* and *premadāḍhya* he places the stages of self-realisation, which are described in the *BhP*[623] as the spontaneous development of total detachment and the understanding (of the truth as against falsity, cf. Yogasūtra I.15 and II. 25), which comes after the dawning of the divine *bhakti*. Here also Madhusūdana exhibits his originality through his arrangement of the succession of stages after *rati*.

While describing the *rāsalīlā*, it is also stated by the *BhP* that the realisation of the all-pervading self as identical with the devotee leads to the heightening of love in the manifestation of *Bhagavat*.[624] But the illustration of the intense love of the *gopis* for *Bhagavat*, mentioned in this context,[625] is used by Madhusūdana to illustrate the climax of love, the final stage of the devotee.

After the manifestation of *Bhagavat* the votary becomes completely absorbed in *Bhagavat*. This condition is stated by the *BhP* while describing the condition of Ambarīṣa.[626] As a result of such total absorption in *Bhagavat* the majesty of *Bhagavat* becomes manifest in the votary. This state is also described by the *BhP* as more or less a by-product of the stage of total absorption.[627] Such absorption culminates in the climax of divine love, which is the goal of the votary.[628] Though Madhusūdana shows his dependency on the *BhP* for the condition of the votary in the last three stages, their order as a progression is his own innovation.

Rasa concept of *bhakti*

Madhusūdana accepts *prema-bhakti*, the climax of divine love, to be a *rasa*. Hence, to that extent, he has to accept the postulates of the literary theory of *rasa*. Following the tradition he has described the permanent mood (*sthāyī-bhāva*), *vibhāva, anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva* of the *bhakti-rasa*. Madhusūdana takes *Bhagavat-rati* as the *sthāyi-bhāva* of that *rasa*.[629] He further explains that the melting (*drūti*) of mind invests the mind with the capacity to receive a form, in this case the reflection of *Bhagavat*. Madhusūdana recognises the following psychological factors to be independent causes of such melting:[630] sexual love (*kāma*), wrath (*krodha*), fear (*bhaya*), affection (*sneha*), delight (*harṣa*), affliction (*śoka*), compassion (*dayā*) and total detachment arising from complete self-control, *Vaśīkārākhyā vairāgya*.[631] The mind, when influenced by these emotions, receives the form of the object that excites that emotion. In his conception of the agents of heating (*tāpaka*) that melt the mind Madhusūdana draws upon the *BhP*,[632] where the same factors are recognised as exciting devotion. These psychological factors regulate the nature of melting. The mind varies according to the variation of this melting. Such variation in the nature of the mind itself explains the qualitative variation in the reflection that *Bhagavat* makes upon it – that is, *bhakti* as *rati*.[633]

Thus, due to the variation in the nature of the mind, the receptacle of the reflection of *Bhagavat*, the quality of *bhakti* also differs in each case. Due to different causes of melting (*tāpaksa*), there are several types of melted mind, and the number of permanent moods (*sthāyi-bhava*) that develop into *rasa* vary according to the number of types of melted mind.[634]

1 Thus when love (*kāma*) consisting in desire for union melts the mind two types of *sthāyi-bhāva*, the *sambhoga-rati* and *vipralambha-rati*, arise according to whether the object of love is present or absent.
2 Wrath[635] generated from jealousy (*irṣya*) excites the mind. Such excitement may cause two types of melting, causing also two types of desire: the wish to destroy the object of such excitement and the wish to incur pleasure in an excited mind. In both cases the melting of the mind may receive the form of *Bhagavat*. In the first case the *sthāyi-bhāva* is known as animosity (*dveṣa*), while in the second it is known as *rati*, resulting in what the commentator points out as *vipralambha śṛṅgāra* of the *māna* (the lovers' tiff,) type.[636]
3 Fear (*bhaya*), marked by mental perplexity (*vaiklavya*), melts the mind; the *rati* in such a melted mind is known as timid love (*bhaya-rati*).[637]
4 Affection (*sneha*) can be of three kinds: when it concerns a son or daughter it is characterised by the nature of protector and the protected. The second type is marked by the nature of servant and the served. This nature can be indicated by servitude (*dāsya*) or by friendship (*sakhya*). The third variety of *sneha* is known as *miśra*, where both *dāsya* and *sakhya* exist in combination. The mind, melted by the emotion such as a protector felt for the protected

(*pālyapālaka*) develops an indulgent affection (*vatsala-rati*) concerning *Bhagavat*. Out of the affection between servant and the served (*sevya sevak-abhāva sneha*), *preyo-rati* arises. The *rati* arising in the mind, melted by *misra rati*, is known as *prīti-rati*.[638]

5 *Harṣa* is marked by exultation of the mind. It is of four kinds. The first kind consists in supreme bliss in the mind that produces the knowledge of the majesty of *Bhagavat*. The mind melted by such delight (*harṣa*) contains pure *rati* for *Bhagavat*. The second kind, is generated by unusual gestures and speech brought about by bashfulness (of a timid person in love). The mind melted by such exhibition of suppressed delight receives the *sthāyi-bhāva* known as *harṣa*.[639] Observing an extraordinary and magnificent object generates the third kind. Such delight melts the mind, enabling it to receive the *sthāyi-bhāva* known as *harṣa*. When the heroes are elated by victory they experience the fourth and last kind of delight. The mind, melted by such *harṣa*, receives the *sthāyi-bhāva* known as enthusiasm (*utsāha*).

6 When, due to the destruction of the beloved, the mind becomes full of sorrow, it melts the mind. The absence of delight in such melted mind is called affliction (*śoka*).[640]

7 Dayā means disgust (*ghṛṇa*), enhanced by the knowledge of the futility of the object of sensual knowledge. It arises when one sees some awful form of human sufferings. In the mind melted by such disgust three kinds of aversion (*jugupsā*) are generated: stressful (*udveginī*), agitating (*kṣobhinī*) and pure (*śuddhā*).

8 Madhusūdana mixes *dayā* with *harṣa* and thus reinterprets the three traditional concepts of *dāna-vīra rasa, dayā-vīra rasa* and *dharma-vīra rasa*. The mind melted by a sense of pity (*dayā*) and attended by enthusiasm of *harṣa*, receives the *sthāyi-bhāva, dayotsāha*. Again, the melted mind, prone to great generosity, receives the *sthāyi-bhāva*, that is, *dānotsāha*. When the mind melts by the noble desire to protect one's own religion, it receives the *sthāyi-bhāva* known as *dharmotsāha*.

9 Detachment (*vairāgya*), marked by lack of desire, melts the mind, and the *sthāyi-bhāva* existing in such mind is known as *śama*.

Madhusūdana makes a list of eighteen types of *sthāyi-bhāvas*, each emerging from an independent *tāpaka*. There are three more *sthāyi-bhāvas* caused by (most probably) a combination of two stimulants, such as delight and compassion. He classifies them in three groups: narrow (*saṃkīrṇa*), mixed (*miśrita*) and pure (*śuddha*).

> *Saṃkīrṇa*: Among the *sthāyi-bhāvas* mentioned above, only a limited number can concern *Bhagavat*. There are some others that cannot be developed into *bhakti rasa*. For even though some of them may concern *Bhagavat*, they do not arouse any pleasing sensation of desire. The rest do not concern *Bhagavat* at all. These last two types are call

saṃkīrṇa. Accordingly, ferocious (*raudra*), ferocious and frightening (*raudra-bhayānaka*), heroic and righteous (*dharma-vīra*), heroic and kind (*dayā-vīra*), loathsome (*vibhatsa*) and equanimity (*śānta*) are *saṃkīrṇa rasas*. Of these, the emotions *raudra* and *raudra-bhayanaka* are not pleasing, while the rest do not concern *Bhagavat* at all. Interestingly, Madhusūdana strongly disagrees with Abhinavagupta with regards to *śānta-rasa* and does not accept it as a *rasa*.

Miśrita: when more than one basic *bhāva*s combine as one *sthāyi-bhāva*, it is known as *miśrita* and the resulting *rasa* is also known as *miśrita*. Among the *miśrita sthāyi-bhāva*s Madhusūdana recognises seven which concern *Bhagavat* and develop into *bhakti-rasa*. These seven *bhakti- rasas* are classified as *kevala-miśra*. These are: erotic love (*śṛṅgāra*), compassion (*karuṇā*), esteem (*prīti*), fearful, (*bhayānaka*), fantastic (*adbhuta*) and heroic generosity (*dāna-vīra*). The remaining two *miśrita-rasa*s, comic (*hāsya*) and heroic (*vīra*), Madhusūdana does not recognise as *bhakti-rasas*, because their *sthāyi-bhāvas* cannot concern *Bhagavat*. When a *miśrita-rasa* concerns some other object, it is termed as *saṃkīrṇa-miśra*.

Śuddha: There are three *sthāyi-bhāvas* that concern *Bhagavat* only and so are known as *śuddha*. The *rasas* are called *viśuddha-bhaktirasas*. These are *śuddha-bhakti-rasa, preya-bhakti-rasa* and *vatsala-bhakti-rasa*.

Rati

Madhusūdana generally uses the term *rati* for the *sthāyī-bhāvas* that develop into *bhakti-rasa*. He thus underscores the two emotions love and desire as the basis of a permanent mood of mind that develops into *bhakti-rasa*. Therefore, grief (*śoka*), the permanent mood of sad or tragic (*karuṇa*)-*rasa*, is specifically mentioned as *arati*, or contradictory to *rati*. Wonderment (*vismaya*) and enthusiastic generosity (*dānotsāha*), the *sthāyī-bhāvas* of marvellous (*adbhuta-rasa*) and heroically generous (*dāna-vira-rasa*), respectively, are not mentioned as *rati the sthāyī-bhāva* of the *bhakti-rasa*. Madhusūdana lays down two conditions for the generation of *rati*: First, that the mind must be melted and second, that it must be free from the influence of *rajas* and *tamas*; only *sattva-guṇa* should occupy the mind.[641] *Raudra* and *raudra-bhayānaka rasa*s are not *bhakti-rasas*, because their basic *sthāyī-bhāvas* do not arise in a melted mind,[642] and also, because they remain under the influence of *rajas* and *tamas*. The *sthāyi-bhāvas śoka, vismaya* and *dānotsāha*, are not called *rati*, possibly because in those cases too the mind remains influenced by *rajo-guṇa* and *tamo-guṇa*. It follows that the *sthāyi-bhāvas* developing into *bhakti-rasa*, as described by Madhusūdana's scheme, must be *sāttvika* that is, possessing only *sattva-guṇa*. Madhusūdana defines *rati* as a mental state of affection and esteem (*prīti*) arising out of incessant thought of the object of love. It is a pleasurable sensation marked by intolerance of separation.[643] The predominance of *sattva-guṇa* places *rati* in a high position and the *bhakti-rasa*

developing from such *rati* is held to be higher than the *bhakti* sentiment where *rajas* and *tamas* are still present.[644]

Among all kinds of *bhakti-rasa, śṛṅgāra-bhakti-rasa* is held by Madhusūdana to be the best. Because the *sthāyī-bhāva* of this *rasa*, that is, *rati* is of great intensity and the pleasure derived is indeed the highest.[645] Madhusūdana classifies *rati* as of two kinds: pure, (*śuddha*) and mixed (*vyamiśrita*). *Śuddha rati* is the unqualified and totally selfless feeling of the devotee (*nirupādhika*) and it emerges from listening to the eulogies of *Bhagavat*. It dawns spontaneously in the mind and develops into *bhakti-rasa*, without being adulterated by any other *rasa*. The other type of *rati* is qualified by having some ulterior motive (*sopādhika*). It is of three kinds: *rati* generated by sexual love (*kāma*), *rati* generating from social relationship (*sambhandha*) and *rati* generated by fear (*bhaya*). When *bhakti* is mingled with the sentiment of love, it is *kāmaja* (borne of sexual desire). Both affectionate love (*vatsala*) and love marked by friendliness and eager helpfulness (*preyo-bhakti*)*-rasa*s are known as *sambhandaja* (borne of social relationship). *Prīti* and *bhayānaka-bhakti-rasas* are *bhayaja* (borne of respect and deferential fear). If all the four types of emotions, that is, *śuddha, kāmaja, sambhandaja* and *bhayaja*, combine in a *rasa*, it becomes extremely delightful.[646] Such *rasa* is present in the minds of Kṛṣṇa's lady companions at Vraja (*Vrajadevīs*). A votary aspiring to attain the highest kind of *bhakti-rasa* should try to imitate the minds of the *Vrajadevīs*.[647] In this way Madhusūdana explains the highest kind of *bhakti* and suggests the means (*sādhana*) for the attainment of such *bhakti*. The Bengal school of Vaisnavism calls this highest *bhakti* of the cowherdesses of Vraja (*Vrajagopis*), the *rāgātmikā-bhakti* and a devotee's imitation of their mental state undertaken in order to attain true *bhakti*, is called by them *Rāgānugā-bhakti*.[648]

It is clear that Madhasūdana's concept of *rati* is different from the literary concept of *rati*. The literary *rati* is the *sthāyī-bhāva* of *śṛṅgāra-rasa* only. But for Madhusūdana the *sthāyi-bhāvas* of even *bhayānaka, prīti* and *śuddha-bhakti-rasa* are *ratis*, when they concern *Bhagavat*. Again, Madhusūdana admits that with the exception of *raudra* and *raudra-bhayanaka-rasa*, the mind must melt in all other kinds of *rasa*. But according to the literary school[649] the mind melts only in the cases of *śṛṅgāra, karuṇa* and *śānta-rasa*, whereas in the cases of other *rasas* the mind becomes inspired (*dīpta*). The commentator[650] on the *Kāvya-prakāśa* states that *dīpta* consists of mind's expansion (*vistāra*) and exultation (*vikāśa*). In the cases of heroic (*vīra*), violent (*raudra*) and disgusting (*vibhatsa*)- *rasa*s, the mind only expands, while in the cases of comic (*hāsya*), fantastic (*adbhuta*) and fearsome (*bhayānaka*) the mind also exults. *Locana*, on the other hand, states that in addition to erotic love (*śṛṅgāra*), sad or tragic (*karuṇa*) and quiescent (*śānta*)-*rasas*, comic (*hāsya*), fearsome (*bhayānaka*) and disgusting (*vibhatsa*)*-rasas* may sometimes arise in a melted mind.[651] Madhusūdana admits the idea but only in case of those *sthāyi-bhāvas* known as *miśrita*.[652] Thus he accepts the view of the literary school in a limited way and reinterprets it in a new light. He must have been inspired by the famous Purāṇic characters, such as Prahlāda.

Rasa

Madhusūdana proceeds next to explain the nature (*svarūpa*) of *rasa*, its locus (*āśraya*), the cause of the manifestation of *rasa* and the nature of its manifestation. The permanent mood, in association with *vibhāva, anubhāva* and *vyabhicāri-bhāva*, becomes manifested as bliss and is termed *rasa*. *Rasa* is therefore bliss per se, and hence is *Bhagavat*. Scriptural sayings such as '*raso vai sa*' and '*ānanda Brahmeti vyanjānāt*',[653] confirm that bliss is *Bhagavat* Himself. Though, in this way, other *rasas* too, like the *bhakti-rasa*, have the same nature – that is, bliss, only in *bhakti-rasa* the reflection is of the pure *Bhagavat*, while in other *rasas Bhagavat* is reflected on the melted mind, as conditioned by some attributes such as being the beloved (*kānta*), etc.[654]

But how can *rasa*, which is all-pervasive *Bhagavat* Himself, have a locus, that is, the mental mode? The answer Madhusūdana gives is that the mind of the audience (*sāmājika*) is regarded as the container of *rasa* insofar as *rasa* is manifested as a reflection in their mental mode.[655] Madhusūdana then explains the causes of the manifestation of *rasa*.

The permanent moods belonging to characters such as Rāma, represented in works of literature, are known to be common (*laukika*). But when the audience listens to or visualises the external behaviour of these characters, it develops within itself, by virtue of intense contemplation of these characters, extraordinary moods corresponding to the ordinary moods of the characters themselves. The permanent moods in characters of literature introduce both the senses of joy and sorrow. The corresponding moods of the audience, however, are a perpetual source of happiness.[656] That is why even tragedy (*karuṇa*) can be a *rasa*, and is enjoyed as such by the audience.

The extraordinary permanent moods, such as *rati*, of the audience develop into *rasa* through the collective operation of *vibhāva, anubhāva* and *vyabhacāri-bhāva*.[657] *Vibhāva* is the direct cause of excitement of characters in literature. It is of two kinds: *ālambana* and *uddīpana*. In the case of ordinary *rasa*, for instance, *śṛṅgāra*, the *ālambana* is the prop of *rati*, while *uddīpana* is the objects like moon, the backdrop that prepares and excites the mind. In the case of *bhakti-rasa* the *ālambana vibhāva* is Kṛṣṇa while the leaf of tulsi, sandalpaste, etc., are *uddīpana vibhāvas*, inasmuch as they excite *rati*. *Anubhāva* is the external expression of the person in whom the permanent mood is excited. These expressions indicate the progressive development of the mood in the person concerned. In the case of *bhakti-rasa*, features such as the tears, and the choked and broken voice of the devotee, are all regarded as *anubhāvas*. *Vyabhicāri-bhāva* are the fluctuating moods that help in the further development of the permanent mood, for example, in the case of *bhakti-rasa*, the mood of detachment (*nirveda*) is regarded to be *vyabhicāri-bhāva*.[658] According to Madhusūdana, the worldly causes of feelings such as love, when presented through literature, assume the status of *sthāyī-bhāva*. But they are still to be regarded as ordinary. Distinguished from these elements of *vibhāva*, etc., are the corresponding elements also called

vibhāva, etc. of the enjoying public (*sāmājikas*). Unlike the ordinary ones, such *vibhāva*, etc. are deemed as impersonal and they help in the manifestation of *rasa*, which is enjoyed by the audience.[659] From the psychological point of view, an illuminating and pure (*sattva-guṇa pradhāna*) *vṛtti* is generated in the mind of the enjoyer. Such a mental mode (*vṛtti*) not only grasps the *sthāyī-bhava*, but also the three auxiliary *bhāvas*, all of which are consolidated (*samūhālabana*) in the same *vṛtti*.[660] Such *vṛtti* reveals at once ecstatic pleasure which is *rasa*. Madhusūdana points out in this context the views of his predecessors, who have taken the revealing *vṛtti* to be the *rasa*.[661]

A literary composition presents the merits (*guṇa*), figures of speech (*alaṃkāra*), style (*rīti*) and the *vibhāva*, etc., and through these factors manifests *rasa*, with the power of suggestion (*vyañjanā-vṛtti*) inherent in such composition. Though the knowledge of *rasa* is inspired by a literary composition, it is still a direct knowledge. The knowledge of self-revealing *rasa* is the revelation of the highest Reality in its undifferentiated, blissful nature.[662]

In conclusion, I again emphasise the following observations made throughout this work: The study of Madhusūdana reveals two distinct aspects of his personality. In one, Madhusūdana is the great scholar of the Advaita-vedānta, a vigorous dialectician, determined to shatter every attempt at minimising the tenets of the Advaita-vedānta. He was determined to not only to save Śaṃkara's non-dualistic vedānta but elevate it to a great philosophical system. In his other aspect, he reveals himself as a great devotee of Lord Kṛṣṇa and a mystic. Though a strict adherent of the Advaita-vedānta philosophy he repeatedly declared his total ecstatic devotion to and love for Kṛṣṇa, as for instance in the concluding verse of his commentary on the *BhG*, Madhusūdana admits that he does not know any higher Reality than Kṛṣṇa, who carries a flute in his hands, who is as dark as the (monsoon) rain-cloud, who wears yellow clothes and whose lips are as red as a ripe bimba fruit; whose face is as beautiful as the full moon and whose eyes are like lotus (petals):

> *vaṃśīvibhuṣitakarānnavanīradābhāt pītāmbarād-aruṇabimbaphalādharoṣṭhāt./ pūrṇendusundaramukhād aravindanetrāt Kṛṣṇāt paraṃ kimapi tatvamaham na jāne.//*[663]

So to gain a complete picture of Madhusūdana's achievement it is imperative to discuss both these aspects. He proves that monistic metaphysics and devotionalism go hand in hand in the search for perfection and unlimited bliss. In the introductory verses of his commentary on the *BhG*, Madhusūdana gives a full description of the nature of spiritual pursuit. In order to purify the mind the devotee should perform religious and social duties (*karma*) without any ulterior purpose. At the same time he must perform such activities as japa (repetition of the divine name or mantra) so that through constant meditation on the Divine and practice of devotion for the Supreme Being may stimulate his/her mind and brings about the dawning of real and spontaneous divine love in his/her mind. Thus purified, the mind acquires the discriminating knowledge of what is true and what is false

(*viveka buddhi*). Such knowledge leads to extreme detachment. Being desirous of liberation, the devotee takes refuge in a guru who teaches him true knowledge. He gains thereby the knowledge of falsity of empirical knowledge, which is the first step towards the achievement of unlimited bliss. The devotee realises for the first time that the worries, privations, woes and afflictions of this life are but illusions and the cause of this illusion is the beginningless false knowledge (*avidyā*). Once this knowledge settles in the mind, he enquires as to the process by which this false universe has been generated. How to account for the entire creation? This leads to the discussion of the genesis of the universe in its different phases. Next, there comes the enquiry about *Brahman*, the only truth that endures throughout eternity. The knowledge of *Brahman*, devoid of all duality, is the primary requisite for the ultimate knowledge of the identification between the devotee, that is *jīva*, and *Brahman*. The knowledge of *Brahman* enables the devotee to know the real nature of his own self, that is, the real self of *jīva*, and the explanation for *jīva*'s outward expression. When the devotee knows the real nature of *Brahman*, as well as his own real self as identical with *Brahman*, ultimate bliss dawns in the mind of the devotee. These constitute the preliminary stages of devotion. The next stage is the true pursuit of the devotee for the attainment of unlimited ecstatic love for the Supreme Being, which is bliss in itself. Here, there is no need for the knowledge of identity or the knowledge of anything else. The field of love for the Supreme Being excels the field of pure knowledge, because pure knowledge merges the pursuer into the Truth, the Knowledge and the Bliss, whereas divine love transports the devotee in the realm of ecstatic enjoyment of that love. To underscore his point Madhusūdana concludes his commentary on *BhG* IX with the following verse:

> *śrī Govinda-padārabindamakarandāsvādaśuddhāśayāḥ saṃsārāmbud-himuttaranti sahasā paśyanti pūrṇaṃ mahaḥ.| vedāntairavadhāyanti paramaṃ śreyas-tyajanti bhramaṃ dvaitaṃ svapnasamaṃ vidanti vimalām vidantic-ānandatām.||*

In this verse he acknowledges that the devotees who have tasted the nectar of their love for Govinda acquire pure minds. They easily get across the ocean of transient existence and fortuitously perceive the supreme Plenum and Joy. By understanding the Upaniṣadic statements they realise their supreme goal. [At the same time] they remove their wrong perception of the world of duality and regard their [empirical experiences] as dreams. They realise that their experience of [divine love] is pure Bliss.

Without making any qualitative distinction between the philosophy of Advaita-vedānta and the theology of pure love for *Bhagavat*, the Supreme Being, he simply makes a synthesis between the two without losing sight of the concept of the non-dual Reality. His originality is most advantageously expressed in his exposition of the *BhG*. In his commentary on the final verse he contradicts Śaṃkara by taking the term *dharma* to mean social duties. Śaṃkara took the term to mean karma in general, and explained that it means total renunciation of all

actions whether social or religious. But Madhusūdana does not agree with Śaṃkara because he is not going to leave out his spontaneous acts of devotion. That is why, in spite of being a great non-dualist Vedāntin, Madhusūdana admits the paradox of his personality:

> *kurvanti ke'pi kṛtinaḥ kvacidapyanante svāntam vidhāya viṣayāntaraśāntimeva./ tvat pādapadma-vigalanmakarandabindumāsvādya mādyanti muhurmadhubhinmanome.//*[664]

Some successful persons (i.e. yogīs) may have extinguished their mind's craving for other objects by fixing (their mind) on some eternal Reality. Oh Destroyer of Madhu![665] My mind constantly tasting the nectar dripping from your lotus feet, keep on acting like a drunk.

Yogic instacy is not enough for Madhsūdana, he rejoices in the ecstasy of his love for Krṣṇa.

GLOSSARY

abhāva Absence, non-existence.

abhihitānvaya-vāda The theory of verbal knowledge where the sentence when uttered presents first the primary sense of the words and then their grammatical interrelations.

adhiṣṭhāna Locus.

adhyāsa Superimposition. One object appears another like a piece of rope appearing like a snake.

adṛṣṭa The previous action (*karma*) causing the production of an object.

ahamartha; ahaṃkāra Ego which is an ontological category.

akhaṇḍākāra Undifferentiated and integral.

anirvacanīya Undefinable.

antaḥkaraṇa Mind, inner sense organ.

anubhāva Physical reaction of a mood.

anuvyavasaya In the epistemology of the Nyāya system complete cognition has two parts. The first part is called vyavasāya where the knower has sense-contact with an object. In the second part, which immediately follows the first part, the subject also appears in the cognition. This is called anuvyavasāya. For instance, vyavasāya part of seeing a water jug presents 'something the eyes are contacting'; the second part presents the cognition as 'I am seeing a water jug.'

anvitābhidhāna-vāda The theory of verbal knowledge in which a sentence when uttered presents the meanings of not only the words in it but also their grammatical interrelations.

anyonyābhāva Mutual absence that means A is not B.

apūrva Result produced by the performance of Vedic rituals (*karma*) – a Mīmāṃsā term. Vedānta calls it *karma-phala*; Vaiśeṣika calls it *adṛṣṭa*; Nyāya calls it *dharma* and *adharma*.

asanga Unrelated.

asat Non-existent, unreal.

āśraya, adhiṣṭhāna Container, substratum, locus.

avaccheda Delimitation.

avāntara Relative.

avidyā; ajñāna; māyā; bhrama Illusion; false knowledge; mistaken appearance.
bhāva Mental mood.
bimba-pratibimba-vāda The theory of identity between the reflection and the object reflected.
citta-vṛtti Cognitive mode of mind.
dṛk Subject of comprehension.
dṛśya Object of comprehension.
jaḍa Insensate.
jīva Person, individual.
jñāna Knowledge; experience.
kartā Agent.
kartṛtva Agency.
mithyā False, mistaken cognition.
nirvikalpa Indeterminate, non-conceptual.
pariṇāma Evolution.
pramā-jñāna Valid knowledge.
pramāṇa Means of valid knowledge. Advaita-vedānta accept six *pramāṇas*: direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*); inference (*anumāna*); scripture (*śabda*); analogy (*upamāna*); presumption, or, deduction from circumstantial evidence (*arthāpatti*) and lack of experience (*anupalabdhi*).
prameya The content of valid knowledge.
pramiti The process of valid knowledge.
prārabdha karma Karma, accumulated in previous lives of a person that has already started to produce result.
pratiyogī Positive counterpart of a negation.
rati Sexual love.
Sādhya Inferable entity.
Sākṣī The omniscient pure consciousness.
sat Existent, real.
savikalpa Determinate, conceptual.
sthāyī bhāva Abiding or permanent mood.
upādhi Limiting adjunct, temporary limitation.
upajīvya Dependant.
upalakṣaṇā Secondary, remote or modified sense of a word.
uparāga Connection.
vibhāva Stimulants for mental mood.
vivarta Illusory transformation.
vṛtti Mode; for example, a mental mode.
vṛtti-jñāna Cognitive knowledge; cognition.
vyabhicāri bhāva Discordant moods.

NOTES

1 INTRODUCTION

1 Gangeśopādhyāya belonged to the thirteenth C.E. His great work the *Tattva-citāmaṇi* started a new era for the classical Indian logicians. Daniel H.H. Ingalls, Materials For The Study Of Navya-nyāya Logic, pp. 1–5ff.
2 S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy; Volume II; pp. 116–227.
3 *AdS*, pp. 435–6. Madhusūdana here explains *Brahma-sūtra* 2.2.28–9 in a new light.
4 *AdS*, p. 846.
5 *AdS*, p. 467; *SB*, pp. 113–15; *Gaekwads Oriental Series*.
6 *AdS*, pp. 486–7.
7 *AdS*, p. 577.
8 *SB*, pp. 9–14.
9 Eliot Deutsch and J.A.B. van Buitenen, pp. 242ff; 252ff.
10 See, *Kāśyapa Vaṃśa-bhāskara*. Ed. by Sītānāth Siddhāntavāgīśa; *Introduction* (Beangali), by Rajendranath Ghosh. Ed. *Advaita-siddhi*, part I. 1931, pp. 84–201; James Benson, *Śaṃkara Bhaṭṭa's Family Chronicle: The Gādhivaṃśavarṇana* , paper in *The Pandit: Traditional Scholarship in India*, ed. Axel Michaels, Festschrift Parameswara Aithal, South Asian Studies No. XXXVIII, South Asia Institute, New Delhi Branch Heidelberg University.
11 *AdRR*, p. 44. (Nirnayasagar edision); and *GGD*, on *BhG*.6.33–4.
12 See preface to *Advaita-siddhi*., ed. Mm. Yogendra Nāth Tarka Sāṃkhya Vedānta-Tīrtha, and 'Introduction to SB' by P.C. Divanji, *Gaekwad's Oriental Series*, Vol. LXIV.
13 *Advaita-siddhi*, Part I, Ed. Yogendra Nāth Tarka Sāṃkhya VedāntaTīrtha, p. 115.
14 *Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. VII, p. 177.
15 *Introduction to Vedānta-kalpa-latikā*, Sarasvati Bhavana text no. 3 (1920).
16 Introduction, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Vol. LXIV.
17 *Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. VII, p. 177.
18 Preface, *Advaita-siddhi*, Part I. Ed. Yogendra Nath Tarkatirtha, p. 91.
19 *Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. VII, p. 178. See also Benson.
20 *Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. VII, p. 178.
21 *SB*, p. 38.
22 *AdS*, Nirnayasagar edition, p. 423.
23 *I.H.Q.*, Vol. XIII, 1937, p. 31.
24 *I.H.Q.*, Vol. XIII, 1937, p. 31.
25 *I.H.Q.*, Vol. XIII, 1937, p. 31.
26 See Benson.
27 *I.H.Q.*, Vol. XIII, 1937, p. 31.

28 *Ind. Ant*., 1912, p. 9.
29 *Introduction to VKL*, Sarasvati Bhavan Text, No. 3. Cf. Benson.
30 *SB*, pp. 117–8. See below.
31 *Vedānta darśan*: *Advaita-vāda*, p. 442.
32 See Chap. 5.
33 See Chap. 8.
34 *Bānglā Sāhityer itihāsa*, Vol. I, by Sukumar Sen, p. 166.
35 See Chap. 8.
36 It may be noted here that Dinesh Ch. Sen mentioned that Jīva Gosvāmī went to Varanasi and became a disciple of Madhusūdana Vācaspati. This Vācaspati title may be a mistake for Sarasvatī as Jīva desired to learn Advaita-Vedānta from his preceptor. Hence Jīva Gosvāmī may be regarded as a junior contemporary of Madhusūdana. However, this conclusion is based on no real evidence (*Bṛhat Banga*, p. 744).
37 Preface to *Advaita-siddhi*. Ed. By Mm. Yogendranāth Tarka Sāṃkhya-Vedānta-Tīrtha, p. 94.
38 Ibid., p. 93. See also the preface to *VKL*, Sarasvati Bhavana Texts, No. 3.
39 *Introduction to SB* by P.C. Divanji, *Gaekwad's Oriental Series*, Vol. LXIV, p. XXI.
40 *C.C*, Part I, p. 427.
41 This is a mistaken form of *Advaita-siddhi*.
42 *Vedānta-darśaner-itihāsa*, Part III, p. 763.
43 *AdS*, p. 8. Nirnayasagar ed.
44 Ibid., p. 8.
45 *VKL*, p. 93.
46 *AdS*, p. 678. Nirnayasagar ed.
47 *VKL*, p. 93.
48 *AdRR*, pp. 9, 24, 26, 28, 37 and 44. Nirnayasagar ed.
49 Ibid., p. 44.
50 *Gaekwads Oriental Series*, Vol. No. LXIV, Part 1. Sans Sec.
51 Ibid., p. 83. Sans Sec.
52 *AdRR*., p. 46.
53 *VKL*, p. 87.
54 *AdS*, p. 490.
55 *SSSS*, Ch. I, p. 1. Kasi Sans Series, Vol. 18.
56 *AdS*, p. 8.
57 *SSSS*, Ch. I, p. 398.
58 *AdRR*, p. 46.
59 *SSSS*, Ch. II, p. 144, Ch. III, p. 352, Ch. IV, p. 392.
60 *GGD*, pp. 282, 1251, etc.
61 *SSSS*, Ch. I, p. 498, Ch. II, p. 144, Ch. III, p. 352 and Ch. IV, p. 392.
62 *AdRR*, p. 46.
63 *GGD*, p. 1251.
64 *AdS*, p. 8.
65 *GGD*, p. 118.
66 *AdS*, p. 750.
67 *BhR*, p. 52.
68 Ibid., p. 48.
69 *GGD*, p. 1239. Ch. XVIII, 66.
70 *BPPS*, V, p. 31, Vol. I. Ed. Nityasvarup.
71 The discussion on the Pāñcarātra at the end of this work is interesting in that it contradicts Śaṣkara's explanation of the *Vyūha* theory and gives his own.
72 *HLV*, p. 10.
73 Translation *of Siddhānta-bindu*, p. 37.

74 *SB*. preface, Government Oriental Series, Class A, No. 2, p. 27.
75 *MST*, p. 20.
76 Ibid., p. 81.
77 *MST*, p. 76.
78 Translation of *SB*, p. 46.
79 *Gaekwad's Oriental Series*, Vol. LXIV, p. XII.
80 *IPP*, pp. 7–10.
81 *Kāvyamālā*, Part II, p. 154.
82 Ibid.
83 *MST*, p. 45.
84 Ibid., p. 72.
85 The polemical style of philosophical works was already fixed by the Logicians (Naiyāyikas). Vyāṣatīrtha's predecessor Jayatīrtha followed the style in his *Vādāvalī* where he refuted Śaṃkara's Advaita-Vedānta. *Vādāvalī By Jayatīrtha: a criticism from Dvaita standpoint of the doctrine of theillusoriness of the universe. (mithyātva-khaṇḍana)*, Ed. and Tr. P. Nagaraja Rao, M.A. Adyar Library Series No. 40 Adyar 1943.
86 Vyāsatīrtha, *Nyāyāmṛta*, editor's Introduction, passim. Dasgupta, opus citum pp. 118–25; 373–92.
87 *AdS*, p. 8.
88 Cf. *AdS*, pp. 577, 583 and 585.
89 Ibid., p. 664.
90 Madhusūdana declared in the fourth verse after the three benedictory verses at the beginning of the *Advaita-siddhi* that the purpose of his writing this work was 'to refute (the arguments) of the opponents of the theory of non-dualism' (*vādivijayāya*); See Dasgupta Opus citum pp. 225–7.

2 *AVIDYĀ*

91 'That from which these beings are born; on which, once born, they live; and into which they pass upon death – seek to perceive that! That is *brahman*!' (*Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante . . .*); *TaiU*, 3.I.
92 The word *śruti* here specifically refers mainly, to the *Upaniṣadic* statements, though occasionally it includes other *Vedic* statements.
93 For details, vide Ch. 6.
94 *AdS*, p. 544 (Nirnayasagar edition), *anādi bhāvarūpatve sati jñānanivartyattvam*).
95 Every knowledge or cognition is a fresh one and must not be known to the knower just before it arises. Otherwise, it cannot be taken as a knowledge. It is just a form of recognition.
96 *AdS*, p. 544.
97 Madhusūdana discusses this point elaborately in his *Advaita-siddhi*, while putting forward the topic of cognisability (*dṛśyatva*), of all empirical objects as evidence proving their falsity. *AdS*, pp. 233–94. See next chapter.
98 *AdS*, (*vṛttivyāpya*) pp. 261–3.
99 For further details, vide Ch. 6.
100 Ibid.
101 According to Purāṇic legend the son of the Asura Vipracitti cheated Viṣṇu while the latter was distributing the divine *amṛta* to the gods only and not to the Asuras, by sitting with the gods. The Sun-god and the Moon-god detected him and informed Viṣṇu who beheaded the Asura. But having consumed *amṛta* he could not be killed but lived on. As the head he is called Rāhu and as the body he is called Ketu and are counted amongst the sacred nine planets (*graha*). The Asura is invisible until Rāhu tries to

devour the two informers, the Sun and the Moon. When this happens we see their eclipse and the dark body of Rāhu covering the luminaries. *ViṣṇuP*, 1, 90, 80–111.

102 (a) '*Ahamajño māmanyam ca na jānāmi*.'
(b) '*Tvaduktamartham na jānāmi*.'
103 '*Etāvantam kālam sukhamahamasvāpsam na kiñcidavediṣam*.'
104 *AdS*, p. 548.
105 *AdS*, p. 548.
106 For detailed treatment on the subject, vide *Ch. 3*.
107 For details, vide Ch. 5.
108 See Ch. 5, Brahman is the undifferentiated and unlimited consciousness. The three other categories of conscious entities are *sākṣin*, *Īśvara* (God) and *jīva* (individual self). While the latter two possess cosmic and individual agency, the first one is there just to ensures that every phenomenon is revealed to the consciousness irrespective of being content of any pragmatic knowledge.
109 According to the Naiyāyikas there are three categories of absence (*abhāva*) viz. *prāgabhāva*, *dhaṃśābhāva* and *sāmānyābhāva*. The first means absence of an entity just prior to its coming to existence. The second means absence of an entity when it has been destroyed. The third means total non-existence of an entity. The positive aspect of an object when its absence is stated is known as *pratiyogin*.
110 *AdS*, p. 552.
111 *AdS*, p. 553.
112 See Mm. Jogendra Nath Bagchi, *Advaitavāde avidyā*. Passim.
113 *AdS*, p. 557.
114 According to Advaita-vedānta, there are six means of valid knowledge the last of which is lack of experience (*anupalabdhi*) which conveys to a person that there is an absence of an object. See Appaya Dīkṣita.
115 *AdS*, p. 557.
116 *AdS*, pp. 558–9.
117 *AdS*, p. 557.
118 *AdS*, p. 558.
119 *AdS*, p. 558.
120 *AdS*, p. 558.
121 Sureśvara, 1.4.300–01, on BṛĀU, 1.4.7.
122 *AdS*, p. 562.
123 *AdS*, p. 566.
124 *AdS*, p. 567.
125 *AdS*, p. 570. *ChU*, VIII.3.2.
126 *KaṭhaU*., I.3.1.
127 '*Bhūyaścānte viśva māyā nivṛtti*.' *ŚveU* I.10.
128 In addition to the three universally accepted *pramāṇa*, (means of achieving a valid knowledge), viz. perception or direct experience, inference and the *śruti* (verbal authority), Advaita-vedānta accepts three more means of valid knowledge, viz., experience based on analogy, inference from circumstance and non-apprehension. However, the fourth and the last are not relevant in that *avidyā/ajñāna* is unique and absent only at the moment of the realisation of Brahman. See Dharmarājādhvarīndra, *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* ch.1.
129 *AdS*, p. 573.
130 *AdS*, p. 575.
131 *AdS*, p. 577. cf. '*āśrayatva-viṣayatva-bhāginī nirbibhaga-citireva kevalā*'.(The indivisible consciousness alone is both the locus and object of *avidyā*); *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka* 1.319.
132 *AdS*, p. 577. See Ch. 5.
133 *AdS*, p. 577.

134 Ibid., p. 578.
135 *AdS*, p. 585. cf. *Kalpataru*, pp. 2–3 and pp. 126–7, *Brahma-sūtra*: Nirnayasagar.
136 *AdS*, p. 585.
137 *AdS*, p. 587.
138 In the Advaita-vedānta philosophy following six categories are accepted as having no beginning: *jīva*, *Īśa*, pure consciousness, the difference between *jīva* and *Īśa*, *avidyā* and its (false) connection with the consciousness.
139 *AdS*, p. 586.
140 *AdS*, p. 587.
141 *AdS*, pp. 48–51.
142 *AdS*, p. 94.
143 Ibid., pp. 98–100.
144 *BṛU*. 4.IV.19. 'there is here nothing diverse at all'.
145 *AdS*, p. 96.
146 *AdS*, p. 121.
147 *Ad.S*, p. 123.
148 *Ad.S*, pp. 123–4.
149 *AdS*, pp. 139–40.
150 *AdS*, p. 160.
151 Each experience lasts only for a moment.
152 *AdS*, p. 162.
153 *AdS*, pp. 166–8.
154 Ibid., p. 171.
155 *AdS*, p. 178.
156 Ibid., p. 168.
157 *AdS*, pp. 182–3.
158 *AdS*, p. 186.
159 *AdS*, pp. 115–8. (*Sadviviktatvam vā mithyātvam; pramā-jñāna viṣayatvam; avā dhitaviṣayatvam pramātvam*).
160 *AdS*, pp. 239–41.
161 'Undifferentiated cognitive mode', According to the Advaita-vedanta epistemology, verbal exerience produced by meditating on *śrutis* like *ta*t *tvam asi*, produce an undifferentiated experience of Brahman. See, Chs 3, 4 and 5.
162 *AdS*, p. 249.
163 *Ad*S, p. 259. *Kalpataru* is a famous commentary by Amalānanda Saraṣvatī on Vācaspati Miśra's commentary, *Bhamatī*. *Bhāmatī* is a commentary on Śaṃkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*. Cf. S.N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, part II (1965), pp. 51–3.
164 *AdS*, pp. 261–4.
165 *AdS*, p. 268.
166 *AdS*, p. 269.
167 *AdS*, p. 273.
168 *AdS*, p. 276.
169 *AdS*, pp. 295–7, 305.
170 *AdS*, p. 322.
171 The Indian system of making a syllogistic formula for inferential evidence is complex. See S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, pp.188–202.
172 *AdS*, p. 657.
173 *AdS*, p. 658.
174 This view is known as *anyathākhyātivāda*, vide *Bhāmatī* on *Adhyāsa* section of Śaṃkara's commentary on the first aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra*. Also, see S. Kuppuswami Sastri, (3rd edition), 1961, pp. 121–7.
175 *AdS*, p. 647.

176 *AdS*, p. 648.
177 *AdS*, p. 648.
178 *AdS*, p. 648.
179 *AdS*, p. 648.
180 *AdS*, p. 652.
181 *AdS*, p. 653.
182 *AdS*, p. 653.
183 Whatever may be the mode of revealing agent, mind or avidyā, the revelation is always consciousness reflecting on that mode. This consciousness is called sākṣin and this consciousness is in fact totally identified with the individual cogniser.
184 *AdS*, pp. 653–4.
185 For a thorough discussion of the process of direct perception cf. the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* Ch I and Bina Gupta's *Perceiving in Advaita Vedānt: Epistemological Analysis and Interpretation*, pp. 34–91 and pp. 201–50 (Indian edition 1995).

3 KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

186 (a) *Satyam jñānamanantam Brahma*, *TaiU*, 2.1.1.
(b) '*Tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvam tasya bhāsā sarvamidamvibhāti.*' *Kau.U*, 2.5.15.
187 *AdS*, p. 577.
188 See *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, Ch. 1. Cf. Bina Gupta, pp. 225–31.
189 *SB*, on verse 8 of Śaṃkara's *Daśaślokī*. (p. 198. *SB*, Advaita Manjari series).
190 *BṛĀU*, 2, 3, 5. tr. Patrick Olivelle.
191 *SB*, on Śaṃkara's *Daśaślokī*, verse 8, See also Brahmānanda's commentary thereon.
192 Cf. *GGD*, on *BhG* VI, 2, (p. 492).
193 See notes 53 and 109.
194 *SB*, (p. 193). '*Smṛti saṃśaya viparyayānām sākṣi-caitanyāśrayatvaniyamāt.*'
195 GGD, (p. 492). '*Pramāṇaviparyaya vikalpanidrāsmṛtayaḥ iti vṛttayaḥ pañcavidhaḥ.*'
196 *SB* on the verse 8 of Śaṃkara's *Daśaślokī*.
This means that only the object that has contact with sense organs can be perceived by *vṛtti*. See Bina Gupta, pp. 201–24.
197 Here *ahaṃkāra* means merely a part of the mind, explained in the *Vedānta paribhāṣā* as *garva*.
198 *SB* on *Daśaślokī*.
199 *AdS*, p. 577.
200 Ibid., p. 384. '*Prakāśakam tāvat adhiṣṭhānacideva.*' cf. 'Him alone, as he shines, do all things reflect; this whole world radiates with his light'; *MuṇḍakaU* II.2.10.
201 *AdS*, pp. 481 and 483; and Gauda Brahmānnada's commentary thereon.
202 Brahmānanda's commentary on *AdS*, p. 183. '*sākṣī cit prakāśikā.*'
203 *AdS*, p. 478.
204 *AdS*, p. 483. Brahmānanda's commentary.
205 See Brahmānanda's commentary on *AdS*, p. 479.
206 *AdS*, p. 479.
207 *AdS*, p. 479.
208 *SB*, op.cit. *AdS*, p. 479.
209 Madhusūdana draws upon the view of Sarvajñātma Muni who holds that both the support and object of ignorance is consciousness alone. Madhusūdana himself cherished the same view. Cf. '*āśrayatva -viṣayatva-bhāginī nirvibhāga-citireva kevalā*", *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka*, I, 319.
210 *AdS*, pp. 486–7.

211 *SB*, p. 144.
212 Brahmānanda's commentary on *AdS*, p. 487.
213 Ibid., p. 487.
214 Ibid., p. 487.
215 *SB*, on *Daśaślokī* and *AdS*, p. 490.
216 *AdS*, p. 430.
NB: The object-consciousness is always *sākṣī* and its revelation, the *sākṣī-jñāna*.
217 *SB*, pp. 147–8.
218 *SB*, pp. 137–8. See also Brahmānanda's commentary thereon.
219 Brahmānand'a commentary on *AdS*, p. 479.
220 *VKL*, pp. 77–8.
221 *ChāU*, 6.16.3; Ibid., 7.26.2; *MuṇḍU*, 3.2.6.
222 *AdS*, p. 875.
223 *Aparyāya śabdānām saṃsargāgocara pramiti-janakatvam akhaṇḍārthatā/ Saṃsargāsangī samyagdhihetutā yā girāmiyam/saivākhaṇḍārthatā, yadvā tat prātipadikārthatā//*, p. 109. *Tattvapradīpikā*. Nirnayasagar edition.
224 The *Sūtra* of *Pāṇini*, namely '*prātipadikārtha linga parimāṇavacanamātra*' states that the stem '*ghaṭa*' does not refer to any relationship of the pitcher with any object or suffix. Likewise, the meaning of the word 'Brahman' in '*aham Brahmāsmi*' only expresses the meaning to which the stem 'Brahma' refers, namely pure Brahman.
225 *AdS*, p. 664.
226 *AdS*, p.673
227 Vide Brahmānanda's commentary on *AdS* p.673.
228 Ibid.
229 *AdS*, p. 673.
230 Vide Brahmānanda's commentary on AdS, p. 674. '*śaktilakṣaṇānyatararūpā lakṣaṇārūpā vā yā ekā nāmnorvṛttiḥ, tajjñānajanya smṛtiviṣayāny-āviṣayaka pramā janakatvameva lakṣaṇam*.'
231 *TaiU*, 2.1.1.
232 Brahmānanda's commentary, on *AdS*, p. 662.
233 Ibid., p. 662.
234 *AdS*, p. 675. '*Akāryakāraṇadravyamātraniṣṭhatve sati samānādhikaraṇatvāt*.'
235 Ibid., p. 689.
236 Ibid., p. 691.
237 '*Tātparyāviṣayānvayānubhavakatvamev ākāṃkṣā vācyā*.' *AdS*, p. 689.
238 '*Āsattirapi avyavadhānena śābdabodhānukūlapadārthopasthiti mātram*.' *AdS*, p. 689.
239 *AdS*, p. 691.
240 See below. Cf., Bina Gupta, pp. 66–72 and 167–200.
241 Vide, Brahmānanda's commentary on *AdS*, p. 296.
242 *AdS*, pp. 771–2.
243 Ibid., p. 772.
244 Ibid., p. 774.
245 Ibid., p. 773.
246 Ibid., p. 770.
247 Cf. Kuppuswami Sastri op. Cit.
248 *AdS,* p. 774.
249 *AdRR*, p. 34.
250 *AdRR*, p. 35.
251 Ibid., p. 33.
252 Ibid.
253 Ibid.

4 BRAHMAN

255 Vide Vyāsarāja, *Nyāyāmṛtam*, ch 2. It should be remembered that for the Vaiṣṇavas Brahman and Viṣṇu/Nārāyaṇa are the same divinity.
256 *Advitīyaparamānanda bodharūpaṃ ca Brahmeti siddham*, *SB*, on Daśaślokī 4. p. 155.
257 *AdS*, p. 739.
258 *Śve*, 6.XI. '(Brahman is) omniscient consciousness – unique and unqualified.'
259 *BṛĀU*, I.4.7. 'One should meditate upon the self alone.'
260 For example, '*sākṣī cetā kevalonirguıaśca*.'
261 *ChāU*, 8.I.5. 'That is the self free from evils . . . .the self whose desires and intentions become real that's what you should try to discover, that's what you should seek to perceive.' Ollivelle.
262 One hears about his highest and truly diverse power, which is part of his very nature and is working of his knowledge and strength'.(*Parāsya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca*). *ŚveU*, 6.VIII.
263 '*Tat tvam asi*', *ChāU*. 6, VIII.7.
264 '*Neha nānāsti kiñcana*', *Br*. 4, IV.19. 'There is no plurality in this world.'
265 *Taittirīya*, 2.VII.1 and *Mundaka*, 3.X.1.
266 *BṛĀU*, 4.IV.19.
267 '*Ityayamtadbrahmātmikā? saccidānandākhya ityupāsītavya*'. *RāmottaratāpanīoU*, Anandasram series No. 29, p. 532.
268 *Bhāmatī*, on *BrS*, 1.I.20.
269 Kalpataru on BrS, 1.I. 20.

nirviśeṣaṃ paraṃ Brahma
sākṣātkartumanīśvarāḥ|
ye mandāste 'nukampyante
saviśeṣa nirūpaṇaih||
vaśīkṛte manasyeyam
saguṇa Brahmasīlanāt|
tadevāvirbhavet sākṣāt
apetopādhi kalpanam'||

270 *ChaU*, 6.2.1.
271 *TaiU*, 2.7.1.
272 *AdS*, p. 720. Madhusūdana holds that the *śrutis* depicting unqualified Brahman are especially privileged to serve a distinct purpose, that is, the attainment of salvation, the highest goal of human life. They are therefore to be regarded as authoritative. On the other hand, *śrutis*, describing qualified Brahman do not serve such a purpose. Hence they should be regarded as auxiliary to the former type of *śrutis*.
273 *ChāU*, 3.XIX.1.
274 *MuṇḍakaU*, 2.II.11.
275 *ChāU*, 6.VIII.7.
276 *BṛĀU*, 1.IV.10.
277 *AdS*, p. 726.
278 *ChāU*., 3.XIV.1.
279 *ŚveU*, 6.11.
280 *MuṇḍakaU*, 1.I.9,
281 *AdS*, p. 721. The *śrutis* describing unqualified Brahman are called *nirguṇa śruti*. Those describing qualified Brahman are *saguṇa śrutis*.
282 '*ātmetyeva upāsīta'*, *BṛU*, 1.IV.7,
283 See above.
284 *AdS*, p. 731.
285 Ibid., p. 738.

286 '*Āditya varṇam tamasaḥ parastāt*', *ŚveU*, I.3.VIII. Also cf. the *Puruṣa sūkta*., RV, X. 90.
287 '*ya eṣo'ntarāditye hiraṇmayaḥ puruṣo dṛśyate*.' *ChāU*, I.6.6.
288 See Ch. 5.
289 '*Vivartādhiṣṭhānatayopādānatvasambhavāt*', *AdS*, p. 757. See also, '*Ekasya eva avidyopahitatvenopādānatvasyāvidyāpariṇāmechākṛtādyāśrayatvena nimittasyāpi sambhavāt*.' *AdS*, p. 759.
290 '*Ātmani kāryajanihetutvasyaiva upādāna lakṣaṇatvāt*', *AdS*, p. 757.
291 *MuU*, 1.I.9.
292 '*Kāryānukulajñānavattvam*', *Laghucandrika* on *AdS*, p. 759.
293 *MuU*, 1.I.9.
294 *SB*, p. 44. '*Māyayā ca sarvajñatvādiviśiṣṭam jagadupādānam nimittam ca*.'
295 *Bhāmatī* on *Śaṃkara bhāṣya* in *BrS*, 1.1.1.
296 '*Sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaśca*,' *ŚveU*, 6. XI. '*Ánando Brahmeti vyājānāt*.' *TaiU*, 3.VI.
297 '*Arthaprakāśatva*.' *AdS*, p. 750.
298 *Laghucandrikā* and *AdS*, p. 750
299 See the chapter on knowledge and epistemology.
300 '*Nirupādhikeṣṭatva rūpatvāt*.' *AdS*, p. 751. '. . . because Brahman is unconditionally desired.'
301 *Langhucandrikā* on *AdS*, p. 751.
302 (a) *Satyam-jñānam-anantam Brahma*, *TaiU*, 2.I.1.
(b) '*Ānanda Brahmeti vyājānāt*.' *TaiU*, 3, VI.
(c) '*Vijñānam-ānandam Brahma*.' *BrĀU*., 3.IX.28.9.
303 *AdS*, p. 751.
304 *AdS*, p. 752.
305 It is remarkable how Madhusūdana explains bliss in clear terms of bhakti. He even uses the term prema to explain the Advaita idea of liberation and bliss.
306 *BṛĀU*, 4.III.23.
307 *AdS*, p. 752.
308 *AdS*, p. 752.
309 *AdS*, p. 768.
310 *AdS*, p. 769.
311 'undifferentiated and integral mode of mind.' Ibid., p. 288.
312 According to the followers of Madhva, there are five kinds of real differences (*bheda*): that is, those between *jīva* and *jaḍa*, (matter); *jīva* and *jīva*; *jaḍa* and *jaḍa*; *jīva* and *Īsa* (God) and *jaḍa* and *Īśa*. In their view, Brahman is identical with *Īśa*, since they do not believe in the existence of attributeless, unlimited, absolute Brahman.
313 *BhG*, 4.5.
314 *MuU*, 3.I.1.
315 As quoted in *Śaṃkara Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma Sūtra*, 2.3.41.
316 *ŚveU*, 4.V. 'One of the unborns joyfully lies with her (i.e. continually remains involved with *prakṛti*) while another (unborn) having enjoyed her (*prakṛti*) abandons her.' When one person entangled himself with the material world, *prakṛti*, remains involved, another (enlightened) person having had his involvement with the world of enjoyment renounces all.
317 *MuṇḍakaU*, 3.I.1.
318 Ibid., 3.I.3.
319 For example, 'the other, not eating, looks on'. (*tayoranyaḥ anaśnanabhicakāśīti'*) or 'The other who is the Lord.' (*Anyamīśam*). Ibid. 3.I.1 and 3.I.2.
320 The real purport of a scriptural discussion is decided by following clues. (1) introduction, (2) conclusion, (3) drift of the argumentation, (4) repetition of one theme, (5) the novelty of the subject and finally (6) the fruitfulness of the subject.
321 *AdS*, p. 810.

322 *AdS*, p. 511.
323 *AdS*, p. 118.
324 *AdS*, p. 522.
325 *BrS. Śaṃkarabhāṣya*, p. 620. Nirnaya sagar edition.
326 *KaṭhaU*, 5.X.III.
327 *ŚveU*, 4.V.
328 *AdS*, p. 822. As, for example, the *śrutis*, such as '*tat tvam asi*', '*aham Brahmāsmi*', etc.
329 The *śrutis* are divided by the Mīmāṃsakas into two groups (1) *vidhi* and (2) *arthavāda*. *Vidhi* means Vedic injunction or prohibition. The Vedic texts that neither lay an injunction nor, a prohibition are known as '*arthavāda vākyas*'. According to the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* – for example, '*āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt*', *Su*, 1.2.1 – only those *śrutis* that direct activity are valid, and those which do not are not valid by themselves. They further state that the Vedic statements of approval or disapproval (*arthavāda vākyas*) are valid insofar as they co-operate with the idea of corresponding Vedic injunction or prohibition, by presenting either praise or abuse of the theme of the injunction or prohibition.
330 *ChāU*, 6.VIII.7.
331 *BṛĀU*, 1.IV.10.
332 *SB*, on the verse 1 of Śamkara's *Daśaślokī*, (p. 11. Advaita Manjari series.)
333 Ibid., p. 9.
334 *SB*, pp. 9–10.
335 Ibid., p. 9.
336 *Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka Sāra Saṃgraha*, 1.290, p. 218.
337 'In spring a Brahmin should (ritually) stoke the fire; at night he should stoke the *gārhapatya* fire and at daytime *the āhavanīya* fire.'
338 *Tai*, 3.I.1.
339 *MuU*, 1.I.3.
340 *TaiU*, 2.1.
341 *BṛĀU*, 4.III.18.
342 Ibid., 4.III.7.
343 Ibid., 3.IV.2.
344 *SB*. On verse 1 of Śaṃkara's *Daśaślokī*; (p. 14. Advaita Manjari series).
345 *Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka* 1.2.58–61 and *Sāra-saṃgraha* thereon.
346 *SB*. p. 35.
347 *AdS*, p. 832.
348 *AdS*, p. 832.
349 See Chapter 00, for further discussion on the subject.
350 Vide *Nyāyāmṛta*. 2.17.
351 'Two birds . . . ' (*Dvā suparṇā*); and '. . . attains the highest identity' (*paramaṃsāmyam upaiti*), *MuU*, 3.I.1 and 3.
352 For example, '. . . the other of the two, not eating . . . ' (*tayoranyaḥ anaśnan . . .*), '. . . . he other who is the Lord' (*anyamīśam . . .*) ibid., 3.I.1 and 2.
353 *MuU,* I.I.3.
354 *MuU*, 1.1.4.
355 Ibid., 1.1.6.
356 *AdS*, p. 827.
357 *MuU*, 2.1.10.
358 *MuU*, 3.2.8–9.
359 Ibid., 3.1.3.
360 It has been accepted that the true meaning of a scripture is known by six characteristics of its discussion:

1 What it proposes to discuss at the beginning and how cogently the discussion ends.
2 Whether the same topic has been repeated within the text.

3 Whether the subject matter is new.
4 Whether the resulting knowledge makes all other things of the world clearly understood.
5 When the scripture praises the theme, and
6 When the topic is discussed with proper argumentation. Bhāratī Tīrtha, *Vai-yasika-nyāyamālā*, 1.1.4.

361 *AdS*, p. 823.
362 *AdS*, p. 830. 'Although in order to grasp their semantic meaning these two, (difference and non-different) are interdependent, (the latter) being self-evident does not depend on any other (evidence to prove its validity) – '*Śaktigrahādau tayorupajīvyatve'pi svaprameye anupajīvyatvāt*.'
363 *ChāU*. 3.XII.6.
364 *BhG*. 15.7.
365 *AdS*, p. 845.
366 Ibid., p. 846. See also *BS*, 2.III.43. 'Individual is a part (of the Lord) because many (*śruti*) show that fact'; this quotation is the first part of the *sūtra*. The second part refutes this opposing opinion by saying: 'there are other *śruti* conforming identity'. See commentaries of Śaṃkara and Vācaspati Miśra on this aphorism.
367 *AdS*, p. 846.
368 The explanation is based on the theory of reflection (*pratibimbavāda*) offered by Prakāśatman and other followers of Śaṃkara. The theory states that pure consciousness, being reflected on the internal organ, becomes the *jīva* and as this internal organ differs in different bodies, *jīva* is considered to be many (one in each body).
369 *AdS*, p. 848.
370 Ibid., p. 848.
371 Ibid., p. 850.
372 *GGD*, pp, 910–14.
373 *AdRR*, p. I.
NB: At the time of Śrī Harṣa, philosophical thought was greatly influenced by the Naiyāyikas on the one hand, and by the dualistic Vaiṣṇavas on the other. At that time, all philosophers preferred the highly technical and subtle method of argumentation of the Naiyāyikas. Therefore, Śrī Harṣa and his followers adopted the same polemical style for the exposition of their Advaita doctrine.
374 *AdRR*, p. 8.
375 Ibid., p. 9.
376 See Ch. 3.
377 *BṛĀU*. 4.4.19,
378 *AdRR*, p. 5; cf. *Saṃkṣepa śārīraka*, 3. 25.
379 This conclusion shows that Madhusūdana rejects the view of Citsukha that the negation of the universe is a fifth category. Madhusūdana draws upon the Mīmāṃsaka view that the negation of an object in its substratum is identical with the substratum, to prove that the universe is identical with Brahman. See also *AdS*. p. 467.
380 This shows that the Advaita-vedānta school is not a nihilistic school (*śūnyavādin*).
381 *AdS*. p. 657.

5 THE SENTIENT WORLD: *ĪŚVARA, JĪVA* AND *SĀKṢĪ*

382 *SB*, on *Daśaślokī* 8.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid.
386 Ibid.

387 *SB*, on *Daśaślokī* 8, see also, Brahmānanda's commentary.
388 Ibid.
389 Ibid.
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
392 *Vedānta paribhāṣā*, pp. 26–7: *upādhistu kāryānanvaya vyavartaka vartamānaśca*.
393 *SB*, on *Daśaślokī* 8.
394 *VSM*, Ed. Late Col. Arthur Venis, M.A., p. 16.
395 *SLS*, pp. 105–7, Advaita Manjari series.
396 *AdS*, pp. 533–42.
397 Ibid.
398 *SB*, The non-dualist school of Vedānta accepts six beginningless phenomena, of which five are not endless. They are, therefore, not the transcendental Reality, that is, the pure consciousness. This six are: Pure consciousness; the primordial *avidyā; Īśvara; jīva*; the difference between *Īśvara* and *jīva*; and the relationship of *avidyā* with the individual self.
399 *AdS*, p. 539.
400 Ibid., p. 539.
401 Ibid., pp. 539–40.
402 Ibid., p. 541: 'Because one accepts that the collective person is Omniscient, and Omnipotent', (*samaṣṭyabhimānino jīvasya sarvajñatva-sarvakartṛtva-svīkārāt*).
403 *ChāU*, 6. II.3. '*Tadaikṣata vahusyām*.' '(It thought to itself: "Let me become many")'.
404 *AdS*, p. 534.
405 *AdS*, p. 534.
406 Ibid., p. 535.
407 See note 394.
408 *SB* on Śaṃkara's *Daśaślokī* 8.
409 *AdS*, p. 534. *Brahmānandī*.
410 *AdS*, p. 541.
411 *AdS*, p. 541.
412 *AdS*, p. 541.
413 *AdS*, 541. (a) '*prati śarīramahamahamikayā*'; (b) '*vaddho'ham'; iti niścayasya svānubhavasākṣikatvena pravṛtti sambhavāt*.'
414 *AdS*, pp. 541–2. '*Śuddhacitaḥ ekatvena vastuto'saṃsāritve'pi āvaraṇa-vikṣepaśaktid-vayasatis-v-āśritāvidyā-vatsaṃsāritva-kalpakatva-mokṣārtha-yatamānatvā-dyupapatti*.'
415 *Śve*.U, 6.II.
416 *Pañcadaśī*, p. 393.
417 *Citsukhi*, p. 382.
418 *Citsukhi*, p. 376.
419 *SB* on *Daśaślokī* 8. '*Bimba-pratibimbamukhānugatamukhasvarūpavat jīveśvarāṇugatam sarvānusandhātṛ caitanyam sākṣītyucyate*'
420 *AdS*, p. 754.
421 '*Caitanye anāvṛta-viṣayasambandho'vidyāvṛtttidaśāyāmeva*', Gauḍa Brahmānanda on *AdS*, p. 755.
422 *SB* on *Daśaslokī* 8.
423 Bramānanda on *AdS*, p. 755. '*Avidyāvṛttyabhāvakāle sākṣyabhāvāt*.'
424 Ibid., pp. 754–5.
NB: The knowledge of *Sākṣī* is indifferent to either valid knowledge or illusion. Among the objects of exclusively *sāksī*-knowledge, the pleasure, conditional *ajñāna* and *Sākṣī* in the state of deep sleep, and the pleasure, pain, *avidyā*, illusory objects and even empirical cognitions in the waking state, are included. It is interesting to

note that the *anuvyavasāya*, (after-cognition, in which the subject also is presented), of the Naiyāyikas are regarded by the Advaitins as a *sākṣī*-knowledge when they include empirical cognitions in the list of the objects of *sākṣī*-knowledge.

425 *SB* on *Daśaślokī* 8.
426 Ibid.
427 Ibid.
428 Ibid., Cf. *KaṭhaU*, 2.2.
429 *ŚveU*, 6.XIV; *BṛAU*, 3.IV.2 and 3.VII.23.
430 *Avidyā* as the un-manifest material source of the creation is called *avyakta prakṛti*. Following the Sāṃkhya cosmology, Advaita-vedānta too, names it to be the primordial evolving source of the created world. *Avyakta prakṛti* has three constituents called, *guṇa*. These are sattva, which is pure, bright and transparent; rajas, which is energetic, intrepid and dynamic; and, tamas, dark, gross and inactive.
431 *SB* on *Daśaślokī* 1.
432 *SB on Daśaślokī* 8.
433 *BṛĀU*, 2.V.19 and *Bra.bindu U*, 12.
434 *BṛĀU*, 1.IV.7 and *TaiU*, 2.VI.1. It is interesting to note that this type of evidence is known as '*śrutārthāpatti*'.
435 *SB* on *Daśaślokī* 8.
436 *BṛĀU*, 4.III.7, 2.V.19 and 3.V.1.
437 *SB* on *Daśaślokī*, 1. '*paramapremāspadatvena ca tasyānandarūpatvāt'.*
438 Ibid.
439 Cf. '*satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya ahamidaṃ mamedamiti naisargiko'yam lokavyavahāraḥ*', *Brahma-sūtra*, *adhyāsa-bhāsya*, by Śaṃkarācārya.
440 *SB* on *Daśaślokī* 8.
441 Ibid.
442 Following Yogic ideas, Madhusūdana adopts this view, which also *Vivaraṇa* follows. *AdS*, pp. 558–9.
443 *AdS*, p. 558. The author of the *Vivaraṇa*, follows the *Yoga-sūtra* (I. 10), 'sleep is the supporting mode of absence', [and thus] accepts the condition of deep sleep to be a form of the [*avidyā*-] mode which is characterised by *tamas guṇa* and the quality of covering [everything]. ('*Vivaraṇakāraistu, "abhāva-pratyayālambanavṛttirnidrā" itiyogasūtrāṇusāreṇatamoguṇātmakāvaraṇamātrālambanakācidvṛtti suṣuptirityabhipretya*', etc.
444 Brahmānanda's commentary on *SB*, on *Daśaślokī* 8. '*avasthājñānākāram saṃskāratāpannajā-gratsvapnaviṣayakam anādi jīveśabhedādiviṣayakam ca yadavasthārūćpam-ajñānam tadviṣayakam*').
445 Ibid.
446 Ibid., '*samūhālambanaikavṛttyā nirvāhe vṛtti-trayakalpane gauravāt.*'
447 *AdS*, p. 558.
448 *SB* on *Daśaślokī* 8.
449 'When the tip of the hair is split into a hundred parts, and one of those parts further into a hundred parts – the individual soul (*jīva*), on the one hand, is the size of one such part, and, on the other, it partakes of infinity.' *ŚveU*, 5.9.
450 'Crossing across this [gross] body, he goes to that region' (*so'smāccharīrādutkramya amūmlokamadhigacchati*), etc. *AdS*, p. 851.
451 '. . . he leads them to Brahman.' (*sa etān Brahma gamayati*). *ChāU*, 4.15.5.
452 'And this is the immense and unborn self' (*sa vā eṣa mahānaja ātmā*) etc. *BṛĀU*, 4.4.25.
453 'He is this eternal, who pervades all, is static and devoid of movement . He is always existent' (*nityaṣ sarvagataḥ sthānuracalo 'yam sanātana.*) *BhG*, 2.24.
454 *AdS*, p. 853.

6 MATERIAL WORLD AND COSMOGONY

455 *SB* on *Daśaślokī* 4, 9 and 10.
456 *AdS*, p. 503. For understanding Madhusūdana's argumentations establishing the falsity of the created world three concepts of the causal relationship between the material cause and the resultant object is necessary. The Naiyākas believe that an object does not exist prior to its creation from its material cause. This is known as *ārambha-vāda*. The Sāṃkhya philosophers believe that an object remains dormant in its material cause, which evolves into the resultant object. This theory is known as *pariṇāma-vāda*. Advaita-vedānta holds that an object is a distorted projection of its cause, mistakenly considered to be a created object. This view is known as *vivarta-vāda*. See Ninian Smart, *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 189–94 and 235–40.
457 *AdRR*, p. 2.
458 Ibid.
459 Ibid. (*Eka sāmagri ekameva kāryam janayalīti svabhāvasya kalpanāt*).
460 *Adrṣṭa* is the karmic predestination that always regulates every worldly event.
461 *AdRR*, p. 2.
462 Ibid., p. 3.
463 *AdS*, p. 757. Also cf. *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali*, p. 117.
464 *TaiU*, 3.I. 1. 'That from which these beings are born; on which, once born, they live; and into which they pass upon death – seek to perceive that. That is Brahman.' cf, Tai, 2.7.1. 'In the beginning this world was the non-existent, and from it arose the existent. By itself it made a body (atman)' (*asat vā idamagra āsit, tato vai sadajāyata tadātmānam svayam akuruta*.)
465 Vide. *Siddhānta leśa-saṃgraha*, p. 61. 'possessing within oneself the cause that produces an effect' (*svātmani kāryajani hetutvam*).
466 *AdS*, p. 757.
467 Ibid.
468 *AdS*, p. 757. Also the commentary *Laghucandrikā* thereon.
469 *AdS*, p. 758.
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid.
472 *Lagucandrikā* on *AdS*, p. 758.
473 *AdS*, p. 759.
474 Ibid.
475 'I establish the distinctions of name and appearance.' (*Nāmarūpa vyākaravāni*), *ChāU*, 6.III.2.
476 *AdS*, p. 759.
477 Ibid.
478 *AdS*, p. 759, 'Possessing the knowledge that is conducive to create objects.' (*Kāryānukula jñānavattva*).
479 *AdS*, p. 79. This is, in fact, *Sākṣī*, the revealer of the physical objects.
480 *TaiU*, 3.I.1, 'That from which these beings are born; on which, once born, they live; and into which they pass upon death… '
481 *ChāU*, 6.III.2.
482 *TaiU*, 2.VI.1.
483 Ibid., 2.VI.1.
484 Ibid., 2.VII.1.
485 *AdS*, p. 762.
486 *ChāU*, 6.II.3; Ibid. 6.II.3.
487 *TaiU*, 2.VII.1.
488 Ibid., 2.VII.1.

489 *AdS*, p. 763.
490 'The cosmic elements are emitted from an existent entity'. [The reason for this conclusion is that:] 'These are characterised by [both] having identity with the Real [i.e., existent] and having various changes.' (*Mahabhūtāni sadvastuprakṛtikāni, satsvabhāvānuraktatve sati vividhavikāratvāt*). 'Just like an earthen ware, which always retains its nature of earthen-ness even when it may take a variety of shapes', (*mṛdanusyūtaghaṭādivat*), *AdS*, p. 764.
491 'Brahman is said to be the (material) cause (of all) because It always abides in ignorance, which is the material cause of the illusion of duality' (*asya dvaitendrajālasya yadupādāna-kāraṇam / ajñānam, tadu-pasṛitya Brahma kāraṇamucyate*). Quoted in *AdS*, p. 757.
492 *Saṃkṣepaśārīraka*, 1.319.
493 *VSM*, p. 117.
494 Puruṣottama's commentary on *SB*, 54, (GOS). Cf. *BhāP*, 3.26.16–18 ('*antaḥpuruṣarūpena kālarūpena yo vahiḥ)*; and *BhG*, 10.33 ('*ahamevākṣayaḥ kālo*').
495 S. Gupta, *Lakṣmī Tantra*, p. XXIII.
496 *SB* on *Daśaślokī* 8.
497 Ibid.
498 'One hears about his highest and truly diverse power – his natural knowledge, strength and actions' (*Parāsya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāvikī jñānabalakriyā ca), ŚveU*, 6.VIII.
499 *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, ch. 1, p. 23. *Anantasaranasanskṛtagranthāvali*, Vol. 5.
500 Ibid.
501 *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha. Vizianagram Sans* series, Vol.V, p. 62.
502 Ibid., p. 63.
503 *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 23.
504 *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgrapha*, pp. 62–3.
505 Cf. 'the knot of heart is unravelled' (*Bhidyate hṛdaya granthi), MuU*, 2/8.
506 *AdS*, p. 603.
507 *AdS*, pp. 597–603. (*Ahaṃkāro hi anubhavāmītyātmānubandhyanubhavasyāham kartetyacidanubandhikartṛtvādeścāśrayaḥ cidacitsamvalanātmakatvādadhyastaḥ*).
508 *SB*, pp.179–80.
509 *SB*, p. 180.
510 The phenomenon darkness is important in the Advaita-vedānta's argumentation for recognising *avidyā* as a positive phenomenon and not just the negation of knowledge. At the introductory sentence of his commentary on the *BrS*. Śaṃkara makes an analogy between *avidyā* and darkness.
511 *SB*, 9, p. 181. According to some philosophers the sense of speech is a product of light because there is a statement in the *Upaniṣad* confirming that view ('*tejomayī vāk' ChU VI.5.4*). However, Madhusūdana states that as it manifests the sense of sound, which is the essence of space, this organ should be a product of space.
512 Ibid., p.183. The seventeen organs in combination are known as the *linga*, because by this combination the existence of self in indicated. This self remains ignorant and undergoes the cycle of birth and death.
513 Vide, *GD*, on *BhG* VII. 7.
514 *ChāU*, 6.III.3. *Trivṛtam trivṛtam ekaikam karavāni.*
515 *SB* on *Daśaślokī* 8.
516 Ibid.
517 *SB* on *Daśaślokī* 8.
518 Ibid.
519 Ibid.
520 See discussion on the person (*jīva*) and on knowledge above.

7 ADVAITA-VEDĀNTA SALVATION

521 *AdS*, pp. 302–3; 'At that time [i.e. the time of self realisation], the revelation is itself bliss; it is not the revelation *of* bliss.' (*tadā hi ānandam eva prakāśo' na tu ānandasya prakāśatvam*).
522 *AdRR*, p. 23.
523 *VKL*, p. 28. 'Therefore it is said that, having realised that self is un-differentiated Bliss, the one and only existent reality, [one gets one's] ignorance removed.' (*tasmād akhaṇḍānandādvitīya caitanyasanmātra ātmā jñātaḥ san avidyānivṛttirityucyate. atraiva sarvapumārtha viśrānti*).
524 As mentioned before, this shows that Madhusūdana himself does not believe in the theory of a fifth kind of reality belonging to the cessation of *avidyā*. *AdS*, p. 467.
525 *BṛĀU*, VI.5.6. 'It is one's self which one should see and hear, and on which one should reflect and concentrate. For by seeing and hearing one's self, and by reflecting and concentrating on one's self, one gains the knowledge of this whole world'.
526 *VKL*, p. 64.
527 *MuU*, III.2.9. 'He who comes to know that highest *Brahman*, he himself becomes that very *Brahman*.'
528 *ChāU*, 8.3.2.
529 *ChāU*, 6.8.7.
530 *BṛĀU*, 1.4.10.
531 *VKL*, p. 91.
532 *VKL*, p. 91.
533 *VKL*, pp. 91–2.
534 *GGD*, on *BhG*. III. 18.
535 Ibid. See also Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*, books 2 and 3.
536 Ibid.
537 Ibid.
538 This gradual development of the degree of intensity of meditative trance (*samādhi*) is described in the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali book 2 and 3.
539 *BhāP*, 3.29.37–8.
540 *GGD*, on *BhG*. III. 18.
541 *AdS*, pp. 891–2.
542 *AdS*, pp. 890–2.
543 *GGD* on *BhG*. III. 18.
544 Ibid.
545 *AdS*, pp. 893–4.
546 *TaiU*, 2.I.
547 *AdS*, p. 895. '*Brahmvidāpnotiparam'ityādau avāpter Brhma-rūpatvāt sāyujyasyāpi tadrūpatayāngīkaraṇīyatvāt*.'
548 The *Bhāgavata* holds that there are five kinds of *mukti*, namely s*ālokya, sārṣṭi, sāmīpya, sārūpya* and *sāyujya* or *ekatva*. *Sālokya* means sharing the same living place with God; *sārṣṭi* means possessing powers similar to God; *sāmīpya* is living near to God as His companion; *sārūpya* is attaining God's form marked by conch, disk, mace and lotus; *ekatva* or *sāyujya* means being identical with God.

Two verses from the *BhāP* may be quoted in this connection:

(a) '*Sālokyasārṣṭisāmīpyasārūpyaikatvam apyuta*
Dīyamānam nagṛnhante matsevanam janaḥ.'
3.29.13.

(b) '*Naikātmatām me spṛhayanti kecit*
Matpadasevābhirata madīyaḥ

ye'nyo'nyato bhāgavatāḥ prasajya
sabhājayante mama pauruṣāni.'
3.25.34.

8 *BHAKTI*

549 *SB* on *Daśaślokī* 9.
550 See chapters five and six.
551 For the historical background see Hardy, pp. 560–2.
552 See Hardy, p. 561.
553 In Varanasi where he spent most of his life, there still exists a temple of Gopāla where tradition alleges, Madhusūdana did his daily worship.
554 S. Gupta, 1991; See the *GGD* on *BhG* XII. 3–4; also cf. 'O slayer of Madhu! Tasting the mead oozing from your lotus feet my mind remains intoxicated.' *GGD* on the *BhG*, X.42.
555 *BhP*, III. 29.11–12.

madguṇa śrutimātreṇa mayi sarva-guṇāṣaye
manogatiravicchinnā yathā gaṅgāmbghaso 'mbudhau.

556 *BhR*, I. 3. and annotations thereon. Cf. *BhP*, I. 7. 10.
557 *BhP*, III. 2. 8–10.
558 *BhP*, XI. 3. 31.

Smarantaḥ smārayantaśca mitho' ghaughaharaṃ Harim
Bhaktyā sañjātayā bhaktyā bibhratyutpulakām tanum.

See Śrīdhara's commentary on this statement.
559 *ŚBhS*, 1.1.2.
560 Commentary on *ŚBhS*, 1.1.2.
561 *NBhS*, 276.
562 *BhP*, VII. 5. 23–24. These are *śravaṇa, kīrtana, smaraṇa* (incessantly remembering Viṣṇu), *pādasevana* (serving His feet), *arcana* (worshipping Him with offerings), *vandana* (singing His laudation), *dāsya* (becoming His bond slave), *sakhya* (cultivating his loving friendship) and finally *ātmanivedana* (totally dedicating one's own self to the Lord).
563 See P.C.De, *Bengal Vaishnavism*, passim.
564 *BhRS*, I.1.11.
565 Ibid.
566 Jīva Gosvāmī's commentary on *BhRS*, I.1.11.
567 *BhRS*, I. 2. 1; see also Jīva Gosvāmī's commentary thereon.
568 *BhP*. III. 25. 25.

satāṃ prasaṃgāt mama vīrya-saṃvido bhavanti hṛtkarṇa-rasāyanaḥ kathāḥ tajjoṣanād-āśvapavarga vartmani sáraddhā-rati-r-bhakti-r-anukramiṣyati.

569 Commentary on *BhRS*, I. 2. 2.; and Ṣaṭsandarbha, p. 450
570 *BhRS*, I. 2. 4–5; I. 2. 69–71.
571 *Ṣaṭsandharbha* 451.
572 *BhRS*, I. 4. 1ff.
573 Ibid., I.4.1. The *prema-bhakti* is defined by Rūpa as:

samyaṃmasṛṇitā-svānto mamatvātiśayāṃkitaḥ
bhāvaḥ sa eva sāndrātmā budhaiḥ premā nigadyate.

When one's mental disposition is saturated (by love) and developed a great sense of the object of love being one's very own, it is called *bhāva*, (meaning a permancent disposition of mind). When this mental disposition becomes dense and saturates the whole personality of the devotee, the learned calls it *prema*.

574 Ibid., I. 4. 2.
575 *Ṣaṭsandarbha*, p. 718.
576 Ibid., p. 450. See Jīva's commentary on BhRS I. 4. 2–5.
577 *Ṣaṭsandarbha*, p. 718. See also *BhRS*, I. 4. 9 –12, and Jīva's commentary thereon.
578 See Gerow Paul, David Haberman and Gerald Carney passim.
579 *BhR*, I. 3.

drūtasya bhagavaddharmād-dhārāvāhikatāṃ gatā|
Sarveśe manaso vṛtti-r-bhakti-r-ityabhidhīyate||.

'*Bhakti* is that mode of mind which due to the practice of *bhagavaddharmas* has melted, and which is constantly flowing towards the Lord of all.' Cf. the *Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇa, Śrīkṛṣṇajanmakhaṇḍa*, part 2, Anandashrama Sanskrit series nr. 102, ch. 34, 7–16, p. 608, which gives a graphic description of how perfect aesthetic enjoyment melted not only the minds of the celestials at Vaikuṇṭha, who had been listening to Śiva's song and music, but their entire personalities became fluid. Lord Nārāyaṇa collected the liquid inside his heaven and then restored the celestials back to their normal selves. The accumulated liquid became the river Gaṅgā.

580 Rāmānuja's commentary on Brahma-sūtra 1.1.1 and IV. 1.1.
581 See previous chapter.
582 *BhP*, X, (first half). 29. 14–15.
583 *BhR*, I. 7.
584 *BhR*, I. 8.
585 See *Nāṭyaśāstra* ch.VI.
586 *BhR*, I. 9–10.
587 *Vibhāvānubhāva vyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ*. NŚ, VI. 32.
588 See Chapter 5.
589 *BhR*, I. 10.
590 It may be noted that Madhusūdana is here exploiting the epistemological concept of *vṛtti-jñāna* to explain the experience of *bhakti*. Cf. Chapter 3.
591 *BhR*, I. 3.
592 See Chapters 3, 4 and 7.
593 Although Thomas A. Forsthoefel does not mention Madhusūdana and his exposition on the experience of bhakti, his work on the epistemology of religious experience in the non-dualist context is very interesting.
594 See Chapters 2, 3 and 4 for explanation of the experience in deep sleep.
595 Auto-commentary on *BhR* I.13.
596 *BhR*, I. 13 and the autor's self-commentary.
597 *VKL*, p. 65.
598 *GGD*, on *BhG* XVIII. 66.
599 *AdS*, p. 893.
600 *AdS*, pp. 894–5. 'The word *sāyujya*, however, indicates the state of difference.' (*Sāyujya śabdastāvat vibhaktatvabhāvābhiprāyaka*).
601 *BhR*, I. 1. Self- annotation on it.
602 These are knowledge to distinguish between real and false experiences; total disinclination to any form of enjoyment; acquiring the mental stability and peace to follow the way of a righteous, and finally deep craving for salvation. See, Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I. C.U.P. Reprint 1969. pp. 489–90.

603 *BhR*, p. 4.
604 *GGD* on *BhG* IV. 10.
605 *BhP*, 1.7.10.
606 It may be noted that in his exposition of the stages, he corroborates everywhere his own viewpoint by apt quotations from the *Bhāgavata Puraṇa*.
607 *BhR*, p. 79.
608 *BhR*, p. 63.
609 *BhR*, p. 116.
610 *BhR*, pp. 83–90.
611 *BhR*, p. 4. See *GGD*, Introductory verses 3–10, and S.K. Gupta (tr.), p. XIV.
612 *BhP*, 7.5.23–4.
613 *BhR*, p. 156. '*Virahāsahiṣṇutātmā prītiviśeṣaḥ-ratirnāma*.'
614 *BhR*, p. 116.
615 *Ṣaṭsandarbha* (*prītisandarbha*), pp. 738 and 741.
616 *Dhanyāloka*, (*kasi samskrit* series), p. 38.
617 *BhP*, 3.25.25.

> '*satām prasaṅgān-mama vīryasaṃvido*
> *bhavanti hṛtkarṇarasāyanaḥ kathāḥ*
> *tajjoṣanādāśvapavargavartmani*
> *śraddhā-ratir-bhaktiraṇukramiṣyati*'

618 *BhP*, 3.9.38.
619 *BhP*, 1.2.39.
620 *BhP*, 11.3.32–3.
621 *BhP*, 11.11.29–31.
622 *BhP*, 7.4.36–7.
623 *BhP*, 1.2.7. '*Vāsudeve Bhagavati bhaktiyogaprayojitaḥ janayatyāśu vairagyam jñānañca yat ahaitukam*.'
624 *BhP*, 10.31.4, 10.31.15, 10.32.2.

> (a) '*na khalu gopikānandano bhavān*
> *akhiladehinām-antarātmadṛk*', etc.
> (b) '*aṭati yadbhavān anhi kānanam*
> *truṭiryugāyate tvāmapaśyatām*', etc.
> (c) '*Tāsāmāvirabhūcchauriḥ*', etc.

625 *BhP*, 10.31.15 and *BhR*, p. 116.
626 *BhP*, 9.4.18–21.
627 *BhP*, 3.25.37; 11.9.21–3.
628 *BhP*, 10.19.16; 10.31.15; 10.29.9–11.
629 *BhR*, pp. 105 and 119.
630 *BhR*, p. 26.
631 See *Yoga-sūtra*, I.15.
632 *BhP*, 10.29.15 and 7.1.29.
633 *BhR*, p. 121.
634 *BhR*, p. 137.
635 *BhR*, p. 121.
636 *BhR*, pp. 124–5. This means the sentiment of love (śṛngāra) in separation (vipralambha) due to peeve (māna).
637 *BhR*, p. 127.
638 *BhR*, pp. 127–8.
639 *BhR*, p. 129.
640 *BhR*, p. 130.

641 See Ch. 6.
642 *BhR*, II. 29–30.
643 *BhR*, II. 59
644 *BhR*, II. 59–60.
645 *BhR*, II. 34.
646 *BhR*, II. 68–69.
647 *BhR*, II. 72.
648 *BhRS*, 1.2.131–52.
649 *Kāvya Prakasa*, Poona, Bhandarka edition, pp. 474–5 and *Dhanyaloka*, Benaras edition, pp. 207–8.
650 *Kavyaprakāśa*, p. 474.
651 *Dhanyāloka*, op.cit.
652 *BhR*, pp. 129, 130 and 134.
653 *TaiU*, 2.6. and 2.9.
654 *BhR*, pp. 35–7.
655 *BhR*, p. 168.
656 *BhR*, III. 4–5.

> '*kāvyārthaniṣṭhā ratyādyaḥ sthāyinaḥ santi laukikāḥ*
> *tatbodhṛniṣṭhastvapare tatsamā' pyalaukikāḥ*
> *bodhya-niṣṭhā yathāsvam te sukhaduḥkhādi hetavaḥ*
> *bodhṛniṣṭhāstu sarve' pi sukhamātraika hetavaḥ*.'

657 *BhR*, III.9–10.
658 *BhR*, III. 7–9.
659 *BhR*, III.11.
660 *BhR*, III. 12. '*Bhāvatritaya-saṃsṛṣṭa sthāyibhāvāvagāhinī samūhālambanātmaikā jāyata sāttvikī matiṣ*.'
661 *BhR*, III.12.
662 *BhR*, III.22.

> '*nityaṃ sukhamabhivyaktaṃ "raso vai saḥ" iti śruteḥ*
> *pratītiḥ svaprakāśasya nirvikalpasukhātmikā*.'

663 The concluding verse 1 in *GGD* on *BhG*, XVIII.
664 *GGD*, on *BhG*, X. 42.
665 Note the pun in the expression 'destroyer of Madhu' which is also his own name.

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